In his essay "The Self and the Future," Bernard Williams conveys two formulations of a thought experiment designed both to clarify the issue of personal identity over time while also revealing the keen methodological limitations of philosophical thought experiments in objectively overriding our intuitions. In this paper, the author seeks to analyze Williams' conclusions of both experiments and determine that one formulation suffers from weaknesses in its semantic and structure that make it indefensible relative to the other more tenable interpretation. Furthermore the author concludes that while the comparison of the two thought experiments in Williams' paper leads to much needed skepticism on the role of thought experiments, that the second formulation Williams' proposes is nonetheless reveals a sound possible basis for personal identity over time.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Response to Bernard Williams "The Self and the Future"
- The First Instance of Williams' Thought Experiment
- The Second Instance of Williams' Thought Experiment
- Clarifying the Distinction Between the Two Thought Experiments
- Problems in the First Instance of Williams' Thought Experiment
- Objections to the Conclusion of Williams' Second Thought Experiment
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This essay analyzes Bernard Williams' thought experiment concerning personal identity. Williams presents two scenarios that lead to different conclusions about the preservation of identity, despite methodological similarities. The essay argues that the second instance of the experiment provides a more accurate characterization of identity, while the first instance relies on questionable assumptions. The essay examines the language employed in each experiment and the implications of psychological and physical changes through specific examples.
- The Nature of Personal Identity
- Thought Experiments in Philosophy
- The Relationship Between Memory, Character, and Identity
- The Role of Bodily Continuity in Personal Identity
- The Limits of Psychological Continuity in Defining Identity
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
- The essay begins by introducing Bernard Williams' thought experiment in which a researcher transfers the memories and character of two individuals, A and B, into each other's bodies. Williams argues that the individuals' testimonies after the transfer suggest that their identities have been transferred to the new bodies.
- The essay then presents the second instance of Williams' thought experiment, in which an individual is told that he will be tortured tomorrow and that his memories will be replaced with those of another person. The essay argues that the individual's fear of the future torture demonstrates that his concern for his future self is not solely based on psychological states, but also on bodily continuity.
- The essay then clarifies why the second thought experiment provides a more accurate intuition of personal identity than the first. It argues that the self should be understood not as an indivisible monad, but as the result of an amalgamation of distinct neural and cognitive processes.
- The essay then examines problems with the first thought experiment, arguing that it relies on questionable assumptions about the transfer of memories and character. It also raises concerns about the reliability of the hypothetical body-people A and B's testimonies.
- The essay concludes by addressing objections to the conclusion of Williams' second thought experiment, which emphasizes the importance of bodily continuity in defining personal identity. It argues that the individual's fear of future pain is a strong indicator that he identifies with his future self, even though his memories and psychological states may have changed.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
This essay focuses on personal identity, thought experiments, memory, character, bodily continuity, psychological continuity, Bernard Williams, self, and the limits of philosophical methodology.
- Quote paper
- Seth Carter (Author), 2017, A critical review to Bernard Williams in "The Self and the Future", Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/371667
