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The Delegation Mandate of the European Central Bank during the Euro-Crisis

A Principal-Agent Analysis

Titre: The Delegation Mandate of the European Central Bank during the Euro-Crisis

Thèse de Bachelor , 2014 , 25 Pages , Note: 1,7

Autor:in: Tony Müller (Auteur)

Politique - Sujet: Union européenne
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On September 6, 2012, the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, announced that the ECB "will do whatever it takes […] to preserve the euro" (Draghi, 2012b). Due to the unfavorable economic situation and the emerging fear of an involuntary break-up of the Eurozone, the Governing Council decided to launch the OMTs program that would allow the ECB to buy unlimited government bonds from countries of the Eurozone on the secondary market. This announcement led to a subject of considerable political debate across the world. It is with this background in mind that the research question arises: Did the European Central Bank exceed its mandate by announcing the bond-buying program, outright monetary transactions (OMTs)? This paper will show that the principals’ preferences heterogeneity with regard to different crisis solution approaches changes when it comes to the survival of the Eurozone. Thus, the agent was given more discretion to do everything to defend the Euro as a common goal. The aim of this contribution is to answer the research question from a principal-agent perspective, not to provide a jurisprudential or economic analysis of the issue. Therefore, the decision of the German Federal Constitution Court will not be included in the following work. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The first part gives a brief introduction to the main assumptions of the PA approach. The next chapter discusses the ECB as an institution, together with the framework and the design of its mandate to consider the level of autonomy of the ECB and which gaps in the policy-making authority could occur. The third part outlines the technical features of the announced OMTs program to see if the bond-buying program is in accordance with the mandate. Then, the debate on this program from a PA perspective becomes the focus. The final chapter summarizes the paper.

Extrait


Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)

  • Introduction
  • The Principal-Agent Approach
  • The European Central Bank
  • The Outright Monetary Transactions Program
  • The Debate from a Principal-Agent Perspective
    • The Preferences of the Agent - ECB
    • The Preferences of the Principals - Member States of the Eurozone
    • Did the ECB Exceed Its Mandate by Announcing the OMTS Program?
  • Conclusion

Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)

This paper aims to analyze the European Central Bank's (ECB) bond-buying program, Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), from a principal-agent perspective. The study seeks to determine whether the ECB exceeded its mandate by announcing this program in the context of the Euro-crisis. Key themes explored in the paper include:
  • The principal-agent framework in EU institutions
  • The ECB's mandate and its autonomy
  • The preferences of the ECB and the Eurozone member states
  • The potential conflict of interest between the ECB and its principals
  • The impact of the OMTs program on the Eurozone crisis

Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)

The paper begins with an introduction outlining the context of the Euro-crisis and the research question. It then provides an overview of the principal-agent approach, a framework used to analyze the relationship between actors with different preferences and interests. The following chapter explores the ECB as an institution, examining its mandate and its level of autonomy. The focus is on identifying potential gaps in the ECB's policy-making authority that might have allowed for the implementation of the OMTs program. The third chapter outlines the technical features of the OMTs program, analyzing whether the bond-buying program aligns with the ECB's mandate. This analysis considers the potential conflicts of interest arising from the ECB's actions. The fourth chapter focuses on the debate surrounding the OMTs program from a principal-agent perspective. It investigates the preferences of the ECB (the agent) and the Eurozone member states (the principals) in relation to the Euro-crisis and the OMTs program.

Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)

This paper focuses on the European Central Bank (ECB), its mandate, and the principal-agent framework. Key topics include the Euro-crisis, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) program, the preferences of the ECB and the Eurozone member states, and the potential conflict of interest arising from the ECB's actions.
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Résumé des informations

Titre
The Delegation Mandate of the European Central Bank during the Euro-Crisis
Sous-titre
A Principal-Agent Analysis
Université
Dresden Technical University
Note
1,7
Auteur
Tony Müller (Auteur)
Année de publication
2014
Pages
25
N° de catalogue
V277592
ISBN (ebook)
9783656705031
ISBN (Livre)
9783656710615
Langue
anglais
mots-clé
ECB Euro-Crisis Principal-Agent European Central Bank
Sécurité des produits
GRIN Publishing GmbH
Citation du texte
Tony Müller (Auteur), 2014, The Delegation Mandate of the European Central Bank during the Euro-Crisis, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/277592
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