On the Credibility of Bail-ins. Has the Single Resolution Mechanism become more credible for European Banks after the Banco Popular Bail-in?


Tesis (Bachelor), 2017

46 Páginas, Calificación: 1,3


Extracto


Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

List of Figures

List of Tables

1 Introduction

2 To Bail-in or Not to Bail-in
2.1 The General Approach
2.2 The Regulator’s Decision Process
2.3 Effect of too-big-to-fail
2.4 Addressing the Problem

3 Event Study
3.1 Previous Studies
3.2 Context
3.3 Hypotheses
3.4 Methodology
3.5 Robustness Testing
3.6 Interpretation of Results
3.7 Shortcomings and Further Research

4 Conclusion

References

Appendix

Final del extracto de 46 páginas

Detalles

Título
On the Credibility of Bail-ins. Has the Single Resolution Mechanism become more credible for European Banks after the Banco Popular Bail-in?
Universidad
University of Frankfurt (Main)
Calificación
1,3
Autor
Año
2017
Páginas
46
No. de catálogo
V379530
ISBN (Ebook)
9783668594425
ISBN (Libro)
9783960951667
Tamaño de fichero
2070 KB
Idioma
Inglés
Palabras clave
Single Resolution Mechanism, European Banking Union, financial industry regulations, bail-in and bail-out, too big to fail banks, Banco Popular, bail in, bail out, banks, regulation, moral hazard, finance, event study, goethe uni
Citar trabajo
Mark Feiler (Autor), 2017, On the Credibility of Bail-ins. Has the Single Resolution Mechanism become more credible for European Banks after the Banco Popular Bail-in?, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/379530

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