Table of Contents
II. The Relevant Case Law
A. Supporting Cases
1. Emilio Augustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain – the seminal case
(a) Exhaustion of local remedies condition
(b) Fork in the road clause
(c) Choice of a particular arbitration forum
(d) Precisely stipulated arbitration rules
2. Siemens A.G. v Argentine Republic
3. Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v Argentine Republic
4. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v Argentine Republic
5. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. and AWG Group Ltd. v Argentine Republic
B. Rejecting Cases
1. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States
2. Salini Costruttori v Jordan
3. Plama Consortium Ltd. v Republic of Bulgaria
4. Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Republic of Hungary
III. The general Ability of MFN Clauses to invoke dispute settlement mechanisms
IV. The Scope of a MFN Clause in a Particular Case
A. Is International Arbitration more Favourable than Dispute Settlement before the Domestic Courts of the Host State?
B. The Ejusdem Generis Principle – a First Coarse Filter
C. The Interpretation of a MFN clause
D. Distinction between procedural obstacles and the creation of jurisdiction
Since 1959, the year in which the first Bilateral Investment Treaty (hereinafter BIT) was concluded, the number of BITs has increased to roundly 2500. The rapid growth of that number spells out the outstanding role BITs nowadays play in the global investment protection regime. The purpose of such BITs is to enlarge private investors’ range of rights and minimize legal insecurities in order to make an investment profitable at all. However, it is not only the investor that profits from the BIT, but also the capital importing country (host country), since the higher level of protection guaranteed by such a BIT might create a crucial incentive for the investor to invest his money in that country.
Typically the host country has not only entered into a BIT with one country but a number of other countries as well. Due to numerous reasons the BITs concluded by the host country often differ in their wording, scope and the guaranteed range of rights. Such a difference is the necessary premise for the operation of any MFN clause. Say for example that the host country has entered into one BIT with country A and one with country B. The first BIT requires investors that want to acquire real property in the host country to be granted permission by the competent Ministry whereas investors from country B do not have to comply with such a requirement pursuant the second BIT. Clearly the second BIT favours investors from country B with the result that investors from the different countries objectively compete on a different level, since investors from country A face more legal restrictions than investors from country B do. In order to prevent such a discrimination and to ensure a balanced competition in the country’s market with equal opportunities for all market players almost all BITs provide for a so-called Most-Favoured-Nation clause (hereinafter MFN clause). Subject to certain limits such a MFN clause, in principle, operates as follows: as soon as the host state accords a more favourable treatment to a third party in another BIT (third party treaty) the party of the basic treaty can rely on the MFN clause to demand the same treatment. Hence, the most favourable treatment agreed upon with one state automatically sets up the standard for the treatment of any other country given that its BIT contains a MFN clause. Consequently, in the above example, investors from country A can invoke the MFN clause to bypass the permission requirement not provided for in the BIT with country B. What is important to note is that the investor in the example seeks to rely on the MFN clause in order to obtain a substantial right. Although it might be problematic as to what extent a basic treaty can be altered by the operation of MFN clauses, it is commonly accepted that they principally can allow for the incorporation of more favourable substantial rights. However, most BITs do not only address substantial matters but provide for dispute settlement procedures as well. Since a host state’s BITs do not always contain the same dispute settlement mechanisms, it was only a question of time when investors would try to invoke MFN clauses in order to bypass the dispute settlement regime in their basic treaty which they regarded as less favourable than the one in the third party treaty. It was the year 2000 when an arbitration tribunal in fact dealt with such a claim for the first time in detail. The pendent dispute gave rise to a question that surprisingly has scraped a shadowy existence before: Are MFN clauses also able to import procedural rights from one BIT to another? Although the competent tribunal in the now-famous Maffezini decision argued in favour of an application with respect to procedural rights the issue today is still alien from being clarified, since other tribunals subsequently have expressly resisted following the Maffezini decision. The divergent decisions caused great legal uncertainty which is not least due to the textual breadth of the MFN clauses the different tribunals had to deal with.
The following essay seeks to “bring light into this legal darkness”. Therefore, in a first step, the arguments raised by the different tribunals are presented and analysed by contrasting the decisions supporting an application of MFN clauses with the declining decisions. Secondly, it is explained why future tribunals should generally accept that MFN clauses can be invoked in relation to procedural rights. However, the operation of a MFN clause is never without limits; the most important one is an opposing intention of the parties to the basic treaty. All the criteria and aspects that are necessary to determine the relevant limits have already been raised or touched by the competent tribunals whilst interpreting the different BITs. However, the tribunals failed to apply these criteria in a systematic order and furthermore chose different starting points for their analysis, which seems to be one of the main reasons, why there is still great uncertainty as to that issue. Accordingly it is the goal of part three to systematize these criteria and to develop a scheme that is proposed to apply in future arbitrations dealing with that issue. Eventually this scheme is applied to the recent cases accompanied by a thesis as to what the outcome most likely would have been.
II. The Relevant Case Law
A. Supporting Cases
1. Emilio Augustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain– the seminal case
The series of arbitration proceedings dealing with that matter was preluded by the above mentioned and now-famous Maffezini decision. The case involved an investment which the claimant, Mr. Maffezini, an Argentinean citizen, made in the Spanish province of Galicia. The claimant alleged a breach of the Argentina-Spain BIT. Article X of that treaty required prior resort to the host state’s domestic courts for 18 months before submitting the dispute to an arbitral tribunal. However, Article IV (2) of the same BIT also provided for the following MFN clause: In all matters subject to this agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third country. By virtue of that clause the claimant tried to override the 18 months domestic proceedings pre-condition, by referring to Article X of the Chile-Spain BIT which did not contain such a one, but instead allowed for immediate arbitration after a 6 months “cooling-off” period, which had already terminated. Spain, on the other hand, contested the tribunal’s jurisdiction on the grounds of the claimant’s non-compliance with the 18 months period. The word “matters” in the MFN clause, Spain argued, refers only to material aspects of a treatment accorded to another state rather than to procedural questions. Hence, a procedural provision in the basic treaty can never be altered by a MFN clause. Additionally the claimant has by no means evidenced that prior resort to domestic courts disadvantages the investor which is the minimum prerequisite of the applicability of any MFN clause.
The arbitral tribunal eventually declined the respondent’s submissions and upheld its jurisdiction. According to the tribunal’s view it is generally not justifiable to differentiate between procedural and substantial rights. The arbitral court held that “there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute resolution arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors” and that they are “essential […] to the protection of the rights envisaged under the pertinent treaties [and] are closely linked to the material aspects of the treatment accorded.” One of the tribunal’s first steps was to apply the so-called ejusdem generis principle. This principle basically says that for an MFN clause to be applicable the treaty containing the MFN clause has to deal with the same subject matter as the third party treaty. Although this principle has been part of international law for ages there still seems to be great uncertainty as to which limits it places upon the application of MFN clauses. The tribunal adopted a view that was previously expressed by the Commission of Arbitration that was concerned with the Amabtielos case. According to its understanding of that principle a MFN clause can only “attract matters belonging to the same category of subject as to which the clause itself relates.” In other words, the MFN clause itself has to relate to the kind of rights that are meant to be imported from the third party treaty. Therefore the tribunal went on and had a detailed look at the wording of the MFN clause. Unlike other MFN clauses the one at stake did not expressly include or exclude dispute settlement mechanisms from its scope. Since the wording of the MFN clause (“all matters”) was generally broad enough to cover procedural “matters” as well, the key question was whether “the omission [of a reference to procedural matters] was intended by the parties or can reasonably be inferred from the practice followed by the parties in their treatment of foreign investors”. Spain’s investment treaty practice, however, did not at all suggest that it was reluctant to resolve disputes directly before an arbitral tribunal. Moreover the given facts evidenced that it was Argentina that had insisted on the domestic court requirement. The tribunal stated:
The Claimant has convincingly explained that at the time of the negotiations of the Agreement, Argentina still sought to require some form of prior exhaustion of local remedies, while Spain supported the policy of a direct right of submission to arbitration, which was reflected in the numerous agreements it had negotiated with other countries at that time.
The above considerations finally led the tribunal to the conclusion that the MFN clause also relates to the dispute settlement provision in Article X of the Argentina-Spain BIT. Thus, and because both treaties related to the same subject matter “protection of investment” there was no contravention of the ejusdem generis principle. The tribunal reached its finding without expressly stating that the parties intended the clause to cover procedural rights. What the tribunal thereby in fact did was to put up a presumption that a broadly phrased MFN clause, like the one at stake, embraces procedural provisions unless there are indications hinting at an opposing intention of the parties.
Having affirmed that the more favourable dispute settlement provision was able to be incorporated by the MFN clause in the particular case the tribunal immediately afterwards imposed some general limits on the scope of MFN clauses. The tribunal held:
As a matter of principle, the beneficiary of the clause should not be able to override public policy considerations that the contracting parties might have envisaged as fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in question, particularly if the beneficiary is a private investor, as will often be the case. The scope of the clause might thus be narrower than it appears at first sight.
The tribunal then specified its statement by listing up four limiting situations that all appear to be subcategories of the overall “public policy boundary”. However, at least three of these four boundaries were not brought up by the instant case but were ruled obiter dictum. Additionally a precise justification as to why exactly these four situations narrow the functioning of an MFN clause is lacking. Nonetheless the limits were to be relevant in the cases to follow. Hence they will now be described in more detail.
(a) Exhaustion of local remedies condition
According to Article 26 of the ICSID Convention a country is allowed to condition its consent to arbitration on the exhaustion of local judicial proceedings. The tribunal took the view that such a condition “could not be bypassed by the invocation of an MFN clause, since…the stipulated condition reflects a fundamental rule of international law.” Surprisingly the tribunal did not apply its own limit in Maffezini at that stage although the 18 months pre-condition might have given well reason to do so. Apparently this is due to the fact that it in the first place has stated that the 18 months pre-condition does not constitute a local remedies exhaustion requirement. The tribunal argued that the condition does not require the claimant to exhaust all available local remedies but only to submit the dispute to local courts at all. As soon as the 18 months have passed by a resort to arbitration is permissive, whether the local courts have ruled on the issue or not. Hence, Spain’s general consent to arbitration was out of question. However, the tribunal should have rather referred to its former considerations at that stage.
(b) Fork in the road clause
The second exception concerns a dispute settlement mechanism that contains a so-called fork in the road clause. Such clauses offer both, international arbitration and domestic proceedings. However, once a choice is made, that decision is final and irrevocable. Hence, the choice cannot be reversed by virtue of a MFN clause either. The tribunal felt that view vindicated “by the consideration that it would upset the finality of arrangements that many countries deem important as a matter of public policy.”
(c) Choice of a particular arbitration forum
Thirdly, a MFN clause cannot be invoked to replace a particularly stipulated arbitration forum (e.g. ICSID) by a different system of arbitration. The tribunal omits to give any arguments for its ruling.
(d) Precisely stipulated arbitration rules
The fourth exception seems to be closely related to the preceding one. “If the parties have agreed to a highly institutionalized system of arbitration that incorporates precise rules of procedure…it is clear that neither of these mechanisms could be altered by the operation of the clause, because these very specific provisions reflect the precise will of the contracting parties. Without saying that expressly the tribunal’s argumentation in that case uses the generally accepted conflict of law principle lex specialis derogat legi generalis as a means of determining the parties’ intention. As an example of such a highly institutionalized arbitration system NAFTA is given.
The tribunal finally concluded that other public policy considerations are likely to arise that might impose limits on the operation of MFN clauses. Hence, the four exceptions are not meant to be comprehensive. The general conflict that has to be resolved by future arbitrations was described by the tribunal as follows:
It is clear that a distinction has to be made between the legitimate extension of rights, on the one hand, and disruptive treaty shopping that would play havoc with the policy objectives of underlying specific treaty provisions, on the other hand.
2. Siemens A.G. v Argentine Republic
The Siemens arbitration is the one that dealt most extensively with the application of MFN clauses in relation to procedural rights. Hence, this case is – apart from Maffezini – probably the most famous and most important decision on that issue. The Argentina-Germany BIT also conditioned international arbitration on the prior resort to domestic courts for 18 months. Again the claimant sought to override this obstacle by virtue of a MFN clause. However, the roles were reversed in that case. It was Argentina this time who was sued by a German company for an alleged breach of the Argentina-Germany BIT. What distinguished the cases from each other was the different wording of the MFN clauses. The MFN clause in the Argentina-Germany BIT read:
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall accord in its territory to the investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party a less favourable treatment than the treatment granted to the investments…of nationals or companies of third States.
(2) Neither Contracting Party shall accord in its territory to the nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party a less favourable treatment of activities related to investments than granted to…the nationals or companies of third States.
Unlike Maffezini, the tribunal began its analysis with a general reference to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Accordingly the tribunal’s interpretation has to be guided by the purpose of the treaty as expressed in its title and preamble. It is a treaty “to protect” and “to promote” investments. The preamble provides that the parties have agreed to the provisions of the Treaty for the purpose of creating favourable conditions for the investments of nationals or companies of one of the two States….The intention of the parties is clear. It is to create favourable conditions for investment and to stimulate private initiative.
Subsequently the tribunal focused on the wording of Article 3, in particular on the words “treatment” and “activities”. It found that although the term “treatment” is clearly narrower than the term “matter” it is still of a very broad kind, which generally allows for the incorporation of procedural provisions. Article III (3) and (4) of the Argentina-Germany BIT, the tribunal argued further, contain a list of matters that were expressly excluded from the MFN clause. According to the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the fact that dispute settlement was not among these matters, must be interpreted to mean that they are covered by the MFN clause. In this context Argentina raised a systematic argument to prevent the application of the MFN clause. Dispute settlement is a right that concerns the treatment of an investor, but Article III (1) only refers to treatment of investments. The inclusion of the word investor was omitted deliberately, as Article IV refers to both investors and investments. Thereby, Argentina argued, it is established that dispute settlement was meant to be excluded from the scope of the MFN clause. The tribunal did not follow that argument. It denied the differential use of the two terms to have any significance, since such an understanding does not comply with the purpose of the treaty. The fact that the exceptions in Article III (3) and (4) refer to investors suggests that the treatment of investments includes the treatment of investors. The tribunal’s interpretation is indeed more favourable, since the exceptions would be superfluous if Article III (1) did not include a treatment of investors. Furthermore Article III (2) refers to activities related to investments. Such activities, be they physical or legal, can only be taken by a person. The express mentioning of investors in Article IV, on the other hand, was simply considered as a matter of emphasis.
Since the wording of the MFN clause was distinctly narrower than the one in the Maffezini arbitration, the tribunal’s finding clearly stretched the existing law. As MFN clauses in many other BITs are identically phrased like the one at stake, the tribunal’s findings were and still are of high practical relevance. Although the tribunal endorsed that the beneficiary of the MFN clause may not override public policy considerations judged by the parties to the treaties it could not see such a one in the present case. It adopted the view of the Maffezini tribunal that the 18 months domestic court requirement does not come within the concept of exhaustion of local remedies, since “it does not require a prior decision of a court at any level” but “only…the passing of time or the persistence of the dispute after a decision by a court.” In the absence of a consistent treaty practice of Argentina in the recent past, the tribunal further found that Argentina could not establish that “the institution of proceedings before local courts is a sensitive issue of economic or foreign policy or that it is an essential part of the consent of the Respondent to arbitration.” Three things are noteworthy about that statement. Firstly the burden of evidence seems to be placed on the respondent. Consequently it is up to him to establish any public policy considerations that limit the scope of the MFN clause. The above mentioned assumption that a MFN clause applies to procedural rights is hence also held true for much narrower MFN clauses. However, it can by implication also be inferred from the statement, that the 18 months before local courts requirement might well place limits on the operation of an MFN clause, if it forms part of a consistent treaty practice. What is not entirely clear is whether a consistent treaty practice alone establishes a “sensitive issue of economic or foreign policy” as demanded by the tribunal or whether there have to be additional circumstances to satisfy that requirement. Either way the 18 months before local courts pre-condition does not come within the concept of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Hence, the Siemens tribunal added a potential fifth exception to the four pre-existing Maffezini limits.
3. Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v Argentine Republic
In that case a Spanish claimant again successfully got around the 18 months domestic court requirement in the basic treaty by virtue of the MFN clause. Argentina challenged ICSID’s jurisdiction by arguing that the 18 months period is an exhaustion of local remedies provision. Clearly Argentina thereby tried to invoke one of the Maffezini exceptions. Furthermore Argentina asserted that its consent to arbitrate was conditioned on the prior resort to Argentinean courts, which the claimant did not comply with. A forced engagement in an arbitration, Argentina went on, would contradict Argentina’s public policy. The second argument refers to the four public policy exceptions as not being conclusive as it was held by the Maffezini tribunal.
Having confirmed that the broad wording of the MFN clause generally allowed the incorporation of dispute settlement provisions, the respondent’s arguments were eventually rejected by the tribunal. The exhaustion of local remedies rule does not apply, since it was allowed “to have recourse to arbitration even if there were a decision in the case by the national courts and a fortiori if no final decision had been rendered in the courts.” Secondly it could not infer an opposing public policy from Argentina’s treaty practice, since many of Argentina’s BITs concluded with other countries did not provide for the 18-month period but instead permitted immediate access to international arbitration. Like the Maffezini and the Siemens tribunal before the Natural Gas tribunal also missed the chance to justify its reasoning. It only affirmed that an exhaustion of local remedies requirement narrows the scope of an MFN clause, but did not explain why that is the case. Moreover it did not give reasons why an 18-months domestic proceedings requirement in contrast to a local courts exhaustion requirement does not constitute a public policy consideration that limits the scope of a MFN clause. The distinction between the two situations seems to be closely related to Argentina’s second contention that it is forced to arbitrate without having consented to it.
 This BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan.
 C F Dugan and D Wallace and N D Rubins and B Sabahi, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 51.
 Vesel, S “Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties” 32 Yale J. Int’l L. (2007) 125, 139.
 The MFN treatment is a feature of international economic treaties since centuries which originally stems from the trade law. For a historical overview of the development of MFN clauses see Kurtz, J “The Delicate Extension of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment To Foreign Investors: Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain in Weiler, T (ed) International Investment Law And Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May Ltd., London, 2005) 523, 524 ff.
 R, Dolzer and C, Scheurer Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 189; Gaillard, E “Establishing Jurisdiction through a Most-Favored Nation Clause” N.Y.L.J. (June 2, 2005)1, 3; Esser, H “Plama v. Bulgaria – Erster ICSID-Schiedsspruch zur Energiecharta“ 6 SchiedsVZ (2006) 311, 313; Schill, S W “Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of The People’s Republic of China” 15 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2007) 73, 100.
 Emilio Augustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, January 2000. The issue has already been touched before in the Amabtielos Arbitration (Greek v U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 (Comm’n of Arb. 1956).
 That was possible, since unlike judges in common law litigations, investment arbitrators are not bound by the stare decisis rule.
 R Dolzer and T Meyers “After Tecmed: MFN Clauses in Investment Protection Agreements” ICSID Rev.-FILJ 19 (2004) 49, 51.
 See below II.
 See below III.
 See below IV.
 See below V.
 ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, January 2000.
 Ibid para 41.
 Ibid para 42.
 Ibid para 54.
 Ibid para 55.
 Acconci, P “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment” in Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 363, 365.
 See e.g. D H Freyer and D Herlihy “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and Dispute Settlement in Investment Arbitration: Just How ‘Favored’ is ‘Most-Favored’?” 20 ICSID Rev.-FILJ (2005) 58, 65, Fn. 21; Sutton, S D “Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain and the ICSID Secretary-General’s Screening Power” 21(1) Arb. Int. (2005) 113; Dolzer, R “Meistbegünstigungsklauseln in Investitionsschutzverträgen” in Bröhmer, J et al. (eds) Festschrift für Georg Rees am 21. Januar 2005 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 2005) 47, 47.
 Amabtielos Arbitration (Greek v U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 (Comm’n of Arb. 1956).
 Ibid para 107.
 See e.g. Article III (3) of the BIT between Albania and U.K. clarifies: For the avoidance of doubt it is confirmed that the treatment provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply to the provisions of Article 1 to 11 of this Treaty. Thereby Article 9, that contained dispute settlement provisions, was expressly included in the scope of the MFN clause.
 ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, January 2000, para 60.
 Ibid para 53.
 Ibid para 57.
 Ibid para 64.
 Ibid para 62.
 Gaillard, E “Establishing Jurisdiction through a Most-Favored Nation Clause” N.Y.L.J. (June 2, 2005)1, 3.
 Ibid para 63.
 Ibid para 28.
 Ibid para 63.
 See Dolzer, R “Meistbegünstigungsklauseln in Investitionsschutzverträgen” in Bröhmer, J et al. (eds) Festschrift für Georg Rees am 21. Januar 2005 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 2005) 47, 50.
 ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, January 2000, para 63.
 ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, August 2004.
 Although the argumentation in Siemens was much more detailed than the one in Maffezini it has not nearly triggered an equal attraction as Maffezini.
 The Siemens case marked the starting point of a whole series of cases in which Argentina was sued by investors from other countries. The claimants’ complaints were due to various measures Argentina had taken to cope with the financial and economic crises in the years 2001 and 2002.
 This is the tribunal’s translation of Article 3 of the Argentina-Germany BIT, emphasis added.
 ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, August 2004, para 81
 Ibid para 85.
 Ibid para 103.
 Ibid para 92.
 Ibid para 104.
 Ibid para 105.
 D H Freyer and D Herlihy “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and Dispute Settlement in Investment Arbitration: Just How ‘Favored’ is ‘Most-Favored’?” 20 ICSID Rev.-FILJ (2005) 58, 72.
 See above page 5 f.
 Likewise Teitelbaum, R “Who’s Afraid of Maffezini ? Recent Developments in the Interpretation of Most Favored Nation Clauses” 22 J. Int’l Arb. (2005) 225, 231.
 Another issue that was treated in that case but which is not dealt with here in detail was whether the claimant has to import the whole dispute settlement mechanism or whether he can choose to import only the favourable parts (so-called “cherry picking”).
 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision on Jurisdiction, June 2005.
 It was the same broadly drafted MFN clause as in the Maffezini case, that referred to “all matters”. He instead relied on the Argentina-United States BIT that provided for immediate arbitration after a waiting period of six months.
 See above page 5.
 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2005, para 18.
 See above page 6.
 Again it was the same MFN clause as in the Maffezini case.
- Quote paper
- LL.M. Sebastian Röder (Author), 2009, To what extent, if any, are most favoured nation clauses able to be invoked by investment treaty claimants suing under one bilateral investment treaty in relation to procedural rights granted by another bilateral investment treaty?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/282056