This paper will describe the importance of compliance in the ever-more complex international relations, discuss the effectiveness of sub-regimes and their importance to enforce the control of common goods, such as pollution of the seas.
Analyzing international relations with the focus on compliance of actors with regimes or sub-regimes to control a common good is becoming more and more interesting, not only because over a very short period of time (compared to world history) all resources on this planet are becoming more and more rare, but also because every political actor in this anarchic world system can use, pollute, destroy, save or ignore it, with basically no real control mechanism.
The paper is going to use two well know theories to analyze compliance and effectiveness of international regimes or regulations. The institutional approach will be used to discuss whether it is more likely for actors to comply or not and under which circumstances the level of compliance is high enough to turn an international regime into a useful and effective instrument to regulate and control a certain behavior. The theory of realism will be used to analyze the likelihood of compliance and effectiveness of international regimes from a realist's point of view.
The two theories will be compared regarding the most coherent explanation of likelihood of compliance and its influence on the effectiveness of the sub-regimes OILPOL and MARPOL, which were created to control oil pollution of the seas. Which theory can best explain the effectiveness and the likelihood of compliance with these two sub-regimes?
Afterwards, compliance of actors with sub-regimes in the scope of the control and protection of common goods will give a detailed view on the problem of pollution of the seas, followed by a brief conclusion.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The key role of Compliance in international relations, especially for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes.
2.1 International regimes from a realist perspective
2.2 International regimes in an institutional approach
3. International environmental regimes to control oil pollution: OILPOL and MARPOL. Which regime was successful and more effective?
4. Conclusion and Outlook
5. Sources
Objectives and Research Focus
The paper examines the critical role of actor compliance in ensuring the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It specifically investigates how international relations theories—institutionalism and realism—explain the success or failure of regimes tasked with protecting common goods, utilizing the oil pollution conventions OILPOL and MARPOL as primary case studies.
- The importance of compliance for regime effectiveness.
- Comparative analysis of realist and institutionalist perspectives.
- Evaluation of the OILPOL and MARPOL environmental regimes.
- Application of game theory, specifically the prisoner's dilemma, to international cooperation.
- Challenges of enforcing regulations in an anarchic world system.
Excerpt from the Book
3.0 International environmental regimes to control Oil pollution: OILPOL and MARPOL - Which regime was successful and more effective?
An example of a sub-regime to control the pollution of a common good is the establishment of OILPOL in 1954 and MARPOL in 1973/78.
Tanker used to wash out their tanks with seawater and discharge this mixture just into the oceans for a long time, without any restrictions. The absence of a hegemon to control and punish such behavior was the reason for a ongoing pollution of the oceans. When discovering in the 1920s that oil from tanker discharges pollutes the seas, multilateral negotiations for an agreement took place, known as the OILPOL agreement of 1954. The United Kingdom was the first actor to call for the creation of a sub-regime, that would be able to change the actors' behavior regarding this issue. It was designed to reduce oil discharges in coastal regions and required tankers to discharge their oil-waste at least 50 miles away from any coastline. The opportunity to discharge oil-waste at ports was costly and only possible, if the port was equipped with the technical solution to do so (Mitchell et al. In: Young 1999: 33)
Even though the 1954 agreement of OILPOL was enhanced by amendmends in 1962, extending the no-discharge-zone to 100 miles from shore and prohibited tankers to discharge oil-water-mixtures with a 100 ppm (100 parts oil per million parts water) limit, no significant change was observed. (Mitchell et al. In: Young 1999: 42)
The load on top – installation (LOT) was used to seperate water and oil after a washout. This was only used in new tankers, because it was costly to install.
The last amendmend to OILPOL in 1969 only allowed tankers to discharg “clean ballast water” that contained no tracec of oil.
Compliance was barely to observe, even though the discharges were reduced, mostly independent tanker operators still continued to discharge oil-waste at sea.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: This chapter outlines the rising complexity of international relations and establishes the central research focus on compliance as the primary driver of regime effectiveness.
2. The key role of Compliance in international relations, especially for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes.: This section defines international regimes and evaluates various approaches to measuring effectiveness, including legal, economic, and political perspectives.
2.1 International regimes from a realist perspective: This chapter explores how realists view international politics as a power-based system where cooperation is hindered by the desire for security and survival.
2.2 International regimes in an institutional approach: This chapter discusses the institutionalist view that shared interests and the mitigation of communication failures can facilitate cooperation even in an anarchic world.
3. International environmental regimes to control oil pollution: OILPOL and MARPOL. Which regime was successful and more effective?: This core chapter analyzes the transition from the failed OILPOL agreement to the more successful MARPOL treaty, identifying the factors that led to better compliance.
4. Conclusion and Outlook: This chapter summarizes the findings and predicts that the increasing scarcity of global resources will necessitate stronger, more effective international regimes to foster cooperation.
5. Sources: This section provides the academic foundation and literature used throughout the research.
Keywords
Compliance, International Regimes, Effectiveness, Institutionalism, Realism, OILPOL, MARPOL, Common Good, Oil Pollution, Cooperation, Anarchy, Interdependence, Environmental Policy, Game Theory, Global Governance.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this publication?
The paper examines how actor compliance determines the success or failure of international environmental regimes, using the specific case of maritime oil pollution control.
What are the central themes of the work?
Key themes include the structural anarchy of the international system, the necessity of common good management, the role of international agreements in changing actor behavior, and the comparative analysis of political theories.
What is the primary research goal?
The goal is to determine how realism and institutionalism explain the differing levels of effectiveness observed in the OILPOL and MARPOL regimes.
Which scientific methods are employed?
The research uses a qualitative comparative analysis of international regimes and applies the prisoner's dilemma framework to explain the incentives for compliance and defection.
What does the main body cover?
It provides a theoretical overview of realism and institutionalism, followed by a historical and empirical analysis of the OILPOL and MARPOL conventions.
What characterises the selected keywords?
The keywords highlight the intersection of political science, environmental law, and the practical challenges of enforcing international agreements.
Why did OILPOL fail to achieve its goals?
The paper identifies four reasons for OILPOL's failure, including lack of enforcement mechanisms, low levels of compliance, and the differing interests of non-state actors compared to national governments.
How does MARPOL differ from its predecessor?
MARPOL proved more effective by introducing stricter regulations, mandatory equipment standards like Segregated Ballast Tanks, and better logistical support through port reception facilities.
What is the significance of the prisoner's dilemma in this context?
The prisoner's dilemma illustrates the tension between individual state costs for compliance and the collective benefit of a cleaner environment, explaining why cooperation is difficult to sustain.
What is the outlook for future international cooperation?
The author concludes that growing resource scarcity, such as shrinking drinking water supplies, will make effective international regimes increasingly vital for global stability.
- Citation du texte
- Felix Braune (Auteur), 2015, Compliance in International Relations. Key to Effective Controlling of Pollution by Environmental Regimes?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/307182
