The concept of possible worlds is useful because it defines the four modalities – possibility, necessity, contingency, and impossibility – but a challenge lies in defining it. The polemical hypothesis from David Lewis (“genuine modal realism“ as it is called) succeeds in it. Lewis’ modal realism stirred controversy because he maintains that a plurality of worlds exists. Some philosophers suggest that the Lewisian view is a violation to the law of parsimony, also known as Ockham’s Razor, that is to say not multiply entities beyond necessity.
While avoiding a circular definition, Lewis constructs an inflated ontology. Is it worth it, and if we do not want to assume too many Lewisian worlds, what alternatives remain? Actualist modal realism and modal antirealism are the most relevant alternatives because modal abstentionism simply will not progress in this direction. This thesis evaluates theories of possible worlds.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- I Background
- 1 Modalities
- 1.1 Possibility
- 1.2 Contingency
- 1.3 Necessity
- 1.4 Impossibility
- 2 Modal Logic
- 2.1 What is Modal Logic?
- 2.2 Possible Worlds Semantics
- II What Are Possible Worlds?
- 3 Theories of Possible Worlds
- 3.1 Modal Realism
- 3.2 Actualist Modal Realism
- 3.2.1 Plantingan Modal Realism
- 3.2.2 Combinatorialism
- Citation du texte
- Valery Berthoud (Auteur), 2016, Modal metaphysical puzzling possible words. An inquiry, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/375505
