The United States of America under President John F. Kennedy showed almost no military reaction after the raising of the Berlin Wall. They sent more troops together with Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to West Berlin, but there was no intention to reopen the border. Instead the US Government tried to get into negotiations with the Soviet Union about the status of West Berlin. This decision avoided transforming the Cold War into a Hot War, but it also manifested the separation of East and West Germany and made the unification in the near future less likely. The decision helped to establish another socialist state in Europe and locked up 17 million Germans within the borders of East Germany.
This paper will focus on the question why President Kennedy and his main advisers decided the way they did. Did they fear the military strength and the use of the Soviet nuclear arsenal? Or did they think they could reach better results by negotiating? Or did they just trade the eastern part of Germany against a secure status quo for West Berlin? Maybe the situation was seen more as a chance for stability than as a threat?
The basic information for this research will come from the Digital National Security Archive. The original documents should show who gave information to President Kennedy and his advisers. Who were the talking heads during the decision-making process? Who had the most influence? Was it only an inner-American process or were other allies involved, too?
An interesting question is, if there is a change between the evaluation of the situation before and after the raising of the Berlin Wall. So this research will compare some documents before and after the crisis.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Research Questions
3. A Military Response as an Option?
4. The Image of the Enemy
5. The Call for Propaganda
6. Travel Restrictions as Reprisals
7. Negotiations
8. Unification or Status Quo?
9. Groupthink?
10. Other Views
11. Conclusion
12. Bibliography
Research Objectives and Themes
This paper investigates the decision-making process of the United States administration under President John F. Kennedy following the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, specifically examining why the U.S. opted for diplomatic negotiation over military confrontation.
- Analysis of U.S. foreign policy strategies during the Berlin crisis.
- Evaluation of the influence of presidential advisers on high-stakes decision-making.
- Investigation into the potential application of "Groupthink" theory within the Kennedy administration.
- Assessment of propaganda opportunities and containment strategies during the Cold War.
- Comparison of internal administration perspectives using archived National Security documents.
Excerpt from the Book
3. A Military Response as an Option?
The United States were not ready to fight a war against the Soviet Union about the East German territory. The documents of the two weeks before the closing of the border show that Kennedy’s adviser were just thinking about the strategy for negotiations about the status of Berlin and East Germany (DNSA - Breakfast with the Secretary of State, August 2, 1961; Berlin Negotiations and Your Meeting with Mr. Rusk at 4 p.m., August 3, 1961; Berlin Negotiating Papers for Hyannis Port, August 11, 1961).
When border was closed and the Berlin Wall was built, it was the President who thought most about the use of military. Only one day after the incident, he wrote a memo to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to inform him about his view that the military capacity of the United States must be increased: “With this weekend’s occurrences in Berlin there will be more and more pressure for us to adopt a harder military posture. […] I do not think we can leave unused any of the men or money that was offered by the Congress with the exception perhaps of the bomber money. […] I am concerned that we move ahead as quickly as possible on Civil Defense,” (DNSA - Berlin Situation Will Increase Pressure to Take a Harder Military Posture, August 14, 1961). He was not even sure if the military strength of the United States alone would be enough to deal with the situation. To McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk he wrote on the same day: “In relation to the Berlin situation, I should appreciate a report on how we are progressing in obtaining commitments from our NATO allies to increase their military forces,” (DNSA - Allied Commitments for Berlin, August 14, 1961). What he feared were further threats from the Soviet Union. He wanted to have all options for adequate response.
Chapter Summaries
1. Introduction: Outlines the historical context of the Berlin Wall's construction in 1961 and the initial delayed reaction of the Western Allies.
2. Research Questions: Defines the focus on President Kennedy's decision-making process and the shift from potential military response to diplomatic negotiation.
3. A Military Response as an Option?: Examines the administration's assessment of military capabilities and the President's initial concerns regarding defense readiness.
4. The Image of the Enemy: Analyzes how the characterization of the East German regime as weak influenced the decision to avoid direct conflict.
5. The Call for Propaganda: Explores the strategic use of the wall to advance American ideological messaging against the Soviet Union.
6. Travel Restrictions as Reprisals: Discusses the internal debate regarding non-military counteractions against the Eastern Bloc.
7. Negotiations: Details the internal disagreements within the administration over the timing and strategy for diplomatic talks with the Soviet Union.
8. Unification or Status Quo?: Addresses the conflict between supporting German reunification and maintaining the status quo to prevent escalation.
9. Groupthink?: Evaluates the decision-making environment using Cottam's theory to determine if consensus-seeking impaired objective judgment.
10. Other Views: Reviews external scholarly perspectives that corroborate the finding that military force was never intended.
11. Conclusion: Summarizes that the crisis was managed through rational political calculation rather than psychological bias or Groupthink.
12. Bibliography: Lists the primary and secondary sources, including documents from the Digital National Security Archive.
Keywords
Berlin Wall, John F. Kennedy, Cold War, United States, Soviet Union, Groupthink, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Propaganda, German Reunification, Decision-Making, National Security, Crisis Management, Status Quo.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this study?
The study examines the U.S. government's policy response to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the decision-making process that led to a diplomatic rather than a military resolution.
Which thematic fields are central to the analysis?
The primary themes include crisis management, Cold War geopolitics, the role of presidential advisory groups, and the strategic use of propaganda and diplomatic negotiations.
What is the primary research question?
The research asks why President Kennedy and his advisers ultimately rejected military action, focusing on whether they feared Soviet nuclear strength or preferred the stability of the status quo.
What methodology is employed?
The author uses historical analysis of primary documents sourced from the Digital National Security Archive, supplemented by existing literature on political psychology and historical crisis narratives.
What does the main body cover?
It covers the timeline of the crisis, the debate over military posture, internal administration conflicts regarding negotiations, and an evaluation of the "Groupthink" phenomenon during the decision-making phase.
Which keywords define this work?
Key terms include Berlin Wall, Cold War, Kennedy, Diplomacy, Groupthink, Foreign Policy, and National Security.
How does the author test the 'Groupthink' hypothesis?
The author compares the specific decision-making process during the Berlin crisis against the six indicators of Groupthink defined by Cottam, such as self-censorship and mindguards.
What role did Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson play according to the text?
Johnson was sent to West Berlin to bolster morale and reported on the opportunity to contrast Western freedom with the repressive nature of the Soviet-backed regime.
How did the relationship between Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy influence the policy?
The text notes that Kennedy frequently favored the approach of his National Security Adviser, Bundy, due to the perceived bureaucratic limitations of the State Department under Rusk.
- Citation du texte
- Patrick Buck (Auteur), 2006, United States’ reactions after the raising of the Berlin Wall, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/229530
