This study applies theory-building causal process tracing to the institutionalization of the CIA's EIT programme. It thereby identifies a casual mechanism endemic to a public bureaucracy that functions as an intelligence agency. Secrecy practices and the nature of covert action create an imperfect information market, wherein informal influence is concentrated in small groups. The actions of these small groups might hamper organizational learning and lead to organizational dysfunctions. In the case of the CIA this is shown to be relevant because of the central role the agency’s Counterterrorism Center played in the causal chain leading up to the EIT institutionalization. Future studies should test this mechanism in the context of intelligence agencies other than the CIA.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction: environments and decisions
2 Literature overview: the relevant data sources and theoretical inputs
3 Method: how to use CPT for theory-building
4 Concept specification: What is an intelligence agency?
5 Inspiration: building a first theoretical construct
5.1 The macro-level perspective: a simple principal-agent-model
5.2 Going deeper: micro-level implications of secrecy
6 Collecting evidence: explaining the torture case with CPT
6.1 Comprehensive storyline: a macro-level tale of institutional torture
6.2 Causal chain: a micro-level retracing of the steps
6.2.1 Phase 1: setting the stage in 2001
6.2.2 Phase 2: the rationalization of torture in 2002
6.2.3 Phase 3: the EITs' institutionalization in 2003
6.3 Leveraging the inspiration: How do the preliminary hypotheses hold up?
7 Refinement: building a causal mechanism
8 Conclusion
Research Objectives & Core Themes
This thesis examines the causal mechanisms behind the institutionalization of the CIA's "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" (EITs) programme, exploring why intelligence bureaucracies may adopt morally ambiguous and ineffective practices through unintended organizational dysfunction.
- Theoretical analysis of intelligence agency decision-making processes.
- Application of Causal Process Tracing (CPT) to specific CIA history case studies.
- Examination of the relationship between secrecy, information asymmetry, and organizational learning.
- Development of a generalizable model explaining bureaucratic administrative behaviour.
Excerpt from the Book
1 Introduction: environments and decisions
In 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was about to launch a new interrogation programme, involving torture techniques, for high-value detainees associated with al-Qaeda. Long-time CIA lawyer and at that time the agency’s acting General Counsel, John Rizzo, was heavily involved in rationalizing the so-called “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” (EITs); so much so that some even labelled him the “CIA Torture Advocate”. In his memoirs, he writes that after seeing a picture of the very first man the CIA would go on to torture he was...
...struck [...] by how ordinary and unprepossessing - almost nerdy - he looked. It caused me to recall the famous title of Hannah Arendt's 1963 book on the trial of Adolph [sic] Eichmann: The Banality of Evil. (Rizzo 2014: 182)
Unfortunately, Rizzo does not further elaborate on this spontaneous association and does, therefore, not see the immense irony in his statement. Hannah Arendt's (1963) baffling insights about the Nazi bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann ring true not just for al-Qaeda terrorists, as John Rizzo insinuates. But they ironically seem fit to describe CIA bureaucrats, just like Rizzo himself, involved in institutionalizing torture techniques:
[I]t would have been very comforting indeed to believe that Eichmann was a monster [...] The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. [...] this new type of criminal [...] commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong. (Arendt 1963: 276)
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: environments and decisions: This chapter introduces the core problem of the institutionalization of torture within the CIA and contextualizes the agency's bureaucratic environment.
2 Literature overview: the relevant data sources and theoretical inputs: This section surveys existing academic and historical accounts of CIA administrative behaviour, identifying gaps in current theory regarding intelligence-specific dysfunctions.
3 Method: how to use CPT for theory-building: The chapter defines the methodological approach of Causal Process Tracing and justifies its application for building theories in qualitative case studies.
4 Concept specification: What is an intelligence agency?: This chapter establishes a formal definition of an intelligence agency using a three-level framework to distinguish it from general public bureaucracies.
5 Inspiration: building a first theoretical construct: This chapter develops initial theoretical propositions and hypotheses based on principal-agent models and organizational secrecy.
6 Collecting evidence: explaining the torture case with CPT: This chapter presents the empirical application of CPT to the CIA's EIT programme, tracking the decision-making chain from 2001 to 2003.
7 Refinement: building a causal mechanism: The final analytical chapter synthesizes the findings into a generalizable causal mechanism of how intelligence agencies produce organizational dysfunctions.
8 Conclusion: This chapter summarizes the findings and proposes how the identified causal mechanism can be tested in future studies of different intelligence organizations.
Keywords
CIA, Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Causal Process Tracing, Secrecy, Intelligence Agency, Organizational Dysfunction, Principal-Agent Model, Bureaucratic Politics, Information Asymmetry, Institutionalization, Counterterrorism Center, Torture, Administrative Behaviour, Accountability, Bounded Rationality
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this thesis?
The thesis focuses on explaining the administrative behaviour of the CIA, specifically investigating why the agency institutionalized morally ambiguous and ineffective interrogation techniques despite its mandate.
What primary methodology is employed?
The author uses theory-building Causal Process Tracing (CPT), analyzing historical evidence and documents to construct a plausible causal mechanism for institutional dysfunction.
How does the work define an intelligence agency?
It uses a three-level framework to define an intelligence agency as a public bureaucracy characterized by specific mandates for covert action, an immense amount of secrecy, and intelligence activities.
What is the central research question?
The research explores the systemic reasons why intelligence bureaucrats behave differently than those in other public administrations, specifically concerning the institutionalization of unintended, dysfunctional practices.
What role does secrecy play in this study?
Secrecy is identified as a structural characteristic that creates an "imperfect information market," allowing small groups to centralize influence, expand their authority, and shield their miscalculations from organizational oversight.
What are the main theoretical contributions?
The study provides a causal mechanism that links structural factors (secrecy, mandates) to unintended consequences (organizational dysfunctions), bridging the gap between macro-level structural conditions and micro-level individual rational actions.
How did the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) influence the EIT programme?
The CTC, being a powerful subunit, used its privileged position to push for the development of its own interrogation capabilities, effectively interpreting vague top-level mandates to satisfy subunit goals rather than the agency's primary mission.
What significance do the "smoking gun" observations have?
These observations, such as internal memos and email traffic, are used to substantiate the author's arguments and cross-reference claims made in actor memoirs with established official records.
- Citation du texte
- Maximilian Woidich (Auteur), 2016, What makes intelligence agencies tick? In search of a causal mechanism in CIA administrative behavior, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/346353
