The South African government’s preservation of apartheid during the 1970s was confronted with contradictory dilemmas. The need for permanent semi-skilled, rather than unskilled migrant labour, for a capitalist economy contradicted the apartheid policy of development in separate spheres: serious urban unrest, illustrated by the Soweto riots in 1976 when 575 people were killed, forced the realisation that repression alone was unsuccessful in quelling black agitation and that reform of the apartheid system was required, whilst the introduction of hostile governments in neighbouring states removed South Africa’s buffer zone protecting it from African clamour for the overthrow of apartheid. This ‘Total Onslaught,’ perceived as being orchestrated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, threatened to replace South African apartheid with Marxist communism by overrunning white supremacists with a black proletariat. Under the emergent leadership of Pieter Willem Botha, the government adopted an all-encompassing policy of regional security measures with concomitant domestic reform between 1978 and 1984 to provide the “resolution of the conflict in the times in which we now live” that demanded “inter-dependent and co-ordinated action in all fields. It is therefore essential that a total national strategy” is “formulated at the highest level.”
Table of Contents
1. Re-organisation of government and the role of the military
2. Formulation of the National Security Management System (NSMS)
3. Deployment of Joint Management Centres
4. Militarisation and the State Security Council (SSC)
5. The campaign to ‘Win Hearts and Minds’ (WHAM)
6. The Confederation of Southern African States (CONSAS)
7. The failure of CONSAS and the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
8. Destabilisation of southern African states
9. South African strategy towards Angola
10. Tricameral parliament and reform of the constitution
11. Reform of African labour
Research Objective and Scope
This essay evaluates the effectiveness of the South African government's 'Total National Strategy' (TNS) between 1978 and 1984, examining its attempts to combat the perceived 'Total Onslaught' through a combination of domestic reform and regional security measures.
- The restructuring of the South African state apparatus and the role of the security establishment.
- The regional foreign policy strategy, including the proposed Confederation of Southern African States (CONSAS) and destabilisation tactics.
- The political and social impact of internal reforms, such as the tricameral parliament and labour law changes.
- The response of internal resistance movements and the international community to the TNS framework.
Excerpt from the Book
The failure of CONSAS and the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
The failure of CONSAS did not mean the end of South Africa’s pursuit of regional stability by economic, military and diplomatic means to neutralise and destabilise southern African states. The aim of this process of destabilisation was to create economic hardship, political disaffection in some states and the replacement of governments in others with more amenable regimes in order to coerce these states into entering formal economic and diplomatic pacts with South Africa, together with dissipating the support in neighbouring countries for the ANC. As Johnson and Martin amply demonstrate, the use of South African economic levers and military strength successfully overwhelmed the Frontline States. For example, the apogee of TNS regional success was the Nkomati Accord of 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique which was achieved “by way of military action …. and as well by way of diplomatic action,” thereby coercing the Mozambique government to undertake not to allow “its soil to be used as a springboard for terrorist activities from Mozambique into the Republic of South Africa” To achieve this goal South Africa covertly supported the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) in a campaign of violence to destabilise President Samora Machel’s hostile FRELIMO government. Official figures estimate that the MNR destroyed 840 schools, 12 health clinics, 174 health posts and 900 shops, kidnapped 52 foreign technicians, murdering 12, with an estimated financial burden on Mozambique of $3.8 billion dollars by 1982. TNS was therefore effective in destabilising states such as Mozambique by sponsorship of insurgency movements such as MNR thereby forcing Mozambique to acquiesce to pressure and sign the Nkomati Accord.
Summary of Chapters
Re-organisation of government and the role of the military: Explains how the state executive and security establishment were strengthened under P.W. Botha to centralize control.
Formulation of the National Security Management System (NSMS): Details the creation of the NSMS in 1979 as a framework for managing the state's security apparatus.
Deployment of Joint Management Centres: Describes the extension of the security infrastructure into regional and local levels to monitor threats.
Militarisation and the State Security Council (SSC): Analyzes how the SSC became a central policy-making body, merging political and military spheres.
The campaign to ‘Win Hearts and Minds’ (WHAM): Discusses the contradictory nature of attempting social upliftment through military personnel in townships.
The Confederation of Southern African States (CONSAS): Outlines the regional plan to create an economic bloc under South African hegemony.
The failure of CONSAS and the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Explains why neighboring states rejected CONSAS, leading to the creation of the SADCC.
Destabilisation of southern African states: Evaluates the shift toward aggressive regional destabilisation to coerce neighboring regimes.
South African strategy towards Angola: Examines the military and political intervention in Angola to counter Soviet influence and preserve control over Namibia.
Tricameral parliament and reform of the constitution: Discusses the 1983 constitutional reforms and the resulting racial polarization and unrest.
Reform of African labour: Analyzes the failed attempts to co-opt an urban African middle class through labour and economic policy adjustments.
Keywords
Apartheid, Total National Strategy, Total Onslaught, P.W. Botha, State Security Council, Militarisation, CONSAS, SADCC, Destabilisation, Tricameral Parliament, United Democratic Front, African National Congress, Constructive Engagement, Reform, Coercion
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper examines the effectiveness of the 'Total National Strategy' (TNS) implemented by the South African government between 1978 and 1984 to maintain apartheid while countering perceived existential threats.
What are the primary thematic areas covered?
The primary themes include state restructuring, militarisation of policy, regional foreign policy (CONSAS and destabilisation), and internal domestic reforms regarding constitutional and labour laws.
What is the central research question?
The essay explores how effective the 'Total National Strategy' was in combating the perceived 'Total Onslaught' threat from the Soviet Union and regional liberation movements.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The paper employs a critical historical analysis, synthesizing secondary source material and official government documents to evaluate the policy's outcomes versus its stated intentions.
What does the main body of the work cover?
It details the reorganization of the state, the shift toward military dominance in policy-making, the failure of regional economic hegemony, and the unintended consequences of internal social and political reforms.
Which keywords best characterize the work?
The work is defined by terms such as Apartheid, Total National Strategy, Militarisation, Destabilisation, and Reform.
How did the militarisation of the state impact the policy objectives?
The militarisation distorted the political aims of TNS, as the security establishment's reliance on coercion ultimately undermined the credibility of the government's reform efforts.
Why did the Confederation of Southern African States (CONSAS) fail?
It failed because neighboring states perceived South African apartheid as inherently undesirable and preferred to build their own economic cooperation (SADCC) to reduce their dependence on South Africa.
What was the outcome of the tricameral parliament reform?
The reform failed to achieve multi-racial power sharing; instead, it exacerbated racial tensions, alienated the black majority, and led to the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF).
How did 'Constructive Engagement' affect the South African government?
The Reagan administration's policy of 'Constructive Engagement' provided the South African government with diplomatic room to maneuver, though it eventually waned as the lack of progress toward ending apartheid became undeniable.
- Citation du texte
- Murray Baird (Auteur), 2008, How effective was the policy of ‘Total National Strategy’ in combating the perceived threat from the ‘Total Onslaught’?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/203306
