When Germany joined the United Nations Security Council in January 2011, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle presented a motto that would guide his country through its two-year tenure: “Responsibility, Reliability and Commitment.” Less than three months after Germany took its seat, the Security Council confronted a crisis in Libya, where the government of Muammar Gaddafi was violently suppressing protesters, Westerwelle’s motto was put to the test. On March 17th, 2011, the German Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Peter Wittig lifted his hand to signal Germany’s abstention on Security Council Resolution 1973. By voting to abstain, Wittig formalized the most controversial German foreign policy decision of recent years. The abstention resulted in irritation among Germany’s allies and an unusually heated reaction within Germany itself, causing a rift in almost all major political parties. Depending on the explanations given for the abstention, politicians and commentators have differed in their conclusions concerning what the decision means for the direction of German foreign policy. Interpretations vary from seeing the decision as a result of the particular haste and the specific circumstances of the Libya crisis to concluding that it represents a strategic shift in German foreign policy towards the BRIC countries. In order to draw conclusions about the meaning of the Libya decision for German foreign policy, it is necessary to thoroughly understand the reasons for the German abstention and the domestic reactions to the Government’s policy. This paper will examine the factors that led Germany to refrain from participating in the NATO mission in Libya and to abstain on Resolution 1973. The paper will also analyze the reactions in the German political arena and the press to the decision. It will be argued that the German policy towards the Libya intervention was not a strategic repositioning of German foreign policy. The abstention was a result of the very specific circumstances around the Libya intervention and was influenced by various factors, including uncertainty over the military risks involved, the speed in which the resolution was put forward in New York, the late switch in positions of the United States and the personal convictions of the Foreign Minister. While the abstention itself represents a break with German foreign policy traditions, the reluctance to participate in the military intervention itself is in line with these traditions.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Introduction
- Germany and the use of force
- From 'checkbook diplomacy' to the intervention in Kosovo
- Increasing contributions and persistent skepticism
- Germany and the use of force in 2011
- The crisis in Libya and the German response: from early leader to abstention
- Initial German leadership: February 15th to February 26th 2011
- From leader to skeptic: February 26th to March 15th
- Negotiating Resolution 1973 and the German decision to abstain: March 15th to March 17th
- Explaining non-participation and abstention
- The decision against military participation
- The abstention
- Domestic reactions and international consequences
- The debate in Germany
- International consequences
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This dissertation aims to analyze the factors that influenced the German government's decision to abstain from participation in the NATO mission in Libya and to abstain on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. It also examines the reactions of German political actors and the press to this decision. The paper argues that the German policy towards the Libya intervention was not a strategic repositioning of German foreign policy, but rather a response to the specific circumstances of the crisis.
- Germany's evolving approach to the use of force since 1990
- The role of the Responsibility to Protect in German foreign policy
- The influence of domestic politics on German foreign policy decision-making
- The relationship between Germany and its allies in the context of the Libya intervention
- The implications of the German abstention for German foreign policy
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
- Introduction: This chapter sets the stage for the dissertation by introducing the key events and issues surrounding the German decision to abstain on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 regarding the intervention in Libya. It highlights the controversy surrounding the decision and the range of interpretations that have emerged in its aftermath.
- Germany and the use of force: This chapter provides a historical overview of Germany's approach to the use of force since 1990, examining its evolution from "checkbook diplomacy" to its increasing involvement in international interventions. It analyzes the factors that have shaped Germany's position on the use of force, including its historical legacy, its constitutional constraints, and its domestic political environment.
- The crisis in Libya and the German response: from early leader to abstention: This chapter focuses on the German government's actions and policies during the Libyan crisis from mid-February to mid-March 2011. It examines how Germany initially took a leading role in efforts to address the crisis, only to later shift its position and abstain on Resolution 1973.
- Explaining non-participation and abstention: This chapter explores the factors that led to Germany's decision against participating in the NATO mission in Libya and its abstention on Resolution 1973. It analyzes the role of military risks, the speed of the decision-making process, the changing positions of key actors, and the personal convictions of the Foreign Minister.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
This dissertation focuses on German foreign policy, the use of force, the Responsibility to Protect, the Libyan crisis, UN Security Council Resolution 1973, NATO intervention, and the domestic and international implications of the German decision to abstain.
- Citar trabajo
- Sarah Brockmeier (Autor), 2012, German Policy towards Intervention in Libya, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/313297
