The Philosophy of Personal Identity which bears a rich tradition dating back to some of the seminal psychological theory of identity forwarded by John Locke. In this essay, I propose a new variation of an imperfect psychological criterion of personal identity that attempts to precisely answer the question, "What is necessary and sufficient for a person to be the same person over time?"
Though various experts in this field such as Derek Parfit have forwarded skepticism and outright rejection of conventional theories of personal identity, this paper appeals to metaphysical notions of immanent causality in an effort to respond to Parfit and formulate a framework of identity that explains and satisfies what are often closely held intuitions on personhood.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.
2. Exposition.
3. Critical Analysis of Objections and Responses
4. Conclusion.
Objectives and Topics
This essay aims to establish a framework for personal identity based on the phenomenological concept of a continued stream of consciousness. By integrating emergentism from the philosophy of mind, the author seeks to provide a more robust criterion for identity over time that accounts for the subjective experience of the self and resolves dilemmas posed by physical duplication thought experiments.
- The role of subjective consciousness in defining personal identity.
- Critique of existing physical and psychological theories of identity.
- Application of emergentism to explain conscious streams.
- The concept of immanent causality as a necessary condition for continuity.
- Addressing epistemological concerns and objections to the proposed framework.
Excerpt from the Book
Introduction.
In his 1984 book, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit develops a formulation of the famous teletransporter paradox to dissect our notions of personhood. Parfit asks the reader to imagine entering a teletransporter machine that induces sleep, records all of the relevant information about her physical composition, destroys her, and transmits the information to another planet to produce a precise replica of the individual out of new matter. It seems reasonable to expect that the replicated reader have all of the memories possessed before destruction, all of the same opinions, intentions, and subtle physical annoyances that accompany owning a physical body. Quite simply, this replica would appear to be identical to the original individual in all observable, qualitative aspects. Parfit suggests the possibility of a modified machine that not only preserves the existence of the original individual entering the machine, but is capable of infinitely duplicating exact physical replicas of the individual from new matter. From the seeming absurdity of considering oneself to be identical with a possibly infinite number of simultaneously existing entities, Parfit chooses to abandon the concept of sameness of person altogether.
Although I disagree with Parfit’s conclusion, his thought experiment precisely extracts what I find to be the quintessential deficiency in many formulations of personal identity theory, both psychological and physical. In imagining a case of precise duplication, in spite of the proposed duplicate being identical in seemingly every qualitative respect, a simple question presents itself: when I enter the teletransporter and fall asleep, why should I expect to necessarily or even possibly wake up as any of these the duplicates? If I cannot anticipate the consequence of awaking, it appears as though the most essential and important aspect of my personhood, my own subjective experience, is omitted entirely.
Chapter Summaries
Introduction.: The author introduces Parfit’s teletransporter paradox to highlight the limitations of current identity theories and proposes a new framework centered on subjective conscious experience.
Exposition.: This chapter explores the foundations of conscious identity through Locke and James, introducing the author’s emergentist approach and the concept of immanent causality as a mechanism for continuity.
Critical Analysis of Objections and Responses: The author addresses potential critiques regarding the use of emergentism and memory theory, defending the focus on a continuous stream of consciousness as the primary determinant of identity.
Conclusion.: The concluding remarks reflect on the importance of continuing to explore personal identity through the lens of diverse philosophical theories.
Keywords
Personal Identity, Consciousness, Emergentism, Teletransporter Paradox, Immanent Causality, Philosophy of Mind, Subjective Experience, Memory Theory, Numerical Identity, Physical Continuity, Personhood, Metaphysics of Causation, Stream of Consciousness, Derek Parfit, John Locke.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental focus of this investigation?
The paper fundamentally investigates the nature of personal identity over time, specifically challenging the idea that identity can be reduced to mere physical or psychological duplication.
What are the central thematic fields explored?
The central themes include the philosophy of mind, the nature of consciousness, metaphysical definitions of identity, and the critique of biological versus psychological criteria for being a person.
What is the primary objective of this work?
The primary objective is to propose a framework that defines personal identity based on a continuous stream of consciousness emerging from a dynamic physical basis, thereby overcoming the flaws of existing identity models.
Which scientific or philosophical method is employed?
The author uses a philosophical methodology that incorporates thought experiments, logical analysis of identity conditions, and the application of emergentism to clarify how conscious states persist.
What is covered in the main body of the text?
The main body evaluates Parfit’s teletransporter paradox, explains the emergentist perspective on consciousness, defines immanent causality, and critiques alternative theories like memory theory and biological criteria.
How can this work be categorized by its keywords?
It is characterized by keywords such as personal identity, emergentism, consciousness, immanent causality, and personhood, reflecting its deep engagement with metaphysical and philosophical concerns.
How does the concept of "immanent causality" support the author's theory?
Immanent causality provides the necessary link of persistence for physical particles within the brain, ensuring that a stream of consciousness remains tied to the same physical structure even as matter is replaced.
Why does the author argue that biological criteria for identity are insufficient?
The author argues that biological definitions lead to counterintuitive conclusions, such as identifying a person with an organism after a total brain transplant, which ignores the preservation of the individual's psychological characteristics.
- Quote paper
- Seth Carter (Author), 2017, Consciousness and Personal Identity. An Investigation, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/371665
