A new step to the European Integration. The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine

Table of Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgements

List of abbreviations

Introduction

1. European neighborhood policy
1.1 The Eastern Partnership: politics of inclusion
1.2 Shortcomings of the Eastern Partnership

2. Ukraine within the Eastern Partnership
2.1 History ofUkraine-European Union relations
2.2 Ukraine in the Eastern Partnership
2.3 Foreign policy ofUkraine

3. The Association Agreement as a political instrument for relations between the EU and third parties
3.1 The Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU
3.2 The political part of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine..

4. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and Visa Liberalisation
4.1 The Formation of a Free Trade Area as a key element of the new Association Agreement
4.2 Increasing Investment in the DCFTA
4.3 The liberalization of the visa-regime between Ukraine and the EU
4.4 Conclusion I

5. Challenges in Europe after signing the Association Agreement
5.1 Ukraine between the European Union and Russia
5.2 Signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement under Russian pressure

6. Future development ofthe Ukraine's European integration
6.1 Status quo of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement
6.2 Implementation of the Association Agreement - Conclusion II

Conclusion

Bibliography:

Abstract

The Association Agreement, which was signed between the European Union and Ukraine in 2014, opened a big discussion about new challenges in Europe. Many European countries signed similar Agreements and became very quickly therafter full members of the EU. Nowadays there are a lot of opinions and myths about what exactly the Ukrainian Association is, and, in general, where it should bring Ukraine and Europe

This research paper explores the objectives pursued by the EU and Ukraine by the time they signed the Agreement. It provides a full analysis and interpretation of its content and describes how Ukrainian attempt to get closer to the European Union changed the geo-political situation in Europe. This paper is important as it will cast in light the background of the present tragical events in Ukraine and will provide deeper knowledge about the situation

“Since 1991 when Ukraine gained independence, the European Union and Ukraine have developed an increasingly dynamic relationship. The impetus for this arose from a shared understanding that the prosperity, stability and security of both the European Union and Ukraine could be significantly enhanced by close partnership”

European Commission,

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Derk-Jan Eppink, Member of the European Parliament. He introduced me with the area, which I found very interesting and exciting to work on and has been a constant source of inspiration and he gave me ideas of intellectual challenge

A special debt of gratitude also goes to Prof. Dr. Georg Vobruba for his irreplaceable academic assistance and intellectual support for my thesis as well as his patience, kindness and self-sacrificing attitude

Thanks also to the interviewers in Kyiv and in Brussels for their extensive contribution to the development of this thesis and to all who supported me during this time

List of abbreviations

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Introduction

The European Neighborhood Policy that has been functioning since eleven years to maintain the EU relationship to 16 contiguous states in the South and East of the Union, has an aim to achieve safety and economic growth on both sides. However, this policy does not always succeed. The latest and most dramatic example is the Association Agreement with Ukraine, which failure to be signed in November 2013 led to the protests on the Maidan Square in Kyiv, followed by the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The agreement was the trigger, but the European Commission sees the causes in the aggressive foreign policy of Russia.

Since years European integration remains a strategic aim for Ukraine. In 1998 the European Union and Ukraine took a decisive step in up-grading the bilateral collaboration relationship by the adoption of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Initially conceived for a 10-years period, the PCA together with the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, so-called "Road Map" has provided legal and practical framework for the EU-Ukraine relations subsequently. Since both documents were limited in time, Ukraine and the European Union began to negotiate new bilateral relations in March 2007.

Two important events increased a need for a closer cooperation: on the one hand the “Orange Revolution” demonstrated Ukraine’s determination to deepen the process of domestic democratic reforms; on the other hand the Eastern enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 established a direct border between the EU and Ukraine. Both of these developments created an opportunity for the EU and Ukraine to move beyond cooperation towards gradual economic integration and deepening political association.

Ukraine holds a very important role in the ENP and in 2009 launched Eastern Partnership. During those years plenty of various projects were realized. Important documents both for Ukraine and for the European Union were signed. Many reforms were planed on the way to European standards. However, Ukraine permanently postponed implementation of the requirements proposed by the EU and demonstrated rather declarative Europeanization policy. The direction of the future European integration of Ukraine stands unclear until now.

This thesis attempts to analyse on what stage of the European integration Ukraine is today and tries to define the prospects of political association and economic integration in the future. It has an extreme significance for understanding what the AA means for Ukraine and how it could lead to European integration. The past events in Ukraine changed the political parameters and the situation has been confusing for many political analysts. Past events in Ukraine, in particular the Euromaidan, governmental change, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the final signing of the AA (political part 21 of March 2014 and economical part 21 of June 2014) reshaped the international image of the country and the geopolitics of the region between the EU and Russia.

In this context it is important to analyze the specific arrangements of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, to compare it to other EU Association Agreements with the third parties and to sum up all the pros and cons for the future European integration. This paper will focus on the following research questions carrying political and economic analysis weight: What are the main issues of the Association Agreement? What issues still need to be addressed and improved on Ukraine's way to the successful implementation of the Agreement? How the geo-political situation in Europe changed after signing the AA and how is the current situation in Ukraine?

The main hypotheses of this work are as follows:

1. The Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU does not give any guarantees for the accession to the EU and could only be seen as the basis of a prospective future membership.
2. The access to the European integration of Ukraine in the EaP is precluded because of inflexible and “naive” policy of the EU. The ENP has failed and needs to be reconsidered.
3. Russian permanent intervention in the policy decision-making of Ukraine slowdowns its integration towards Western Europe.

The main actor in this policy area is the European Union, which is seen here as a collective actor represented by the European Parliament, European Commission The role of the Ukrainian government is also mentioned, especially in the case of bilateral negotiations towards the common EaP and the Association Agreement. The research covers bilateral EU-Ukrainian relations. The focus is on the role of the ENP/EaP as a framework for the integration policy.

The topic is of great scientific, but also political and social significance. Practical application could be found in the European institutions for decision­making or political consulting. The results can be used in the educational process of higher educational establishments in the context of such themes as: "European integration of Ukraine", "Bilateral relations between Ukraine and the European Union", as well as for understanding of integrational steps in Europe. The paper can also provide a basis for further research, especially in the areas like: Russian-European relations, geopolitics or economic integration policy in Europe.

The primary source for this paper will be the original text of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA, published on the website of the European Commission in 2013.^[1] As well as other official publications of the European Commission, European Parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Protocols of the EaP Summits.

The object of study of this work is not sufficiently explored in its core issues. The latest and the most comprehensive work in this field made by Korosteleva Elena in the “Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbours?” The issue deals with the question of Ukraine’s Europeanization since the start of the EaP, achievements and the shortcomings of the policy.^[2] The authors analyze the perspectives of the EaP in the case of Ukraine and express high hopes that the new AA will lead Ukraine to the soon EU membership. Among papers that were written by non- European scholars, the most substantial ones are by Stegniy Oleksander, Babanin Oleg and Kuspus Piotr. These experts analyzed the content of the Association Agreement from the Ukrainian perspective. Their research results seem to be also quite positive concerning the prospect of the future membership.

In Europe, in contrast, there are much more critical publications about the Eastern Neignborhood policy and the future enlargement of the EU. Since Ukraine did not show a high progress in the state reforms, European researchers' point of view got pessimistic character, what can be observed in the papers of Parmentier Florent, Fraser Derek, Paczynski Wojciech and Schmidtke Oliver.

The research shortage exists in the EU-Ukraine-Russia relations that would be rarely analysed in this constellation. The bilateral relations the EU-Ukraine and the EU-Russia are better covered. To make a qualitative examination of the elements of the triangle it was necessary to combine and to compare these two dimensions. In comparison to the theoretical part of this paper, covering the history of the ENP and European relations, where predominantly the primary sources will be used, the analytical part of the last developments will be done with the help of numerous current monographs, anthologies, research papers and articles. The own interviews with some Members of the European Parliament and the Ambassador of Ukraine to the EU Konstantin Eliseev made an empirical contribution to this paper.

The paper will be a mixture of description and “data followed by analysis”, going gradually more in depth from the negotiation process to the conclusion of the AA between Ukraine and the EU. To make the argument easy to follow, chronological analysis will be used in dealing with the interval of 2007-2015 (from the beginning of negotiations to the implementation process of the AA).

The work is divided into two major parts. In the first part it will be present the current European integration policy of the EU, covered by the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership and directed to its Eastern neighbors. This section will outline the general terms of the policy and its historical background.

It will be explore the place of Ukraine within the Eastern Partnership. This helps to differentiate particularities and the prerequisites of the EU-Ukraine relations that led to the signing of the AA, including the key objectives of both parties: policy of inclusion. At least the main terms of the Association Agreement as a political instrument of EU foreign policy, special features of the Agreement with Ukraine and the main objectives agreed upon will be analysed. To add to the academic weight, comparative analysis of other EU Association Agreements with third parties will be made. It will allow to see the pattern of a country’s development after the signing of above-mentioned agreement and to understand better the peculiarity of the Ukrainian association. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area is illustrated in this part in a more detailed way as the most significant part of the Agreement.

The second part deals with the question of what kind of challenges happened in Ukraine and in the EU-Ukraine-Russia relations after signing the Association Agreement. The part is dedicated to the past events in Ukraine after the Vilnius Summit in October 2014, the war in Donbas region, as an impact of the Russian aggressive policy towards Eastern Ukraine, European participation on the decision-making in Ukraine and the current problems related to the implementation of the signed AA.

Since it is not possible to predict the future of the country in a moment of instable political situation and the delayed implementation of the DCFTA, there can be only given some forecasts of the capability of the analysed Agreement to promote integration processes of Ukraine that followed from the content.

1. European neighborhood policy

This chapter outlines a general picture of the existing EU neighborhood strategies and policies and in addition tries to elaborate a typology based on the EU's relations towards Eastern European countries. It offers an overview of the conceptual and practical limitations of the policies (ENP/EaP), stemming from a theoretical examination of policy documents and official discourse in the Europe.

Since the European Union with the present financial and institutional system cannot offer a full membership to its neighbors, other levels of integration are needed. The European Neighborhood Policy is a new basis for the current policies of the EU on its periphery. But comparing the structure of the Enlargement policy and the European Neighborhood Policy many similarities could be found. In both cases the European Union tries to bring successive peripheries to the EU core. Both policies include deeper economic relations, the approximation of laws and regulations of the economic systems and the development of the social relations. The only distinction of the new policy is the lack of the membership perspective.^[3] The encouraging point though is that the EU looks to be Pareto efficient, trying to build a system of equals, a system considering not the well being of one individual member state, but the overall well being of the entire structure.^[4]

The EU's foreign policy differs from that of the conventional states. This type of policy varies between integration steps (including certain neighbors in the EU project), stabilization (expanding “privileged partnership” with “near abroad neighbors”), bilateral agreements with medium and big powers and concluding multilateral partnership agreements with distant regions.^[5]

In the more detailed picture it is possible to observe that the neighboring countries themselves fall under certain categories: bilateral (Switzerland and some micro-states), the EEA/EFTA (Norway, Island, Lichtenstein), non­members (Russia), candidates (Turkey, Macedonia), non-members with an accession perspective (Albania, Serbia, BiH, Montenegro) and non-members with no accession perspective (ENP countries).^[6]

The foreign policy system is made up of three pillars (the Community Pillar, the CFSP, and the EU pillar) as well as foreign policies of the member states.^[7]

The interest of our study concerns mostly the Eastern dimension of the EU's neighborhood policies focusing on post-Soviet states, particularly Ukraine.

1.1 The Eastern Partnership: politics of inclusion

The EU's growing internal complexity and its interdependency with the outside world linked the EU policy from “politics of exclusion” to the “politics of inclusion”. It was seen as more advantageous for responding to radical changes of the new European order.^[8]

So called “Big Bang” enlargement in 2004, followed by Romania and Bulgaria's accession in 2007, changed not only the geographical borders in Europe, but required strategy policies in the EU's new surroundings. The year 2004 was the most important regarding the EU's approach towards its neighborhood and the EU started to draw new strategies for its new frontiers.^[9]

The crucial role in the planning of a new neighborhood policy played security issues. For this reason the EU openly used the promise of membership during the previous decade, but after removing the “carrot” of membership, the EU faced a new problem - how to ensure stability and security in its vicinity. As a response to this dilemma, the EU created a new framework of relations with its neighbors - the Eastern Neighborhood Policy (the ENP).^[10]

Initially the strategy covered 13 states, but after 2004 three Caucasian republics (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) were added. Russia has opted to stay out of this new arrangement, willing to be regarded as a special neighbor. Later the EU has launched the so-called Strategic Partnership with Moscow covering four „common spaces“: economic, freedom, security and external security.^{[11] [12] [13]}

The ENP-concept includes two goals:

- It propagates the aim of consolidating democracy by transferring liberal and democratic rules outside its borders;
- It intends, from security perspective, to create a stable circle of surrounding states.12,13

As mentioned above, the Union has different types of agreements and economic assistance programs and utilizes all of the four foreign policy practices: enlargement (towards core states), stabilization (towards neighbors), bilateralism (towards big powers) and interregionalism (towards far away regions). While trying to ensure security of its borders, the EU uses different combination of the four main foreign policy approaches.^[14] A wide range of foreign policy instruments was put into effect: from trade and customs union agreements to financial and technical assistance and cooperation.^[15]

According to Karen Smith, the EU pursues five foreign policy objectives: promotion of regional cooperation, promotion of human rights, promotion of democracy and good governance, prevention of violent conflicts and fight against the international crime.^[16] Four out of five of these objectives are mostly pursued by member states, independently from the Union's context, which appears in their national policy agendas.^[17]

A time line of dynamics and evolution of the EU's regional initiatives and an overview, which of these four practices does the EU apply to which of its neighbor are given below, as well as what kind of contractual agreements and assistance programs does it have towards Eastern group of neighbors.^[18]

illustration not visible in this excerpt^{[19] [20]}

Initially known as the ‘Wider Europe’ and ‘Proximity Policy,’ the ENP was created as an extension of existing regional and bilateral relations that had been established with non-EU countries in the Mediterranean region through the Barcelona Process and in the Eastern Europe through various Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA). With the ENP, the EU sought to address certain problems encountered inherent in these existing agreements and bring them up-to-date with the current political situation. To be more specific, the EU aimed to “develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood - “ring of friends” - with whom the EU enjoys close and peaceful cooperative relations”.^[21]

The ENP’s aim of influencing the economic integration of the participated countries is explicitly fixed in Commission’s non-paper:

“The economic integration of ENP partner countries with the European Union is not only an incentive and reward for economic and regulatory reform in our neighboring countries; in a globilized economy, it is also of interest to the EU to build a common EU-ENP area of economic integration where the same or similar regulatory standarts apply. Yet the challenge with regard to most ENP partners is how to engage them to pursue their ongoing reform process and to lock in the results”.^[22]

On one hand the ENP offers a new form of enlargement and attracting partner countries with deeper co-operation perspective and financial aid; however, on the other hand, it excluded them from the EU's prospective membership due to enlargement limitations, institutional difficulties and yet pending membership commitments to other countries.^[23] This strategy excluded new partners from integration prospects, but in the meantime deprived the EU itself the greatest normative leverage over them. Not a surprise that ENP received soon a mixed and delegitimizing response from the eastern neighbours who were either hesitant or indeed rejective from the outset. The new initiative was necessary to facilitate closer co-operation with the region.^[24]

The first idea of a new policy framework towards the direct geographical neighbors after the Eastern enlargment voiced the European Commission on 11 of March 2003 that offered a wider and more far-reaching vision of cooperation with participated countries.^[25]

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) that was proposed by Poland and Sweden on 26 of May 2008 and officially inaugurated on 7 of May 2009 at the Prague summit, during the Czech presidency in the EU, and it is for now the newest initiative of the above mentioned multiple neighborhood strategies. For many enlargement commissioners the EaP is seen as the most consistent and so far successful foreign policy of the EU.^[26] According to the Commission, the initiative is intended to complement the ENP by developing deeper bilateral ties with the member countries and to contribute to their further economic integration.^[27]

It covers five following countries: Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan (the ENP also includes Mediterranean states). To some extent it involves countries that surround them - Poland, Lithuania and Russia. Special feature of this region is a shared neighborhood between the Union and the Russian Federation and the rivalry between these two big regional superpowers. Revamped Russian imperial ambitions are playing a crucial role in effecting regional security. Initially, this region was a part of the common European Neighborhood Policy, but with respect to clear negative influence pressure from their "insider" supporters, as well as considering the Russian attack on Georgia and endless Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes, the EU felt forced to create a new, more varied policy towards this region.^[28]

All the existing financial instruments towards the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries were unified by a comprehensive the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which is directed to an easier and more flexible access to funds for joint cross-border cooperation projects.^[29]

Basically it seeks to pursue greater differentiation towards the front-runners, such as Ukraine, and also to provide more possibilities for the less experienced countries, with the ambitions to join the Neighborhood Economic Community in the future. The EaP consists of four thematic platforms: good governance and democracy, energy security, economic convergence with EU legislation and people-to people contacts, to be embedded through new association agreements.^[30]

The so-called agreements of a new generation, should be more adapted to each country's needs than the previous PCAs, as well as deep and comprehensive free trade agreements for the countries that are willing to close deeper commitments with the EU (e.g. Ukraine). DCFTAs, based on WTO rules, should cover „substantially all trade, including energy, and aim at the highest degree of liberalization“. The EaP follows three directions in its policy: fostering extensive political connections through association agreements; enhancing economic integration through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements and increasing mobility. Main ways of cooperation are the Eastern Partnership Summit, meetings of foreign affairs ministers and other ministers, as well as with working groups, the European Parliament (Euronest) and civil society.^[31]

Since the European Union is not ready to offer the EU membership, the AA is without any doubts the most effective political asset in its Eastern neighborhood. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, as a second important instrument is aimed at aligning neighboring state's standards and regulations with European ones. This objective concerns only three countries of the EaP: Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Azerbaijan, as not a WTO member (which is a pre-requisite), Belarus, that tend to the membership in the Eurasian Union and Armenia, that turned to Russia too, were excluded from DCFTA negotiations.^[32]

Since these Eastern countries have got an important transit function in energy infrastructure (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia) or energy resources (Azerbaijan), they play a key role for the EU's energy diversification. Mobility and Security Pacts (MSPs), as well as the possible accesion in the Energy Community Treaty, like it was with the Western Balkans, should increase cooperation on energy security and will improve mobility and security conditions between the EU and its partners (corruption, illegal immigration, etc.).^[33]

The main elements of the EaP are the bilateral Action Plans agreed and signed between the EU and a separately taken partner.^[34] This fact gives a ground to state that the EaP is not a homogenous policy but rather a differentiated one, since the Action Plans are individual and the agendas of political and economic reforms are theoretically tailored to the needs of each country and their willingness to cooperate with the Union.35,36 The removal of the ENP's Southern partners from the EaP made it more coherent and easier to design multilateral policies towards the Eastern neighbors.^{[35] [36] [37]}

1.2 Shortcomings of the Eastern Partnership

Arguments of “inclusion” that were used by design of neighborhood policy, aim to blur the differences between the insiders and the outsiders, without necessitating their amalgamation. In order to prevent new dividing lines that would emerge between a more prosperous Europe and iťs less stable backyard, the EU sought to offer to the latter an inclusive policy of partnership - “a kind of partnership that would push EU boundaries to the limits of interconnectedness by proffering political association and economic integration to the neighborhood, but nevertheless would prevent neighbors physical accession to the EU- to share everything with the Union but institutions”.^[38]

In particular, „shared values“ have become fully institutionalized as „the values of the Union“ by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 7a). And „joint ownership“, which intended to avoid EU imposition and unilateralism, has been replaced by mutual obligations under the Eastern Partnership, which stresses the meaning decreasing of ownership altogether.^[39] Guided by its own agenda, the EU clearly fails to discriminate between its own priorities and what would constitute “mutual interests”, or indeed what would constitute “access” rather than “control”.^[40] External experts consider the EU relations with its neighbors as a one-way traffic, based on the donor-recipient formula. Bilateral relations prefered by the EU, allow in fact to pursue unilateralist policy towards weak neighbors and to strengthen the EUs bargaining position.^[41] This one way politicy is not able to recognize the existence of “the other” in the partnership, that may equally have, as sovereign entities, their own boundaries to consider and to shift, and whose interests and needs appear to be excluded a priori from their equations of partnership with the EU.^{[42] [43]}

Therefore, it is very difficult to agrue if the new initiative is likely more successfull, and consequently more legitimate, since it promotes the old presumption of EU centrality to the outside world, including their neighbor countries. The EaP as a form of an ambitious partnership and a deep co­operation appears to be in reality a “projecting EU model” to the outsiders, whereby it represents EU strategic interests, especially of security on one side and partners that are largely perceived as “needy” - “wanting membership, or money”.

If in the past the neighborhood policy stood for EU's pre-accession strategy, now it is gradually developing into regional economic cooperation models.^[44] The question is if economic incentives are really that attractive to commit partner countries to painful political reforms?

The last experiences demonstrated that in reality the EU has not been productive in projecting its norms and values or normative power in circumstances when the memebrship has been excluded from incentives or long run and vague perspectives that offer too little motivation for the EaP's advanced partners.^[45] The entire picture can be changed with the new kind of regional economic cooperation model in form of Association Agrements.

[...]

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^[1] European Commission 2013. In: http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/assoagreement/assoagreement2013_en.htm [assecced 16.03.2015].

^[2] Korosteleva 2012, p. 20.

^[3] Vobruba 2007. In: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-02-28-vobruba-de.html [accessed 01.03.2015].

^[4] From the interview with Werner Schulz, Member of European Parliament (Election Period: 2009-2014).

^[5] Korosteleva 2012, p. 24.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Ejoshvili 2010, p. 14.

^[8] Ibid. p. 4./ Vobruba 2007.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Korosteleva 2012, p.54.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] European Commission 2004, p.1.

^[13] ENP is often seen as an effort of European Union to export its legislative and political model to an unstable region that could be a potential source of destabilization too (Parmentier 2013, p. 3.)

^[14] Korosteleva 2012, p. 54.

^[15] European Commission 2004, p.1.

^[16] Korosteleva 2012, p.58.

^[17] Ibid. p. 58.

^[18] Lewis 2002, p. 27.

^[19] ENP plus was a proposal drafted during the 2006 German EU presidency advocating for developing a differentiation approach within the ENP and proposing upgraded and more inclusive partnership with the EU's eastern neighborhood's „forrunners“ (Ibid. p.30).

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Spech of Romano Prodi on 5-6 December 2002. In: europa.eu/.../press-release_SPEECH-02- 619_en.doc [accessed 20.03.2015].

^[22] European Commission 2006, p. 2.

^[23] Ejoshvili 2010, p. 5.

^[24] Korosteleva 2012, p. 1.

^[25] European Commission 2003.

^[26] From the Interview with Pawel Kowal, Member of European Parliament (Election Period: 2014-2019).

^[27] European Commission 2008.

^[28] Korosteleva 2012, p.37.

^[29] Current proposed total amount is 600 million euro. 250 million will come from the ENPI's existing budget from 2010-2013 and 350 million will be additionally fundraised from the proposed sources like European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well as funds from individual Member States. In: web-site: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about- us/index_en.htm [Accessed 15.10.2014].

^[30] From the interview with Werner Schulz, Member of European Parliament (Election Period: 2009-2014).

^[31] Parmentier 2013, p. 3.

^[32] Ibid. p. 8.

^[33] European Commission 2008.

^[34] “Action plans are the main operational instruments, individualized and country-specific documents. They set up short and medium-term agendas (3-5 years) and objectives mainly in the area of political and economic reforms. They offer benefits based on the progress made and periodically evaluated by the Commission. Responsible for promoting and monitoring implementation of the Action Plans are specially established Association and Cooperation Councils, Commitees and sub-Commitees” In: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm [accessed: 03.11.2014].

^[35] For example, while an enhanced agreement was negotiated with Ukraine, Morocco negotiated on an „advanced status“ and Israel on an „upgrading relationship“.

^[36] Korosteleva 2012, p. 55.

^[37] Lewis 2002, p. 80.

^[38] Korosteleva 2012, p. 55.

^[39] It is about injecting European values into the neigborhood and aligning them with Europe, rather than vice versa: Co-operation on EU-terms or no co-operation at all.

^[40] Korosteleva 2012, p. 6.

^[41] For example, the regional initiative “Black Sea Synergy” had allegedly taken account of the wishes of the Black Sea countries. But, in reality, it was mainly designed for countries of the region that are already members of the EU (Bulgaria, Romania and Greece). In this way, the EU had demonstrated clearly to whom its policies were primarily directed, and whose interests were at stake. (Stegniy, Oleksandr. 2012, p. 62).

^[42] Korosteleva 2012, p. 7.

^[43] Ibid. p. 8.

^[44] Lewis 2002, p. 92.

^[45] Lewis 2002, p. 93.