This study assumes the validity of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) theory and follows Ingebritsen‘s sectoral approach. The thesis under investigation is formulated as follows: While the fishing industry in Norway constantly succeed in intervening in national policy-making towards European integration, Icelandic fishermen lost access to governing parties after the sudden change of government in 2009. Consequently they failed to prevent the government from filing the EU membership application.
Iceland and Norway have traditionally been referred to as “outsiders” or even “outliers” in the process of European Integration (Miles 2005). While Iceland had not applied for EU membership until 2009, the Norwegian public rejected the country´s accession twofold in a referendum, first 1972 and again in 1994. Since the mid-1990s, both states have nevertheless been highly affiliated to the EU project through their participation in the European Economic Area (EEA). Additionally, both countries experienced similar developments concerning political representation since 1994, with long-serving Eurosceptic center-right governments, which were replaced by pro-European center-left governments after the turn of the millennium. The electorate in Norway brought a coalition government of Labor, Socialists and Center Party to power in 2005, which was reelected four years later. In Iceland, a coalition of social democrats and Left-Green Movement replaced the conservative government in 2009. How did it come that Iceland for the first time in history applied for EU membership after the change in government while Norway did not?
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 State of Research
2.1 The European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
2.2 Impact of interest groups on political parties
2.3 Reluctant Europeans: The Case of Iceland
2.4 To Join or Not to Join: The Case of Norway
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism & the Sectoral Approach
3.2 Network analysis
3.3 Dependent and independent variable
4 Methodology
4.1 Operationalization of (in)dependent variable
4.2 Case Selection
5 Expected Results
6 Bibliography
Research Objectives & Topics
This study investigates why Iceland applied for EU membership in 2009 while Norway has consistently refused to do so, despite both nations sharing significant structural similarities as fishing-dependent "outsiders" to the European project. The research aims to evaluate whether the loss of political access for the fishing industry in Iceland, following a change in government, provides the key explanation for this deviation from the Norwegian experience.
- The role of the fishing sector in national preference formation regarding EU integration.
- Application of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Sectoral Approach to Northern European states.
- Comparative analysis of interest group-party relations in Iceland and Norway.
- The impact of institutional networks and standing committees on national policy-making.
- Testing the explanatory power of sectoral dependence during transitions between conservative and pro-European governments.
Excerpt from the Book
3.1 LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM & THE SECTORAL APPROACH
The theoretical framework used in this study is mainly deduced from liberal intergovernmentalism theory. Andrew Moravcsik sought to explain the evolution of European unification as well as further integration processes as the result of interstate bargaining between autonomous governments subsequent to domestic decision-making. In his view “state behaviour reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment” (Moravcsik 1993: 474). European integration, hence, is the result of a three-step process. First, unitary national governments set their preferences in the domestic political arena by weighing the cost and benefits of market integration and increased interdependence (ibid.: 480). Especially domestic pressure groups and societal actors shape the formation of state preferences. They all articulate their interests within political institutions, e.g. the national parliament. This design concurs the assumption of LI that social groups are competitors fighting for impact, but presumes superiority of the fisheries in Norway and Iceland (see also 3.3 for remarks on this choice).
In a second step, the states bargain its preferences in order to build common institutions. “National governments have an incentive to co-operate where policy coordination increases their control over domestic policy outcomes, permitting them to achieve goals that would not otherwise be possible” (ibid.: 485). To retain the achieved bargaining outcomes, states cooperate in a third step within international institutions. They shall enhance the efficiency of interstate negotiations and increase the power of national political leaders face to face with domestic interest groups (ibid.: 507). This process reflects the two-level political game theory developed by Putnam (1988). However, this analysis focuses on the first step – the domestic policy formulation process.
Chapter Summary
1 Introduction: Provides an overview of the research puzzle, comparing the integration histories of Iceland and Norway and introducing the thesis that interest group access dictates national policy outcomes.
2 State of Research: Reviews existing literature on the European Common Fisheries Policy and the influence of interest groups, highlighting the unique political contexts of both Nordic nations.
3 Theoretical Framework: Outlines the application of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the Sectoral Approach, and Network Analysis to explain the behavior of small states regarding European integration.
4 Methodology: Details the comparative small-N research design, including the operationalization of variables through the analysis of party programs, parliamentary committees, and interest group affiliations.
5 Expected Results: Hypothesizes that the Icelandic shift toward EU application resulted from a breakdown in the historical clientelistic network between the fishing sector and the government, a pattern not observed in Norway.
6 Bibliography: Compiles the comprehensive list of academic sources, policy documents, and data used throughout the research project.
Keywords
European Integration, Iceland, Norway, Fisheries Policy, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Sectoral Approach, Network Analysis, Interest Groups, Political Access, EU Membership, Clientelism, National Preference, Foreign Policy, Nordic States, European Economic Area
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core research subject of this work?
The paper examines the different approaches of Iceland and Norway toward European Union membership, specifically analyzing why Iceland applied for accession in 2009 while Norway continues to remain outside.
What are the primary fields of study involved?
The research combines political science, European integration studies, international political economy, and the sociology of interest group politics.
What is the main objective or research question?
The primary research question asks how the fishing industry's access to governing political parties influences a country's decision to pursue or reject EU membership.
Which scientific methodology is applied?
The study uses a qualitative, small-N comparative analysis, investigating party programs, parliamentary committee protocols, and the interpersonal networks between economic stakeholders and government decision-makers.
What is addressed in the main body?
The main body focuses on theoretical frameworks (Liberal Intergovernmentalism), the historical role of the fishing sector in both countries, and a comparative study of how these sectors exerted pressure on domestic governments.
How would you characterize this work using keywords?
The work is characterized by terms such as European Integration, Sectoral Approach, Interest Groups, Political Access, and Nordic Small State Politics.
Why did the fishing industry matter so much for the Icelandic EU application?
The author argues that the industry historically maintained strong clientelistic ties with conservative governments. Once a left-wing coalition took power in 2009, those ties weakened, allowing the government to override the industry's objections to EU membership.
How does the Norwegian case serve as a contrast?
Norway is used as a control case where, despite government changes, the fishing industry maintained stable access to decision-makers, thereby preventing any successful government push toward EU integration.
- Citar trabajo
- Ron Böhler (Autor), 2010, Fishing in Troubled Waters. Iceland, Norway and the Question of EU Membership, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/376502
