The leading question in this paper is if one specific structural reform output in the German health system, concrete the institutionalization of the Federal Joint Committee according to the SHI Modernization Act (GKV- Modernisierungsgesetz/GMG) in the beginning of 2004, is an example for building a quasi-governmental institution with limited external political accountability relations which causes an political accountability deficit.
This paper is grounded on the content and theoretical focus of the seminar Accountability, democracy and management in the welfare state, which I attended at the University Potsdam in summer semester 2014. It deals with the issue of using a couple of premises from the academic field of accountability to analyze one specific output of a reform in the German health care system in relation to the founding and the work of the Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesauschuss/ G-BA) since 2004.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 1.1 Relevance
- 1.2 Approach
- 2. Public Accountability as analytical framework in health system
- 2.1. Framework for analysing political accountability
- 2.2. Indicators for accountability deficits
- 3. The Federal Joint Committee in the German health care system.
- 3.1. Legal status & effects on accountability relations
- 3.2. Insufficient Interest Representation & Intransparency.
- 3.3. Conclusion-an example for weak political accountability and an accountability deficit?
- 4.Bibliography
Objectives and Key Themes
This paper aims to analyze the impact of the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) on political accountability in the German health system. The paper specifically explores whether the G-BA, established by the SHI Modernization Act of 2004, represents an example of a quasi-governmental institution with limited external political accountability, resulting in an accountability deficit.
- The concept of accountability and its various meanings in the context of governance.
- The framework for analyzing political accountability and its key features.
- The role and influence of the Federal Joint Committee in the German health system.
- The implications of the G-BA's structure and functioning on political accountability.
- Potential accountability deficits arising from the G-BA's decision-making processes.
Chapter Summaries
The introduction provides the context of the paper, focusing on the relevance of the Federal Joint Committee in the German health system and its potential impact on political accountability. It also briefly explores the meaning and application of accountability in the context of governance.
Chapter 2 delves into the analytical framework of public accountability in the health system, specifically focusing on political accountability. It outlines key indicators for assessing accountability deficits, laying the groundwork for the analysis of the Federal Joint Committee.
Chapter 3 examines the Federal Joint Committee's legal status, its impact on accountability relations, and its decision-making processes. It discusses issues related to interest representation, transparency, and the potential for accountability deficits.
Keywords
The key concepts explored in this paper include political accountability, accountability deficit, quasi-governmental institutions, health system reform, Federal Joint Committee, decision-making processes, interest representation, transparency, and democratic control.
- Citation du texte
- Malte Jannik Jacobs (Auteur), 2014, The Federal Joint Committee in the German health system. Political accountability deficit caused by a decoupled government institution?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/313546
