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Institutional Design of Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany

German Politics and Culture

Titre: Institutional Design of Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany

Essai , 2011 , 11 Pages

Autor:in: Görkem Ercan (Auteur)

Politique - Système politique de l'Allemagne
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Résumé Extrait Résumé des informations

In 1949, the Basic Law was written in Germany in order to keep certain aspects according to certain rules. This literature review examines certain historical events and defines which instruments exist in the Basic Law to prevent those historical events from happening again. Furthermore, it includes constitutional norms, which then are applied to Lijphart’s (1999) question of whether the Consensus Model of Democracy or the Westminster Model of Democracy is better. The paper then discusses pros and cons of the mentioned models that are mentioned and concludes with a decision towards one of the two.

Extrait


Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Historical Context of the Basic Law

3. Theoretical Framework: Dahl and Lijphart

4. Comparison of Political Models: Westminster vs. Consensus

5. Critical Evaluation and Conclusion

Objectives and Key Themes

This paper examines the institutional design of German democracy, specifically analyzing the Basic Law as a mechanism to prevent historical failures such as the Weimar Republic and the Holocaust. It evaluates whether the German Consensus Model of Democracy effectively achieves democratic ideals compared to the Westminster Majoritarian Model.

  • The historical formation and intent of the German Basic Law
  • Application of Arend Lijphart’s democratic typologies
  • Comparative analysis of the Consensus and Westminster models
  • The relationship between proportional representation and political stability
  • Reflections on constitutional design and democratic resilience

Excerpt from the Book

Lessons Learned: Institutional Design of Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany

To begin with, it is important to mention that Germany is a country with a concrete historical situation having “the idea of forming an association to achieve a certain ends; or what is more likely, they want to adopt an already existing association to undertake these tasks” (Dahl, 1989, p. 106). On July 1948, the three Western Allied powers held a meeting in Frankfurt with the Ministerpräsidenten of the various states in order to draft a constitution for the three Western zones, which “was then to be placed before the electorate for approval”. Instead, the state executives decided to create a document named a “Basic Law” rather than a constitution. This Basic Law was completed after nine Months in May 1949 (Conradt, 2004, p.15). The Basic Law is a document that states the population’s rights and restrictions. Also the Basic Law includes penalties for non-compliance. The idea of the Basic Law is that people follow the Laws, respecting what it states in order to avoid certain historical events such as the failure of the Weimar Republic and the Holocaust. According to Dahl (1989), who wrote the piece of work A Theory of the Democratic Process, a good democracy should have certain items: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding and control of the agenda.

Summary of Chapters

Introduction: Provides the foundational context regarding the post-war creation of the German Basic Law as a preventive measure against historical political failure.

Historical Context of the Basic Law: Explores the motivations behind drafting the Basic Law in 1949 and why it replaced the previous Weimar Constitution.

Theoretical Framework: Dahl and Lijphart: Introduces Robert Dahl’s criteria for good democracy and Arend Lijphart’s typology of democratic models.

Comparison of Political Models: Westminster vs. Consensus: Details the structural differences between the Majoritarian and Consensus systems regarding executive power, electoral systems, and constitutional rigidity.

Critical Evaluation and Conclusion: Analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the German model, concluding with personal reflections on potential improvements for democratic stability.

Keywords

Basic Law, Consensus Model, Westminster Model, Democracy, Germany, Weimar Republic, Constitutional Design, Proportional Representation, Lijphart, Dahl, Political Institutions, Federalism, Human Rights, Parliamentary System, Majoritarianism

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the primary focus of this research paper?

The paper focuses on the institutional design of German democracy and how the Basic Law serves to prevent a recurrence of historical democratic failures.

Which theoretical frameworks are used in the analysis?

The author utilizes Robert Dahl’s theory of democratic processes and Arend Lijphart’s typology distinguishing between Consensus and Westminster models of democracy.

What is the central research question?

The paper explores whether Germany’s adoption of the Consensus model is ideal or if a transition toward the Majoritarian model would better serve democratic goals.

What methodology is applied?

The paper employs a literature review and a comparative institutional analysis of political systems.

What content is covered in the main body?

The main body contrasts the Westminster model's concentration of power with the German Consensus system's emphasis on coalition, federalism, and constitutional rigidity.

Which keywords characterize the work?

Core keywords include Basic Law, Consensus Model, Westminster Model, Proportional Representation, and Constitutional Design.

Why was the "Basic Law" chosen over a traditional "Constitution" in 1949?

The document was named "Basic Law" rather than "Constitution" to emphasize its provisional nature and to distinguish it from the failed Weimar Constitution.

How does the paper view the multi-party system in the context of German history?

The author expresses skepticism regarding a multi-party system, suggesting that it might weaken stability and could potentially allow small, extremist parties to gain undue influence.

Fin de l'extrait de 11 pages  - haut de page

Résumé des informations

Titre
Institutional Design of Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany
Sous-titre
German Politics and Culture
Université
Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH  (FY)
Cours
German Politics and Culture
Auteur
Görkem Ercan (Auteur)
Année de publication
2011
Pages
11
N° de catalogue
V229467
ISBN (ebook)
9783656453192
ISBN (Livre)
9783656453895
Langue
anglais
mots-clé
institutional design democracy federal republic germany german politics culture
Sécurité des produits
GRIN Publishing GmbH
Citation du texte
Görkem Ercan (Auteur), 2011, Institutional Design of Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/229467
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