The on-going process of technological innovation and expansion combined with a more and more fast-paced, dynamic and global world result in a slow take over of computers and artificial intelligence in fundamental human task areas. One example of how technological progress invades into our daily life is the invention of dating applications that enhance the search for a possible relationship partner by providing a distinct platform for people with similar purposes.
Since the interaction on these platforms are simultaneous actions of a group of human beings that yield a specific result – getting to know possible partners – the situation can be analysed from a game theoretic perspective. During this paper I will firstly elaborate on the underlying assumptions of my model. Afterwards I am developing a formal framework that allows to explore the phenomenon from a rather objective and rational perspective. The quintessence of this setup is that the problem at hand can be identified as a repeated collective prisoners’ dilemma or an example of the tragedy of commons. In a final step I will provide several possible solutions to improve the efficiency of the analysed market / social interactions. Two of these approaches are very game theoretical, while I also included two more market-oriented approaches to provide a multidimensional perspective on the issue.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Definition of the Problem and Assumptions
3. Derivation of the Problem
4. Possible Solutions
4.1. Internalization of Costs
4.2. Introduce new “types” of men
4.3. Market Restriction
4.4. Market design
5. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper aims to analyze the behavioral patterns of male users on dating applications through the lens of game theory. By identifying the phenomenon as a repeated collective prisoner's dilemma or a tragedy of the commons, the research explores why current market structures lead to inefficient outcomes and proposes strategic interventions to improve platform efficiency.
- Application of game theory to digital dating platforms
- Analysis of male user behavior and platform interaction
- Identification of the "tragedy of the commons" in female attention
- Evaluation of market-oriented and theoretical solution models
Excerpt from the Book
3. Derivation of the Problem
The following mathematical derivations will show that although rating every woman as a possible date is rational behaviour from an individual perspective, it’s neither the social nor the individual maximum that could be achieved.
Most of economic goods can be broadly classified by using the following matrix: Based on the assumptions mentioned in chapter 2, women’s attention therefore can be classified as a Common resource for our further analysis: When person A is receiving attention of a woman, this does not exclude any other man from receiving that woman’s attention. However, as stated before, we assume that too many men striving for a woman’s attention lead to less interest of that woman on all men on that platform – whether they are showing interest (yet) or not. This makes women’s attention rivalrous.
In the next step we will build a model (based on Diekert 2012) to show how these features lead to a tragedy of the commons of women’s attention, an excessive signalling of men’s interest in women.
We define the relative amount of likes that men will give the women as a: a ∈ [0,1]
The relative amount of acceptances induces costs that are determined by a function c(a). Moreover, a yields an amount of matches M (depending on a and the total amount of existing women’s interest on that platform, W). The amount of matches can be translated to utility by multiplying with a factor q. Since time preferences are part of human’s nature, we discount the complete personal benefit exponentially at a rate r.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Presents the technological context of dating apps and outlines the research objective to analyze them using game-theoretic models.
2. Definition of the Problem and Assumptions: Defines the scope of the study, focusing on male user behavior and the underlying rational assumptions for the model.
3. Derivation of the Problem: Mathematically models the interaction on dating apps as a tragedy of the commons regarding the finite resource of female attention.
4. Possible Solutions: Discusses strategic mechanisms, such as cost internalization and market restrictions, to transition from a prisoner's dilemma to a socially optimal state.
5. Conclusion: Summarizes findings, affirming that the current dating app market is inefficient and requires structural changes to overcome the tragedy of the commons.
Keywords
Game Theory, Dating Applications, Prisoner's Dilemma, Tragedy of the Commons, Female Attention, Nash Equilibrium, Market Design, Behavioral Economics, Rational Choice, Digital Interaction, Optimization, Externalities, Modeling, Social Efficiency, User Behavior
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this research paper?
The paper focuses on analyzing the behavior of male users on dating applications using game theory, specifically modeling the interaction as a repeated prisoner's dilemma or tragedy of the commons.
What are the central themes discussed in the work?
Central themes include the allocation of limited female attention, the inefficiency of current dating market structures, and the impact of individual rational behavior on collective social outcomes.
What is the main objective or research question?
The research seeks to demonstrate that individual rational behavior in dating apps leads to market inefficiency and aims to propose potential structural improvements to enhance social and individual utility.
Which scientific method is utilized in this paper?
The author utilizes a game-theoretic framework, specifically employing dynamic optimization models and payoff matrices, supplemented by existing literature on the "tragedy of the commons."
What is covered in the main body of the text?
The main body covers the mathematical derivation of the problem using optimization equations, the classification of the market, and the proposal of four distinct solution strategies to improve efficiency.
Which keywords best characterize this study?
Key terms include Game Theory, Dating Applications, Tragedy of the Commons, Female Attention, Market Design, and Nash Equilibrium.
How does the author define the "Common resource" in this model?
The author defines the attention of women on the platform as a common resource that becomes rivalrous when too many men compete for it, leading to decreased platform interest.
What solution does the author propose regarding "Internalization of Costs"?
The author suggests that making users pay (via real currency or in-app tokens) for every "like" could internalize externalities and incentivize more deliberate, efficient user behavior.
Why does the author classify the situation as a Prisoner's Dilemma?
It is classified as a prisoner's dilemma because individual rational behavior leads to a state that is not socially optimal, where a cooperative strategy would yield better results for the entire user base.
- Citation du texte
- Frederik Frank (Auteur), 2016, Game theoretical approach to dating applications, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/367465
