The enlargement of the European Union is scheduled for May 2004, only a few weeks from today. While all the political treaties are signed, the accession parties are prepared as big media events and the decision of ten new members entering the Union is widely accepted, there are quite a few issues that have not been discussed thoroughly enough yet; and public opinion as well as party politics do show some traces of Euroscepticism here and there. Although the mainstream voice in the Western countries is warmly welcoming their neighbours to the East, fears of economic loss through their entrance are keeping publics in the ‘old’ member states critical concerning the future. The new members to the East on the other hand are regularly portrayed as welcoming the idea of joining the Union without even the slightest concerns – not only by the media but also by numerous scholars. After all, it’s them who will profit from the enlargement. They almost seem desperate. This essay will show however that Euroscepticism is not a purely Western phenomenon. Publics in the candidate countries do have fears and concerns that often overshadow their genuine approval of the European integration process as well as their Western neighbours. These public opinions are also mirrored in party-based Euroscepticism that in some countries even raised single- issueanti- EU parties. This essay will now focus on two countries that encompass two completely different types of Euroscepticism. First, there is Poland, which has always been seen as the country wanting to join the European Union the most desperately.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Introduction
- Development of Euroscepticism
- Poland
- The Czech Republic
- Reasons for Eurosceptic tendencies
- The EU accession-process
- Transition losers
- Independence and influence in Europe
- The 'German Factor'
- Conclusion
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This essay aims to explore the development and reasons behind Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe, focusing on Poland and the Czech Republic. It examines the transition from enthusiastic support for EU membership in the early 1990s to a more nuanced and sometimes critical stance in recent years.
- The evolution of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe.
- Contrasting Euroscepticism in Poland and the Czech Republic.
- Factors contributing to Eurosceptic tendencies in the region.
- The distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism.
- The role of public opinion and party politics in shaping Euroscepticism.
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
The introduction sets the context for the analysis, highlighting the shift in public opinion and political discourse towards Euroscepticism. It argues that Euroscepticism is not solely a Western phenomenon and that the candidate countries also harbor concerns about European integration.
Chapter two examines the development of Euroscepticism in Poland and the Czech Republic. It provides data on the decline in support for EU membership and highlights key differences in the nature of Euroscepticism between the two countries.
Chapter three explores various reasons for Euroscepticism in the region, including the EU accession process, the impact on transition losers, the desire for independence and influence, and the role of the "German Factor."
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
This essay focuses on Euroscepticism, EU membership, Central and Eastern Europe, Poland, Czech Republic, public opinion, party politics, accession process, transition losers, independence, influence, "German Factor," hard Euroscepticism, soft Euroscepticism.
- Citation du texte
- Birte Müller-Heidelberg (Auteur), 2004, Comparing Euroscepticism in Poland and the Czech Republic, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/26879
