John R. Searle was born in 1932 in Denver, Colorado. In his article What is a Speech Act? Searle develops a “theory in the philosophy of a language, according to which speaking in a language is a matter of performing illocutionary acts with certain intentions, according to constitutive rules (Grewendorf / Meggle 2002: 4). The following paper will deal with the ideas on speech acts developed in Searle’s article.
First, a fundamental understanding of the assumptions Searle’s theory is based on will be provided. There will be a brief introduction to the theories of J.L. Austin and H.P. Grice, whom Searle’s article was mostly influenced by. Grice’s Meaning and Austin’s How to do things with words will constitute the reading mostly consulted.
After providing a basis for Searle’s theory, his article What is a Speech Act? will be looked at in detail. The examinations will include Searle’s distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules and his introduction of the notions ‘proposition-indicating element’ and ‘function-indicating device’, as derived from ‘illocutionary act’ and ‘propositional content of an illocutionary act’. The focus will then be on Searle’s conditions for the illocutionary act of promising, and the rules for the use of the function-indicating device for promising, which he derives from these conditions.
There will finally be a brief overview on revisions and amendments Searle developed on his theory after 1965. These include a more detailed classification of speech acts and a distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Influences on Searle’s “What is a speech act?”
2.1. Grice’s Meaning (1957)
2.2. Austin’s How to do things with Words
3. John R. Searle: What is a Speech Act?
4. Searle’s further linguistic examinations
5. Conclusion
Research Objectives and Topics
This paper aims to provide a foundational understanding of John R. Searle's theory of speech acts, primarily as developed in his seminal article "What is a Speech Act?". The study explores the theoretical precursors to Searle’s work, specifically the linguistic contributions of J.L. Austin and H.P. Grice, before examining Searle’s own framework, which includes his distinction between constitutive and regulative rules and his conditions for the illocutionary act of promising.
- Theoretical foundations in the philosophy of language
- Influence of J.L. Austin’s and H.P. Grice’s meaning theories
- Distinction between regulative and constitutive rules
- Analysis of the conditions for the illocutionary act of promising
- Classification of speech acts and the gap between speaker and sentence meaning
Excerpt from the Book
3. John R. Searle: What is a Speech Act?
Searle begins by pointing out that he will focus his examinations on Speech Acts on what Austin called „Illocutionary Acts”. Searle then describes this Illocutionary Act as “the production of the sentence token under certain conditions” and as “the minimal unit of linguistic communication” (1996: 110). His final goal is to find rules for performing an illocutionary act. In order to do so, he first deals with the notions “rules, propositions and meaning” (1996: 111).
Searle starts by distinguishing between regulative rules and constitutive rules. The former “regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior” (1996: 111) while the latter refer to forms of behavior that only exist because of this particular rule. As an example for a regulative rule, Searle mentions the rules of etiquette: The relationship between two people does exist without these rules. According to Searle, regulative rules “can be paraphrased by imperatives” (1996: 111) with the form “If Y do X” (1996: 112). Constitutive rules, on the other hand, are nonimperative and we often don’t perceive them “as rules at all” (1996: 112). Searle gives the example of the rules of football: The game only exists because of the rules. Constitutive rules can have the same form as regulative rules (“if Y do X”), but they also have the form “X counts as Y” (1996: 112). The semantics of a language consists of “a series of systems of constitutive rules” (1996: 112). Illocutionary acts are “performed in accordance with these rules”. Searle wants to find the regulative rules for a certain speech act and expects these rules to be imperatives.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: The introduction outlines the biographical context of John R. Searle and defines the primary objective of analyzing his theory on speech acts, building upon the foundational works of Austin and Grice.
2. Influences on Searle’s “What is a speech act?”: This chapter introduces the theoretical concepts of meaning proposed by H.P. Grice and the classification of speech acts established by J.L. Austin as the basis for Searle’s own theory.
3. John R. Searle: What is a Speech Act?: The core of the analysis, this chapter examines Searle’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules and the detailed nine conditions required for the illocutionary act of promising.
4. Searle’s further linguistic examinations: This section covers Searle’s later contributions, including his five-fold classification of speech acts and the exploration of the distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning.
5. Conclusion: The conclusion summarizes Searle’s contribution to philosophy, highlighting his success in formulating semantic rules for speech acts and pointing toward future research paths.
Keywords
Speech Acts, John R. Searle, J.L. Austin, H.P. Grice, Illocutionary Act, Constitutive Rules, Regulative Rules, Meaning, Promising, Propositional Content, Function-Indicating Device, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, Semantics, Utterance
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental focus of this paper?
The paper focuses on John R. Searle's "What is a Speech Act?", specifically analyzing how he builds a theory of language based on illocutionary acts and constitutive rules.
What are the central themes discussed in the work?
Central themes include the nature of meaning, the differentiation between various types of linguistic rules, the conditions for performing specific speech acts like promising, and the classification of illocutionary acts.
What is the primary goal of the author?
The primary goal is to explain and examine the framework Searle developed in 1965 to understand how speaking is a matter of performing acts with specific intentions under constitutive rules.
Which scientific methods are utilized?
The work employs a theoretical and analytical method, reviewing existing philosophical literature and interpreting the primary texts of Searle, Austin, and Grice.
What is covered in the main body of the work?
The main body covers the influence of predecessors, the detailed rules Searle extracts for promising, and his later linguistic examinations regarding metaphorical meaning and classifications of speech acts.
Which keywords characterize this work?
The work is characterized by terms such as Speech Acts, Illocutionary Act, Constitutive Rules, Philosophy of Language, and Meaning.
How does Searle distinguish between regulative and constitutive rules?
Searle defines regulative rules as those that govern pre-existing behavior (like etiquette) and constitutive rules as those that define the very existence of a behavior (like the rules of football).
What are the nine conditions for a promise according to Searle?
Searle outlines nine conditions involving normal communication, propositional content, preparatory factors, sincerity, and the essential obligation, though he notes that some are more relevant for the specific rule-making task than others.
Why does Searle emphasize the distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning?
He highlights this to address phenomena like irony and metaphor, where there is a clear gap between the literal meaning of a sentence and what the speaker actually intends to convey.
- Quote paper
- Franziska Müller (Author), 2016, What is a Speech Act? A brief introduction to Searle’s theory on speech acts, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/345644
