When Germany joined the United Nations Security Council in January 2011, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle presented a motto that would guide his country through its two-year tenure: “Responsibility, Reliability and Commitment.” Less than three months after Germany took its seat, the Security Council confronted a crisis in Libya, where the government of Muammar Gaddafi was violently suppressing protesters, Westerwelle’s motto was put to the test. On March 17th, 2011, the German Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Peter Wittig lifted his hand to signal Germany’s abstention on Security Council Resolution 1973. By voting to abstain, Wittig formalized the most controversial German foreign policy decision of recent years. The abstention resulted in irritation among Germany’s allies and an unusually heated reaction within Germany itself, causing a rift in almost all major political parties. Depending on the explanations given for the abstention, politicians and commentators have differed in their conclusions concerning what the decision means for the direction of German foreign policy. Interpretations vary from seeing the decision as a result of the particular haste and the specific circumstances of the Libya crisis to concluding that it represents a strategic shift in German foreign policy towards the BRIC countries. In order to draw conclusions about the meaning of the Libya decision for German foreign policy, it is necessary to thoroughly understand the reasons for the German abstention and the domestic reactions to the Government’s policy. This paper will examine the factors that led Germany to refrain from participating in the NATO mission in Libya and to abstain on Resolution 1973. The paper will also analyze the reactions in the German political arena and the press to the decision. It will be argued that the German policy towards the Libya intervention was not a strategic repositioning of German foreign policy. The abstention was a result of the very specific circumstances around the Libya intervention and was influenced by various factors, including uncertainty over the military risks involved, the speed in which the resolution was put forward in New York, the late switch in positions of the United States and the personal convictions of the Foreign Minister. While the abstention itself represents a break with German foreign policy traditions, the reluctance to participate in the military intervention itself is in line with these traditions.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Germany and the use of force
2.1. From ‘checkbook diplomacy’ to the intervention in Kosovo
2.2. Increasing contributions and persistent skepticism
2.3. Germany and the use of force in 2011
3. The crisis in Libya and the German response: from early leader to abstention
3.1. Initial German leadership: February 15th to February 26th 2011
3.2. From leader to skeptic: February 26th to March 15th
3.3. Negotiating Resolution 1973 and the German decision to abstain: March 15th to March 17th
4. Explaining non-participation and abstention
4.1. The decision against military participation
4.1.1. A traditional German skepticism towards the use of force and Afghanistan
4.1.2. Uncertainty over military risks of a military intervention and doubts concerning French and British motives
4.1.3. The American change and the shift to “all necessary measures”
4.1.4. The ‘power of parliamentary reservation’
4.1.5. Guido Westerwelle and the FDP
4.1.6. The upcoming elections
4.1.7. No significant role for the Responsibility to Protect
4.2. The abstention
4.2.1. Time and timing contributing to the abstention
4.2.2. Was it possible to vote “yes” and not participate militarily?
4.2.3. A coalition compromise?
5. Domestic reactions and international consequences
5.1. The debate in Germany
5.1.1. Reactions in the press and public
5.1.2. The Foreign Minister and his talking points
5.1.3. Reactions in the Bundestag
5.2. International consequences
5.2.1. The German role on the Security Council
5.2.2. Germany in NATO: reinforcing doubts about ‘pooling and sharing’ and German reliability
6. Conclusion
Objectives & Research Themes
This dissertation examines the factors that led the German government to abstain from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 in March 2011, thereby refraining from participation in the subsequent NATO-led military intervention in Libya. It aims to clarify whether this decision signaled a strategic shift in German foreign policy or was a reactive choice shaped by specific situational constraints and internal political pressures.
- Evolution of German military policy since the end of the Cold War.
- Chronology of the German diplomatic response to the Libyan uprising in early 2011.
- Analysis of domestic factors, including parliamentary reservation and political election cycles.
- The role of key political figures, particularly Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle.
- Assessment of the international impact on Germany’s reliability within NATO and the EU.
Excerpt from the Book
4.1.2. Uncertainty over military risks of a military intervention and doubts concerning French and British motives
Starting from a traditionally skeptic position towards the use of force and a suspicion of the motives of its European allies to call for an intervention, it would not have taken much to make the German government worry about the viability and usefulness of using force to protect civilians from the Gaddafi government in Libya. In interviews with the author, German decision makers repeatedly highlighted these concerns and related doubts on the French and British motives for an intervention as the most important factors for the decision not to participate and, ultimately, for the abstention.
German policy makers both in the Government and in the Bundestag were suspicious of the French and British motives to push for an intervention. As shown in Chapter 3, politicians and diplomats in the Chancellery and the Foreign Office were irritated by the speed and fervor with which Nicolas Sarkozy changed course, called for a no-fly zone and recognized the NTC. Especially the Chancellor was annoyed at the French President's actions that were neither coordinated nor previously announced to the German government. The policy makers suspected that Sarkozy was primarily motivated by a desire to impress voters with his activist attitude and to make up for his former close relationships with Arab dictators as the French presidential election approached. UK Prime Minister David Cameron, some Germans believed, was concerned to not be seen by his voters as less assertive than his French counterpart.
German policy makers doubted whether a no-fly zone or similar military engagement from the air could be successful in protecting civilians and feared it would instead lead to Western entanglement in a Libyan civil war. Officials highlighted a lack of reliable information – including from the German intelligence services – on who exactly the rebels were that would be supported from the air and what aims they were pursuing. The policy makers were afraid that killings would continue under the Western watch from the air and ultimately, the initial military involvement would lead to the interveners having to send ground troops into a protracted civil war – something that no government wanted, including the French and the British.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Outlines the research context regarding Germany's controversial abstention on Resolution 1973 and defines the paper's aim to identify the underlying drivers of this decision.
2. Germany and the use of force: Provides a historical overview of Germany's evolving approach to military force, from 'checkbook diplomacy' to the debates surrounding Kosovo and Afghanistan.
3. The crisis in Libya and the German response: from early leader to abstention: Details the chronological events from February to March 2011, tracking the shift in German diplomacy as the intervention moved toward a mandate for broader military action.
4. Explaining non-participation and abstention: Analyzes the specific domestic, strategic, and individual political factors that influenced the government's decision to withhold participation.
5. Domestic reactions and international consequences: Examines the intense internal political debate within Germany and explores the subsequent impact of the abstention on Germany's standing among its NATO and EU allies.
6. Conclusion: Summarizes findings, arguing that the abstention was a result of path-dependent skepticism, specific crisis dynamics, and internal political pressures rather than a permanent strategic realignment.
Keywords
Libya intervention, UN Security Council Resolution 1973, German foreign policy, NATO, Responsibility to Protect, Guido Westerwelle, military restraint, parliamentary reservation, multilateralism, German domestic politics, transatlantic relations, coalition policy, civil war, interventionism, German abstention
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this dissertation primarily about?
The work focuses on the German government's decision to abstain from the UN Security Council vote on the military intervention in Libya in March 2011 and its subsequent refusal to participate in the NATO mission.
What are the central thematic areas covered?
It covers the evolution of post-Cold War German military policy, the specific diplomatic chronology of the 2011 Libya crisis, and the internal institutional and political constraints governing German foreign policy.
What is the primary research question of this study?
The research asks why Germany chose to abstain from the resolution and whether this signaled a strategic redirection of German foreign policy or was a decision necessitated by temporary internal and situational factors.
Which scientific methodology is utilized in this paper?
The author employs a comprehensive, qualitative study approach, primarily utilizing 23 expert interviews with politicians, diplomats, and think-tank experts, combined with an extensive analysis of primary sources and parliamentary records.
What topics are analyzed in the main body of the work?
The main body examines the historical background of German military skepticism, the rapid shift in American and international expectations, and the specific domestic tensions within the German coalition government during the decision-making process.
How would you characterize this work through keywords?
The paper is characterized by terms such as German foreign policy, military restraint, NATO, transatlantic relations, Libya intervention, and the 'power of parliamentary reservation'.
How significant was the 'Responsibility to Protect' concept in the German decision?
The study concludes that the Responsibility to Protect played only a minor role in the actual decision-making process in Berlin, which was dominated more by concerns over military risks and domestic political considerations.
Did the German abstention permanently damage its standing within NATO?
The author argues that while the decision reinforced pre-existing doubts among allies regarding German reliability in integrated military structures, the government actively worked to mitigate this damage through other contributions, such as in Afghanistan.
- Quote paper
- Sarah Brockmeier (Author), 2012, German Policy towards Intervention in Libya, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/313297
