Long struggle of nation, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia against the military junta of Derg regime brought the coming power of Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front. The 1991 was a historic period in the history of the country that transferred from unitary system of government to the Federal system of government. The introduction of defacto-federalism in the transitional charter provides the right to self-determination up to and including secession as well as led the foundation for vertical, horizontal and normative relationships besides cooperation.
The promulgation of 1995 constitution gives a ground base of dejure federalism by providing powers to nations, nationalities and peoples as ultimate power holders.in this constitution 9 regional states are identified with their own sovereignty and administrative arrangements and they shall establish their own smallest administrative units as enshrined in Article 50 of FDRE constitution. The other issue that we discussed in this constitution is that the absence of formal intergovernmental relations/cooperation among federal government and regional states vertically, between regional states and within local governments horizontally. The absence of formal vertical and horizontal relationships does not mean that no relation at all. Relations through sectorial base, party channels and through institutions are held informally. Intergovernmental relations are one of the pillars for most federal states and unitary governments to facilitate their socio-economic and political as well as cultural developments
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Definition of Intergovernmental Relations
3. IGR in Ethiopia
4. System/Form of government and IGR in Ethiopia
5. Diversity and IGR
6. Party System versus Intergovernmental Relations
7. Intergovernmental Relation (IGR) and its Institutional Setups in Ethiopia
7.1. House of Federation
7.2. Ministry of Federal Affairs
7.3. Sector-based IGR
7.4. The Party Channel
8. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
The main objective of this paper is to provide a comparative analysis of intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Ethiopia, examining how the country manages the complex interactions between different levels of government in a federal system defined by ethnic-based diversity and party-led centralism.
- The transition from a unitary state to a federal system in Ethiopia since 1991.
- The role of the 1995 FDRE Constitution in defining (or omitting) formal IGR mechanisms.
- The impact of party centralism and party channels on federal-regional autonomy.
- The functionality of institutions like the House of Federation and the Ministry of Federal Affairs.
- The management of ethno-linguistic diversity as a driver for intergovernmental interaction.
Excerpt from the Book
Diversity and IGR
The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereinafter FDRE Constitution) begins in its preamble with the recognition of the Ethiopian polity as a composition of Nation, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. It is clearly discernible in its wording “we, the Nation, Nationality and Peoples of Ethiopia.” This expression hints to the recognition of Ethiopia as the land of Nation, Nationality and Peoples and with that implicitly as the land of minorities, in whatever criteria minority may be defined in the Ethiopian context. This normative framework is seen by some scholars to be a clear commitment to a plural-national polity and a clear departure from a single ethnic based domination of one cultural group over the others ( Asefa, 2007; Tronvoll, 2000).
What makes the Ethiopian federalism unique from other federal experiences is its express permission for every nation, nationality and people of Ethiopia to have an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession (Art 39(1) of the FDRE constitution) After recognizing Ethiopia as a multi-ethnic state, and affirms that the Ethiopian peoples, in full and free exercise of their right to self-determination, it also emphasizes their commitment and wish to build ‘‘one political community’’ and ‘‘one economic community’’ based on their ‘‘common interests, common outlook and common destiny (The preamble of FDRE constitution).
On the contrary, Merara views the normative framework as a political game based on ethnically divide and rule, to legitimatize the incumbent governing IGR party (Merara, 2007). But, the normative recognition of the Ethiopian polity as a multi-ethnic/national polity is a necessary first step towards the protection of minority rights.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: This chapter outlines the historical shift from a centralized military regime to the post-1991 federal system and introduces the fundamental challenges regarding formal intergovernmental relations.
Definition of Intergovernmental Relations: This section explores various scholarly perspectives on IGR, emphasizing that it involves the coordination of financial, legal, and administrative activities across government tiers.
IGR in Ethiopia: An overview of the Ethiopian political landscape, focusing on how federalism was adopted as an instrument to manage ethno-linguistic diversity.
System/Form of government and IGR in Ethiopia: This chapter discusses the pragmatic development of IGR in a parliamentary context where executive roles predominate.
Diversity and IGR: An analysis of how the 1995 Constitution addresses multi-ethnicity and the subsequent challenges in accommodating minority rights within regional states.
Party System versus Intergovernmental Relations: This chapter examines the influence of party hierarchies and centralized control on the autonomy of regional governments.
Intergovernmental Relation (IGR) and its Institutional Setups in Ethiopia: A detailed look at the roles of the House of Federation, the Ministry of Federal Affairs, sector-based coordination, and party channels in facilitating government interactions.
Conclusion: A summary of the importance of IGR in fostering negotiation, maintaining stability, and addressing the current institutional gaps in the Ethiopian federal structure.
Keywords
Federalism, Ethiopia, Intergovernmental Relations, IGR, EPRDF, Constitution, Diversity, Decentralization, Regional States, Party System, Sovereignty, Self-determination, Public Policy, Governance, Political Coordination
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this research paper?
The paper provides a comparative analysis of intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia, exploring the formal and informal mechanisms used to coordinate between federal and regional governments.
What are the central themes of the work?
The central themes include the impact of the 1991 political restructuring, the role of ethnic diversity, the influence of the ruling party on state autonomy, and the effectiveness of current institutional frameworks for IGR.
What is the main research question or objective?
The primary objective is to evaluate how the Ethiopian federal system manages intergovernmental cooperation, particularly in the absence of explicit constitutional guidelines for horizontal and vertical relations.
Which scientific methodology is applied?
The author uses a analytical approach, reviewing existing scholarly definitions, constitutional provisions, legal proclamations, and existing academic literature to assess the practice of IGR in Ethiopia.
What is discussed in the main body of the text?
The main body covers definitions of IGR, the historical context of Ethiopian federalism, the role of diversity, the influence of party structures, and specific institutional mechanisms like the House of Federation and the Ministry of Federal Affairs.
How would you characterize this paper with keywords?
The paper is characterized by terms such as Federalism, IGR, Ethiopian political system, party centralism, constitutional law, and diversity management.
How does the House of Federation influence IGR?
The House of Federation is positioned as an organ to resolve non-constitutional disputes and protect ethnic self-determination, though it often acts as an ethnic representative body rather than a coordinator of regional state interests.
Does the ruling party (EPRDF) affect intergovernmental relations?
Yes, the party plays a significant role; its hierarchical structure often serves as an informal mechanism for conflict resolution and policy alignment, which critics argue undermines the constitutional autonomy of regional states.
Is there a formal institutional framework for IGR in Ethiopia?
The Ethiopian Constitution is largely silent on formal IGR. Consequently, frameworks have been established pragmatically through proclamations, ad-hoc meetings, and party-led coordination rather than through explicit constitutional provisions.
What is the author's final conclusion on Ethiopian IGR?
The author concludes that while informal mechanisms exist, there is a critical need for permanent, formal forums to enhance negotiation, check centralization, and ensure effective coordination for socio-economic development.
- Citar trabajo
- Melese Chekol (Autor), 2015, Comparative Analysis of Intergovernmental Relations in Ethiopia, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/374857
