Martin Heidegger is widely considered one of the most controversial and influential philosophers of the twentieth century, his influence extending to the works of several philosophers, as well as in important philosophical schools such as existentialism and phenomenology. At the same time, his philosophy is also regarded as notoriously difficult, highly idiosyncratic and often even obscure. It is considered that there are several ways of reading Heidegger, which, in turn, is due to the existence of several ‘Heideggers’, the major distinction being the one that happened with die Kehre, or, ‘the turn’. This turn, which began in the 1930s, marks a departure from the earlier Heidegger and the beginning of a philosophical approach that separates his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927), from subsequent works.
Table of Contents
1. The development of logic
2. Problems for the concepts of correctness
3. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper examines Martin Heidegger's critique of the historical transformation of the concept of "logos" as presented in his work Introduction to Metaphysics. It explores how the original meaning of "logos" as "gathering" was distorted over time, leading to its identification with logic, assertion, and reason, which in turn contributed to a fundamental restriction in the understanding of Being.
- The historical shift of "logos" from gathering to assertion and logic.
- The impact of this transformation on the concepts of truth (aletheia) and correctness (orthotes).
- Heidegger's critique of the "logical prejudice" in Western philosophy.
- The relationship between the restriction of Being and the development of formal logic.
- The philosophical implications of attempting to think beyond current logical limits.
Excerpt from the Book
The development of logic
Before we begin to outline Heidegger’s account of the development of logic, perhaps it would help to clarify in what context and why the origin of logic is traced in the Introduction of Metaphysics. In chapter four, Heidegger undertakes to elucidate four aspects against which Being is delimitated – what he calls Being and the Other – which, according to him, are: seeming, becoming, thinking and the ought. Out of the four, Heidegger holds that thinking is by far the most important because it represents the other three divisions to itself, as well as standing against Being much like an object – Gegen-stand - that which stands against.
To Heidegger, thinking is fundamental to understanding the meaning of Being because the two used to be one before they came to stand against each other, hence understanding thinking would consequently lead one closer to understanding the original meaning of Being. This means an investigation into the concept of thinking becomes essential. It is here that logic comes in, for logic is crucial to thinking as the two have come to be considered the same one with the other. As Heidegger puts it: ‘It [logic] is the science of thinking, the doctrine of the rules of thinking and the forms of what is thought’.
Chapter Summaries
The development of logic: This chapter outlines how Heidegger traces the evolution of "logos" from its original pre-Socratic meaning of "gathering" to its eventual identification with logic and the faculty of thinking.
Problems for the concepts of correctness: This section examines the implications of the reduction of truth (aletheia) to mere logical correctness (orthotes) and how this transformation serves to restrict the understanding of Being.
Conclusion: The final chapter synthesizes Heidegger's critique, suggesting that while his analysis may rely on logical principles, it successfully challenges us to move beyond the constraints imposed by formal logic to reconsider the fundamental question of Being.
Keywords
Heidegger, Metaphysics, Logos, Being, Logic, Correctness, Aletheia, Orthotes, Truth, Thinking, Pre-Socratic, Phusis, Assertion, Gather, Philosophy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental focus of this paper?
The paper examines Martin Heidegger's critique of the historical development of logic and its role in narrowing the philosophical understanding of Being, as presented in his 1935 lectures collected in Introduction to Metaphysics.
What are the central thematic fields?
The central themes include the etymological and conceptual transformation of "logos", the relationship between truth (aletheia) and correctness (orthotes), and the historical restriction of the concept of Being in Western philosophy.
What is the primary research goal?
The primary goal is to outline Heidegger’s account of how the original meaning of "logos" was lost through a process of distortion, and how this loss forced a shift toward viewing truth as mere correctness, thereby limiting our access to Being.
Which scientific method is applied?
The paper utilizes a hermeneutical approach, specifically Heideggerian exegesis of pre-Socratic fragments (e.g., Heraclitus, Parmenides) and a critical review of the historical development of logical terminology.
What topics are discussed in the main body?
The main body covers the transition of "logos" from a designation of gathering to a designation of assertion, the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian thought on this shift, and the resulting philosophical implications for truth and the "logical prejudice."
Which keywords characterize the work?
Key terms include Heidegger, logos, Being, logic, correctness, aletheia, orthotes, truth, and the critique of logical prejudice.
How did the meaning of "logos" change according to the text?
According to Heidegger, "logos" originally meant "gathering" in the pre-Socratic sense, but was subsequently reduced to "word," "discourse," "assertion," and finally identified with the rules and science of thinking (logic).
Why does the author argue that Heidegger’s critique is potentially paradoxical?
The author notes a potential paradox because Heidegger uses logical arguments and language to critique the very development of logic, an issue that some scholars, such as Dahlstrom, have highlighted as a point of tension in his work.
What is the significance of "physis" in this context?
In the pre-Socratic understanding described by Heidegger, "physis" was associated with Being as an emerging, abiding sway; its later reduction to a mode of "idea" in Platonic philosophy marks the beginning of the decline and the restriction of the concept of Being.
Does the paper conclude that Heidegger rejects logic entirely?
No, the paper concludes that Heidegger is not rejecting logic itself, but rather challenging humanity to think beyond the limits imposed by formal logical principles to reopen the inquiry into the nature of Being.
- Citar trabajo
- William Fujii (Autor), 2008, Being, logic and correctness: An enquiry into Heidegger's "Introduction to Metaphysics", Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/203251
