Bureaucratic inefficiency, patronage-induced overstaffing, and outright corruption retard economic development and reduce public well-being in developing countries. They prevent governments from effectively carrying out the economic plans to which they devote so much official attention, and deprive citizens of government services to which they are legally entitled. (Geddes 1991, p.371)
Corruption, patronage and inefficient bureaucracies are widespread in many countries and under all forms of government. Whereas such problems are often recognized to be at the core of rent-seeking regimes like dictatorships or oligarchies, they occur in similar ways in developing and even in developed democracies. For instance, there is evidence for bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption and patronage in Brazil (Weyland 1996), but also in Germany (Braendle 2012) and France (Facchini and Melki 2013).
A rich body of research however underlines the importance of good institutions as main determinants of economic development, growth and prosperity. But why and under which conditions do some societies choose inefficient institutions? This is the main question the thesis seeks to answer.
A related second question concerns a possible explanation for the setup of inefficient institu- tions: Why do democracies often pursue relatively elite-biased policies contrary to the predictions of the median-voter-theorem? As Acemoglu (2010, p.1) notes, institutions are often “structured to maximize the rents captured by the elite, the individuals or social groups monopolizing political power". In electoral democracy, the influence of different social groups should be closer related to their population share than in nondemocracy. However, the distribution of political power can by diluted if institutions reshape political influence and redirect government spending towards the top.
The thesis tries to bring together the two issues by elaborating a possible explanation for the link between the emergence of inefficient institutions and the prevalence of pro-elite policies.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
1.2. Some Historical Observations
1.3. Benefits of a Political Economy Approach
1.4. Structure of the Thesis
2. The Political Economy of Inefficient Institutions
2.1. Setting the stage: State Capacity, Inefficiency and Bureaucracy
2.1.1. Inefficient Institutions
2.1.2. Institutional Change
2.1.3. State Capacity
2.1.4. Bureaucracy
2.2. Inequality, Democratic Transition and the Median Voter Puzzle
2.2.1. Initial Inequality and Political Conflict
2.2.2. Democratic Transition and Inequality
2.2.3. The Median Voter Puzzle
2.3. Related Literature
2.3.1. Why Societies End Up with Inefficient Institutions
2.3.2. Literature on Inefficient States
2.3.3. A new Perspective on the Emergence of Inefficient States
2.4. Empirical Evidence
3. Emergence of Inefficient States under Patronage Politics
3.1. Economic and Political Framework
3.1.1. Tax Evasion, Effort Decision and State Organization
3.1.2. Political System
3.2. Timing of Events
3.3. Equilibria
3.3.1. Constraints and the Government Budget
3.3.2. The Comparative Cases: Permanent Democracy and Nondemocracy
3.3.3. Emerging Democracy: an Inefficient Equilibrium
3.4. Comparative Statics
3.4.1. Characteristics of an Inefficient State
3.4.2. Inequality and Inefficiency
3.4.3. Nondemocracy, Democracy or Emerging Democracy?
4. Discussion and Extension
4.1. Critical Assumptions and the Inefficient State
4.1.1. Agents and Democratic Transition
4.1.2. Public Expenditure
4.1.3. Taxes
4.1.4. Preferences and Inefficiency
4.2. More Comparative Statics
4.2.1. Excessive Bureaucracy
4.2.2. Tax Rates and Inefficiency
4.3. Extensions
4.3.1. The Middle Class and the Inefficient State
4.3.2. Progressive Income Taxation
4.3.3. Endogenizing Inefficiency
4.3.4. Distribution Costs
4.4. Potential and Limits
4.4.1. Explaining Inefficient States
4.4.2. Limits
4.4.3. Contributions to Related Research
4.5. Persistence
4.5.1. Determinants of Persistence
4.5.2. When Inefficient States Persist
5. Concluding Remarks
Objectives & Research Questions
This thesis investigates the underlying conditions that lead societies to choose inefficient institutions, specifically focusing on the emergence and persistence of inefficient states during democratic transitions. The primary research goal is to demonstrate how a ruling elite may strategically utilize patronage politics—specifically the creation of an excessive bureaucracy—to capture democratic processes, maintain political power, and minimize redistributive pressure.
- The role of strategic political choices in creating bureaucratic inefficiency.
- The influence of initial economic inequality and democratic transition on institutional outcomes.
- The mechanism by which elite groups use patronage to build winning coalitions.
- The impact of an entrepreneurial middle class on the likelihood of state inefficiency.
- The conditions under which inefficient institutions become self-perpetuating equilibria.
Excerpt from the Book
1.1. Motivation
The approach of the baseline model comprises at least two new perspectives on the emergence and persistence of inefficient institutions. First, the seed of inefficient institutions might already be planted in an early phase of democratization. With the use of political patronage and the creation of an insider/outsider society, a rich elite might capture the political process from the beginning. Knowing that democratization and demand for redistribution require setting up a bureaucracy, the elite exploit this necessity. This is important, since economic and political institutions evolve endogenously in interaction with their economic environment over time, but depend on initial economic conditions (Acemoglu et al. 2004). Yet if the setup of bureaucracy results from an inefficient political agenda and not out of pure technical necessity, this can predetermine the path to an ever-growing bureaucracy.
Second, in the chosen model the inefficiency of the state is not considered to be due to internal dysfunctional processes, slow adaptation or monitoring incapacity, but due to strategic purposes of a small elite, which is fully aware of the explicitly created inefficiencies. The rationale implies that all “internal" or procedural explanations of inefficient institutions only capture the outcome of an underlying political process. Consequently, also the persistence of inefficient institutions might rather be the result of a conscious political choice than due to organizational or accidental reasons or changing environments (as suggested by the developmental view of institutions).
However, with a structural focus on patronage politics and bureaucracy and a temporal focus on emerging democracy, the baseline model only displays an isolated mechanism that potentially creates persistent inefficiency in a certain phase of democratic transition. Naturally, there are numerous other possibilities for the elite to act in order to keep political power in democracy. These include lobbying, media control, (direct) vote buying, use of (military) force and co-optation.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Outlines the research problem regarding inefficient bureaucracies and patronage as a strategic choice rather than a technical failure.
2. The Political Economy of Inefficient Institutions: Embeds the study within existing literature, defining institutional change and the role of state capacity.
3. Emergence of Inefficient States under Patronage Politics: Provides the formal rebuild of the model, establishing the game-theoretic equilibrium where the elite creates an inefficient state to maintain power.
4. Discussion and Extension: Critically evaluates the model's assumptions and introduces extensions, such as the role of a middle class and progressive taxation.
5. Concluding Remarks: Summarizes the findings and provides an outlook on the limitations and potential for future research.
Keywords
Political Economy, Inefficient Institutions, Patronage, Bureaucracy, Democratic Transition, Elite Capture, State Capacity, Income Inequality, Redistribution, Median Voter Theorem, Economic Growth, Political Power, Institutional Persistence, Patronage Politics, Rent-seeking
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core argument of this thesis?
The thesis argues that inefficient states—characterized by bloated bureaucracies and corruption—are not necessarily the result of incompetence, but often the product of strategic choices made by a ruling elite during the transition to democracy to protect their political and economic power.
What are the central themes of the work?
The research focuses on the intersection of political power, economic incentives, institutional design, and the dynamics of patronage politics within emerging democracies.
What is the primary research question?
The work seeks to answer why and under which conditions societies choose to adopt and maintain inefficient institutions, particularly when more efficient alternatives appear available.
What methodology is employed?
The author utilizes a political economy approach, rebuilding and extending a formal model from Acemoglu et al. (2011) to analyze equilibria in an infinite-horizon economy.
What is covered in the main body?
The main body rigorously examines the model’s structure, including tax evasion, bureaucratic effort, and the political decision-making processes, while providing comparative statics to understand how inequality and middle-class presence alter these outcomes.
How are the key terms defined?
The work defines inefficient institutions as extractive mechanisms that concentrate political power and divert resources, as opposed to inclusive, growth-promoting institutions.
How does the middle class influence the emergence of inefficient states?
The author identifies a conditional relationship: a large, affluent middle class generally reduces the likelihood of an inefficient state, whereas a smaller, productive middle class may provide the elite with additional tax revenue to sustain an inefficient bureaucracy.
Is the inefficient state necessarily permanent?
The thesis explores the persistence of these states, concluding that while they can be highly resilient due to the established coalition between the elite and the bureaucracy, their stability depends on the underlying economic environment.
- Citation du texte
- Mirko Hajek (Auteur), 2014, Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/307121
