Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Table of figures
2 Civil-Military Co-Operation
2.1 Civil Military Cooperation - NATO concept
2.2 Civil-Military Coordination - UN-Concept
2.2.2 Humanitarian Principles
2.3 Arising Conflicts
3 The Essence of Decision: Organizational Theory applied to the Cuban Missile Crisis
3.1 The Essence of Decision - Background
3.1.1 Approach towards an Application of Organizational Theory
3.1.2 Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis
126.96.36.199 Deployment of Soviet Missiles in Cuba
188.8.131.52 Organizational Implementation
3.2 Organizational Theory
3.2.1 Bureaucracy Theory
3.2.2 Scientific Management
3.2.3 Contemporary Bureaucracy Theory: James March and Herbert Simon
3.2.4 The Human Relations Movement
3.2.5 Contingency Theory - Joan Woodward
3.3 Organizational Culture
4 Case Study Peregrine Sword
Table of Contents V
4.1 Purpose of the Exercises
4.2 Procedure of the Exercises
4.3 Background of the Exercises: “Tytan” Conflict
5 Application of the Organizational Theory
5.1 Critical Incidents
5.1.1 Bad communication
5.1.2 Unimportant NGOs
5.1.4 Overzealous military
7 List of References
7.2 Articles and Documents
7.4 Unpublished Sources
8 Further Reading
Civil-military cooperation has been becoming increasingly important in peace-keeping and natural disasters. An effective cooperation between civil and militaryactors facilitates the integrated mission in the specific host country.For this reasonboth civil and military actors developed guidelines on how civil-military cooperationshould ideally work.
There are, however, conflicts that arise between civil and military actors. Due to different objectives of the organizations, there are disputes on how things should be done. There has already been research on how to analyze the differences and how to solve them but a solution has not been found yet.
In this bachelor thesis the Organizational Theory Modell is presented to explain theese conflicts. The Organizational Theory Modell is used by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow to explain events that happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This approach to explain international conflicts is so far unique.
During the zivil-military exercises of the first German-Netherlands Corps, one of thetraining objectives was to train civil-military cooperation. Also during these exercises,conflicts occurred between the civil and the military side. To make the conflicts betterunderstandable the method of critical incidents of Alexander Thomas is used. Heuses this method to describe critical incidents between different cultures. The methodof critical incidents is changed in this paper and applied on civil and military actors.After the description of the situations the situations are analyzed with theOrganizational Theory Modell.
Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit ist seit einigen Jahren ein immer wichtigeres Thema bei Friedensmissionen und Naturkatastrophen. Die gelungene Koordination von zivilen und militärischen Akteuren beschleunigt und verbessert die Arbeit in dem jeweiligen Einsatzland.
Deswegen haben sowohl zivile als auch militärische Akteure Richtlinien entwickeln wie die zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit für die jeweilige Organisation idealerweise ablaufen sollte.
Allerdings gibt es auch einige Konflikte, die immer wieder zwischen der zivilen undder militärischen Seite auftreten. Durch die unterschiedlichen Zielvorstellungen derOrganisationen, kommt es oft zu Auseinandersetzungen wie bestimmte Dingeerledigt werden sollten. Diese Konflikte wurden schon einige Male versucht zuinterpretieren, aber die Konflikte zwischen zivilen und militärischen Akteurenpassieren immer noch.
Um diese Konflikte zu erklären, wird in dieser Bachelorarbeit das Organisationstheoriemodell vorgestellt, das Graham Allison und Philip Zelikow in ihrem Buch „the essence of decision“ verwenden um die Ereignisse während der Kubakrise zu erklären. Noch nie zuvor wurde die Organisationstheorie dafür verwendet internationale Konflikte zu erklären.
Während der zivil-militärischen Übungen des ersten deutsch-niederländischen Korpswurde unter Anderem zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit geübt. Allerdings erschienenauch dort Konflikte zwischen der zivilen und militärischen Seite. Die Methode vonAlexander Thomas eignet sich dazu kritische Interaktionssituationen zwischenverschiedenen Kulturen darzustellen. Um die Konflikte besser vorstellen zu können,wir die Methode von Alexander Thomas abgeändert und dann auf zivile undmilitärische Akteure angewendet. Die Situationen werden im Anschluss mit derOrganisationstheorie analysiert.
Table of figures
Figure 1: Civil-Military Cooperation in peace-time and combat
Figure 1: Correlation between Organizational Culture, Operational Activity and Routines
illustration not visible in this excerpt
For the last twenty years, civil-military relations during a humanitarian interventionhave been a common sight. There have, however, been countless conflicts andproblems in these interactions between civilian and military actors. Theseproblems not only hamper the relationship between the actors but also slow downthe whole humanitarian or military mission in a country. There is a considerableamount of literature about the different issues arising between the civil andmilitary side and also suggestions on how to resolve them. A perfect solution forthe problems of civil-military interaction has not yet been found and would appearoverly simplifying.
The number of papers on this issue indicates that the conflicts should be looked upon from a different perspective than it has been done during the last decades. This bachelor thesis will focus on a theory to explain international conflicts that has first been used by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in their book Theessence of decision: Organizational theory.
When people talk about international conflicts, they mostly talk about actors ororganizations as if they were one person: “Berlin says…”, “The Hamasattacked…” or “The military does…” What they actually mean are wholeorganizations. Even though, leaders of organizations can influence the directionof an organization, it is impossible for a leader to control everything in a bigorganization. It is the same when people try to explain a conflict between civil andmilitary actors. It is easy to find a scapegoat for a problem but is it really alwaysthe fault of one single actor? Thus, for example, a one soldier, who was trying tofulfill an assignment which was set on the strategic level or is it rather a complexinteraction within the organization?
This paper will try to analyze the conflict as Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow didit in their book The essence of decision. In this book, the authors take threedifferent approaches to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis: The rational actormodel, the Organizational Theory Model and the Government Politics Model.
While the Rational Actor Model is rather common interpretation for internationalconflicts, the Organizational Model is a model that has hardly been used for this.
To make the conflicts better understandable, this paper uses the same approachthat Alexander Thomas applies in his books about intercultural communicationand competence.1 Alexander Thomas wrote a number of books about differentcountries in which he uses the method of critical incidents to describe interactionsbetween people from two different nations. This paper will take the method ofcritical incidents, as described by Fiedler, and change them accordingly so thatthey can be applied on critical incidents between civil and military actors.
This paper does not try to explain every kind of conflict that can happen between the civil and the military side. There are multiple factors that influence civil and military interaction and it is nearly impossible to evaluate all of them. Since this theory is not commonly used to explain international conflicts, the perspective provides a fresh look on old conflicts.
This paper tries to facilitate civil-military interaction by providing an explanation forthe conflicts. It is a lot easier to prevent conflicts if the actors gain more insightinto the problems and conflicts, for example, if they know how organizationsgenerally work and make their decisions. Additionally, workers within anorganization might understand how both their own and other organizations work.
This bachelor thesis first describes the civil-military cooperation phenomenon withfocus on the NATO CIMIC concept and the UN CMCoord concept. Then theOrganizational Theory Model is introduced. To illustrate this model, the work ofGraham Allison and Philip Zelikow in their book The Essence of decision isintroduced and one example is used to show how they applied the OrganizationalTheory on an international event. After that, the two case studies, namely the civil-military exercises “Peregrine Sword” and “Quick Sword” are presented. The setting of the case studies is presented for a better understanding of the conflicts that occurred during these exercises. Subsequently, the conflicts are introduced and an attempt is made to explain them according to the method that Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow used.
2 Civil-Military Co-Operation
Civil-Military Cooperation or Coordination describes the interaction betweenmilitary and humanitarian actors, mostly during an integrated mission. Militaryactors can include the military that undertakes the mission in another country butalso the host nation military. Civil actors include humanitarian actors like IOs,NGOs and GOs and also the local population or the host nation government.
Civil-Military Cooperation is a concept that has been used since World War II. TheAmerican army used a concept which was called “Civil Approach” during WorldWar II to “maintain law and order, manage the flow of refugees, prevent diseaseand exploit the host”.2 After the occupation in Europe and during the Cold Warera, however, the experience and the knowledge of the civil affair concept, werelost.
It was not until the 1990s that some NATO member states integrated a CIMICsection in their military. The necessity of a concept like Civil-Military Co-operationarose after the Cold War. The conflicts that the international community facedwere no longer inter-state wars. Instead conflicts became more frequent andmore complex. As Sebastiaan Rietjens states “emergencies are said to becomplex, because mostly they are caused by a combination of natural and man-made factors”3
In addition, NATO undertook some changes itself after 1999. During the Cold Warera, NATO only served as a defense alliance. At the end of the 1980s it faced thechoice of intervening in conflicts “out of area”4 to promote security anddemocracy. The threat of “oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”5 got more actors involved than the wars before. Nowadays, the conflicts are“predominantly intra-state disputes and civil wars.”6 The concept of CIMIC hasbeen changing with every new conflict that arose and will be bound to furtherchange in the future.
To solve a conflict is no longer the task of the military alone but there are manymore actors.7 Therefore NATO introduced a new concept, the concept of the“Comprehensive Approach” (CA). In the Comprehensive Operational PlanningDirective (COPD), NATO acknowledges the need for an approach to conflictresolution in complex emergencies8 that includes civil as well as military actors.9
With this change it became increasingly important for the military to link itself with civil organizations to better understand and handle situations in integrated missions. Integrated missions are missions in which military as well as civilian actors participate. Civil-Military Cooperation is used during humanitarian disasters, like the Pakistan earth-quake10 as well as in stabilization and reconstruction missions, like in Afghanistan11.
There have been many disputes about the term of CIMIC but nowadays it ismainly used to describe the military concepts of civil-military cooperation and within the military only the contacts on a tactical-strategic level.12 The UN refrains from using the term Civil-Military Cooperation and uses the term civil-military coordination (CMCoorD)13 instead.
In this paper the term CIMIC is used to describe the NATO concept. For the general meaning the term Civil-Military Cooperation is used.
2.1 Civil Military Cooperation - NATO concept
There are many different kinds of CIMIC. Each country has its own guidelines and approaches to the concept. Of course, humanitarian organizations14 have a different view on civil-military co-operation than the military has. The EU and the NATO, for instance, both have a military doctrine on which tasks CIMIC should have. The doctrines are used for guidelines for the respective member states. The guidelines, however, are very general. In addition to that, most NATO and EU member states have a CIMIC doctrine of their own.15
This paper, however, will focus on the CIMIC concept of NATO, since the case study is conducted in a NATO environment.
In 1997, NATO recognized the need of a CIMIC concept.16 After the NATO mission IFOR (Implementation Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1995 to 1996, a new CIMIC doctrine originated.
NATO’s definition of CIMIC is as follows:
“The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies."17
Within complex emergencies, CIMIC is a part of the NATO force and “the link tothe civil environment”18. In the COPD, NATO states that “NATO has norequirement to develop capabilities […] for civilian purposes”19 and therefore itneeds to cooperate with civil partners to operate more effectively during complexemergencies.
CIMIC has three main purposes. The first task of CIMIC is to coordinate the civil-military relations. To achieve this, it is important to build up relationships on thestrategic as well as on the tactical level.20 Secondly, CIMIC should support thearmed forces. Due to their relations with civil actors, CIMIC can help createsituational awareness, to establish connections to the local populations and toaccess resources in the country of mission. The last point is that CIMIC shouldsupport the civil actors with their reconstruction tasks. The support ofhumanitarian organizations, however, always has to be in line with the mandate ofthe military mission. Every single action that CIMIC undertakes has to help tocontribute to the mission’s success.21
CIMIC might not behave as a military actor, hence the guideline of the NATOCIMIC doctrine to “be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary!”22, but itserves a military purpose, namely to achieve the stable desired end-state.23
Additionally, NATO also installed a website for CIMIC, the “CIMIC Centre ofExcellence (CCOE)”. The mission of this Centre of Excellence is to assist NATOand civil institutions in the field of civil-military cooperation by providinginformation, training and by contributing “to the lessons learned processes”24 TheCIMIC Fusion Center (CFC), a part of the CCOE, is a platform where “open-source unclassified information between civilian and military workers”25 is shared.The platform provides current news, maps, weekly reviews and reports ofcountries of interests, for instance Afghanistan or Mali. Besides information aboutthe countries that civil and military actors are involved in, there is a civil-militarydocument exchange where important information about civil-military concepts canbe found. For the civil actors, for example, there is the NATO CIMIC doctrineavailable for download, for the military staff on the other hand, the UN Civil-Military Coordination Concept.
2.2 Civil-Military Coordination - UN-Concept
Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) is the term which the UN uses for CivilMilitary relations. The United Nations implemented a set of guidelines which humanitarian actors should follow when they are interacting with the military. Due to the change of nature of conflicts, humanitarian disaster relief became increasingly dangerous for humanitarian workers.
Therefore, it is understandable that in some crises humanitarian organizationsseek the help of the military to provide security for the humanitarian workers.26
According to the International Standing Committee (IASC), it is important whencivilian actors cooperate with the military that the humanitarian principles arebeing upheld.27 The primary reason in complex emergencies for humanitarianorganizations is to bring support to those who need the most help. The concept ofcivil-military relations can range from coexistence to cooperation. In each crisis ithas to be decided case-by-case how the nature of civil-military relations will be.
illustration not visible in this excerpt
Figure 1: Civil-Military Cooperation in peace-time and combat28
This graph shows the different kinds of coordination between civil and military actors. During a peace-time mission, when it is less dangerous for civil actors to be seen collaborating with the military, they can openly cooperate in humanitarian assistance.29 The more violent and dangerous a conflict is, the more dangerous it is for humanitarian actors to be associated with the military. Therefore, in a combat-like situation it is preferable for humanitarian organizations to have a mere coexistence with the military.
The UN CMCoord Concept states: “Even in the worst situations, a minimumamount of liaison is required in order to protect personnel and assets.”30 This isthe opinion of the UN but this cannot be applied on all humanitarianorganizations. Since there is a huge variety of NGOs and IOs which are involvedin humanitarian aid, the goals and practices of humanitarian organizations alsodiffer greatly. While the UN states that civil-military cooperation is essential on amission, there are a number of NGOs which prefer to have no relation with themilitary at all.
Another important point of the UN guidelines is that military support to humanitarian assistance should be a last resort.31 The use of military means only comes into use when the HOs are overwhelmed and cannot deal with the situation without support from the military.
UN OCHA demands furthermore that humanitarian operations in which militaryand civilian actors collaborate should always be under the command of ahumanitarian organization.32 Operations should always be clearly of a military or acivilian purpose, so that humanitarian organizations do not become victims ofviolence.
2.2.2 Humanitarian Principles
It is crucial for humanitarian organizations that the humanitarian principles are notviolated when they interact with the military. The Humanitarian principles are asfollows:
“Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particularattention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and theelderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities ortaking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as toethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the sufferingmust be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases ofdistress.” 33
2.3 Arising Conflicts
There are a number of conflicts which arise during civil-military operations. It isonly natural that there are a number of problems when actors utterly differentinteract with each other. There are main challenges that arise when civilianscommunicate with the military.34 First, there are different organizational cultures,their goals are different. The goal of the humanitarian actors is to alleviate humansuffering.35 They do not distinguish between adversaries or allies but they givehelp to the people who need it most. Military actors are always on a specificmission. It might include humanitarian help but only if it serves to achieve thedesired end-state of the mission.36
Another big issue is that Civil-Military relations pose a threat to the humanitarianprinciples of the IOs and NGOs. If they cooperate with the military, they are nolonger neutral or impartial. There is a fine line between coordinating with themilitary and remaining neutral. Another point is the security of the organizations.
1 Cf. Thomas, Alexander; Kinast, E.U.; Schroll-Machl, S. (2003): Handbuch Interkulturelle Kommunikation Und Kooperation: Band 1: Grundlagen Und Praxisfelder: Vandenhoeck + Ruprecht Gm., p. 197
2 Rietjens, Sebastiaan; Joost Henrikus (2008): Managing civil-military cooperation. Burlington, p.9- 10
3 Rietjents (2008), p.1
4 Rehse, Peter (2004): CIMIC: Concepts, definitions and practice. Hamburg: IFSH (Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, 136), p.25
5 NATO (ed.) (1999): The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, para. 3
6 Rehse (2004): p.11
7 Cf. Erhart, Hans-Georg (2007): Civil-Military Co-operation and Co-ordination in the EU and in selected Member States. Ed. of Policy Department External Policies. European Union. Brussels, p.1
8 Definition of complex emergency: “A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/ or the ongoing United Nations country program.” IASC (2004). p.5
9 Cf. NATO (ed.) (2010): Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive. COPD Interim V1.0. NATO, p. 1-2
10 Cf. NATO (2013): Terminated operations and missions, para. 8
11 Cf. NATO (2013): Current operations and missions, para. 1
12 Cf. Pradetto, August (2011): Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit und “Comprehensive approach” im Kontext post-bipolarer Weltordnungspolitik, p.13-15
13 United Nations (ed.) (2005): United Nations (UN) Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Concept. Endorsed by the Interagency Standing Committee Working Group, at its 60th meeting in Rome, on 22 March 2005. Rom, p.1
14 Humanitarian organizations include United Nations-Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, the Red Cross Movement, and other international organizations and governmental organizations
15 Cf. Rietjens (2008), p.6
16 Cf. Ibid., p.6
17 NATO (ed.) (2003): AJP-9. NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine. In the following quoted as NATO CIMIC Doctrine, p.1-1
18 Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (ed.): CIMIC Field Handbook, p.5
19 NATO (ed.) (2010), p.1-2
20 Cf. Meyer, Christian Wilhelm; Vogt, Marcus Juri (ed.) (2003): CIMIC-Faktoren I: Militärische Aspekte. Speyer.Aspekte, p.111
21 Cf. NATO CIMIC Doctrine, p.1-1
22 Meyer; Vogt (ed.) (2003), p.43
23 Cf. Sucharipa, Ernest (2003): Cooperation in peace operations. The United Nations and Europe : 33rd IPA Vienna seminar. Wien: Diplomatische Akad. Wien.EU, p.83
24 Civil-Military Co-peration Centre of Excellence (2011), para. 2 http://www.cimic-coe.org/home/about.php
25 Civil-Military Fusion Centre, para. 1 https://www.cimicweb.org/CMO/Pages/CimicWebHomePage.aspx
26 Cf. IASC (ed.) (2004): Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies. An IASC Reference Paper. Unites Nations, p.3
27 Cf. IASC (Ed.) (2004), p.8
28 Own graphic based on IASC (Ed.) (2008): Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies. Unites Nations. New York., p.9
29 IASC (ed.) (2008): Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies. Unites Nations. New York, p.9
30 IASC (ed.) (2003): Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. Unites Nations, p.14
31 Cf. IASC (ed.) (2004), p.10
32 Cf. IASC (ed.) (2003), p.9
33 Ibid., p.8
34 Cf. Haufevik, Kristin M., Carvalho, Benjamin de (2007): 718 Working Paper. Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations. Discussion Paper on operational Terminologies and Assessment. Hg. v. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. OsloCivilMilitary Cooperation in multinational and interagency operations, p.8
35 Cf. IASC (2004), p.8
36 NATO (ed.) (2003), p.1-1
- Quote paper
- Julia Krebs (Author), 2013, The Application of the organizational theory on civil-military Co-operation, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/231396