Excerpt
Table of Contents
§1 Hegel of the Differenzschrift
§1.1 Some Initial Terminology - Reason, Intellect, Speculation, Reflection
§1.2 Translation of Key Terms
§1.3 Qualms with Kant
§1.4 Fuss with Fichte
§1.5 Historicism - The Eternal and the I diosyncratic In Philosophy
§1.6 The Necessity/Need of Philosophy - The Dichotomy and its Suspension
§1.7 Reflection as an Instrument for Philosophy.
§1.7.1 Reflection of Reason
§1.7.2 Reflection of the Intellect for Reason I
§1.7.3 The Failure of Reflection of the Intellect without Reason 1
§1.7.4 Reflection of the Intellect for Reason II
§1.7.5 Conclusion of Reflection as an Instrument for Philosophy
§1.8 Relation of Speculation to Common Sense
§1.9 Summary of sections 1.1 - 1.8
§1.10 Principle of a Philosophy in the Form of an Absolute Basic Proposition
§1.11 The .Absolute Identity
§2 Frege
§2.1 Funktion und Begriff
§2.2 IJber Sinn und Bedeutung
§2.3 Conclusion
§3 Fregel
Bibliography
Abstract
In this paper, I propose that Hegel and Frege are more alike than currently thought. As Hegel and Frege are the founding fathers of the continental and analytic cultures of philosophy respectively, the salient argument of this paper is that the two cultures are, likewise, more alike than thought.[1] I compare Hegel's first publication, often called Differenzschrift, to Frege's later works on the philosophy of language, Funktion und Begriff and Uber Sinn und Bedeutung. I argue that in explicating the cognitive difference expressed by the concept of identity, Hegel develops a theory of pragmatics and semantics that has several similarities to the Mediated Reference Theory proposed by Frege.[2] In doing so, I present an analytic account of Hegel's Absolute Identity determined by the equality of the co-domains produced by two compound functions. These functions are composed of semantic, pragmatic and epistemic constraints that evaluate the ontic content of a proposition.[3]
Keywords: Hegel, Frege, Identity, Analytic, Continental, Pragmatics, Semantics, Differenzschrift, On Sense and Referent, Uber Sinn und Bedeutung, Absolute, Absolute Identity, Dialectic, Speculation, Reference Theory,
§1 Hegel of the Differenzschrift
In this section, I will be d iscussing the p reface a nd the first section of H egel's Differenzchrift called Various Forms Occurring in Contemporary Philosophy. At first, I will be explicating key terms in Hegel’s philosophy, but I will present the work paragraph by paragraph thereafter. That said, it's a difficult enterprise to present Hegel's work in a clear and concise format without disturbing his manner of presentation or argumentation. Instead of defining his t erms, presenting his argument, drawing a conclusion and defending it a gainst r efutations, Hegel philosophizes In the way an author would craft a narrative. His argument u nfolds throughout the course of the Differenzschrift a nd matures much 1 ike the character of a novel would. Despite its complication, is ense an aesthetic quality to this way of philosophizing. beyond that, ithink it is Hegel's motive to philosophize in the same way that he holds nature to operate. For those reasons, I've s ought to stay t rue to Hegel's representation of philosophy and analyse his terms along the way by presenting their development, Instead of s imply abstracting the argument. That said, when Hegel speaks of Reason and Intellect a s though they were characters In a story, I find it easier to understand them as functions that have c ertain properties, and I will be analyzing and presenting them as such.
§1.1 Some Initial Terminology - Reason, Intellect, Speculation, Reflection
In this paper, there will be several concepts that I will be defining that will serve as terminitechnici. Such concepts will be denoted with a initial capital letters. At the outset, I would like to introduce Refection, Intellect, Reason and Speculation. In due time, all other important concepts will be donated likewise.
Hegel begins the preface of the Differenzschrift by refuting the conception laid out by Reinhold, based upon the work of Bardili, that philosophy should be grounded in logic.[4] Hegel does not, however, give any argument as to grounding philosophy on logic would be fallacious at this point in the Differenzschrift. The explication of Hegel’s argument against the founding of philosophy upon 1 ogic is Intertwined with the overall goal of this p aper and thus will be demonstrated in detail throughout. To sum, Hegel argues that true philosophy includes the work of Speculation and not merely Refection that logic makes use of; though at this point in the Differenzschrift, the exact definition of these terms is unknown. In order to best understand what Hegel means, a discourse that is not in line with the text must be brought to bear.
We need to begin by conceptualizing the faculties of consciousness that are at the center of philosophy at the time of the composition of the Differenzschrift. In brief, there a re two: Reason (Vemunft) and the Intellect (Verstand). Building his conception primarily upon Kant, Hegel argues that the Intellect is the faculty that uses the mode of thinking called Refection. The function of Refection is to delineate knowledge into understandable forms. Reason, on the other hand, makes use of the mode of thinking called Speculation. Speculation's function is to unify its content into a single form. To clarify, I've used the term 'content' to stand for whatever happens to be thematized for philosophical Inquiry.
Now, we may begin t o t ruly gain Insight into Hegel's argument against the founding of philosophy upon logic. He contests this approach because logic, as it is understood by Bardili and Reinhold, is the work of the Intellect. That logic is, however, largely equivalent to the modern Formal Logic. The three major principles that form its foundation have not changed since. These are the principle of identity, the excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction. All three of these principles delineate knowledge Into workable 'bits'. L ater on, these principles will play a major role In the Differenzschrift.
Many questions arise and have yet to be adequately answered. First, how does Hegel understand the delineation of knowledge to be a problem for philosophy? Inother words, what is fallacious about founding philosophy on logic? S econdly, a ssuming that the unity of knowledge is possible, how does Hegel see this is to be done? Inother words, what is the operation of Speculation? Thirdly, again assuming that it is possible to construct a unified philosophical system, what does Hegel think is achieved by doing so? In pragmatic terms, what p roblem would a philosophy of speculation solve? These questions find themselves at the crux of section one of this paper and will be addressed In detail throughout.
§1.2 Translation of Key Terms
Before I d iscuss the Differenzschrift further, s omething must be said about two common translations from German into English. The first I will treat is the translation of Aufhebung as sublation. As is well know, Aufhebungpossess two contradicting meanings: the first is to terminate and the second is to preserve. Along with those two meanings, auf suggests a forward movement or if we like, progression. I personally do not see the need to invent a word for this concept. This is because the common word suspend expresses the dual nature that .Aufhebung does. To suspend is at the same time to stop as well a s to hold In place or, i f we 1 ike, p reserve. On topof that, the su In suspend suggests a lifting from the bottom upwards or, if we like, p rogression. beyond that, creating a terminus technicus for .Aufhebung defeats the purpose that Hegel original intended; namely, that it is a natural occurrence that a word having contradicting meanings arises.
The second translation I'll need to discuss before continuing is that of entgegensetzen which is translated as to oppose. The word oppose has the adjectival variant of opposed and the substantive variant of opposite. These translate as gegensatzlich und Gegensatz respectively and not as entgegengesetzt und das Entgegengesetzte. The idea of there being an opposite in the sense that up is the opposite of down is not meant by the German entgegen. Chiefy, there are two problems with this t ranslation. The first is that opposite s uggest a r elation of two terms, s uch as b lack and white. In entgegen there is no such Intention. The second is that the two terms are mutual exclusive. The opposite of left is r ight and, given the same perspective, o ne c annot t urn right a nd 1 eft at the same time. Entgegen is actually understood as the simultaneous o pening and closing of an area {Gegend) between a given number of terms. The opening of space is, In part, expressed by the intention because the Included terms do not find themselves in the same location. At the same time, it suggests the closing of space because the terms are j oined In some way. To clarify, I will be using term to indicate whatever happens to be posited for a proposition.
When looking for an appropriate translation that is not a terminus technicus, Latin supplies the best choice in my opinion. isuggest juxtapose, which means to place side by side. Furthermore, juxta expresses three concepts simultaneously. First, it has the adverbial variant iuxta meaning near; viz. juxtapose means literally 'to place near'. Secondly, juxta is derived from iungere meaning to join. Lastly, iugista, an adverbial variant of iungere, means closely connected. All three taken into account implies that to j uxtapose is to posit multiple terms such that they are in some way closely joined. Therefore entgegensetzen and all of its variants will be translated here as j uxtapose, respective to all of its variants. By doing this, we avoid the confusion between what is in opposition, imGegensatz, and what is in juxtaposition, entgegengesetzt, and we have the same intention that the given terms are j oined t ogether In some way.
§1.3 Qualms with Kant
In the preface of the Differenzschrift,[5] Hegel begins by briefly introducing the beginnings of German I dealism. He claims that Kant, through his deduction of the categories by the Intellect, made it possible for the extraction of the Principle of Speculation. Hegel calls the Principle of Speculation also the Principle of Reason and defines it a s the i dentity of s ubject a nd object. Hegel states that it is o n the account of this p rinciple that Kant's philosophy was truly i dealism. Kant's philosophy is, however, unable to fully grasp the Principle of Speculation because of the privilege place of the Intellect and its relation to Reason. For the Intellect, every term is j uxtaposed to s ome other term. A term that is j uxtaposed is also 1 imited by another t erm and is, o n the a ccount of the fact that it is li mited, a finite term. Therefore, Kant's philosophy does not express the Principle of Speculation because it leaves the subject and object juxtaposed to one another, and thus as finite terms. Hegel faults Kant further for the s taticity of the categories a nd their nullification of the language needed t o express the Absolute. This raises the question as to the properties of a language that is capable of expressing the Absolute but this will be discussed throughout section one. What is unclear at this point is how exactly the Infinite is r elated to the i dentity of s ubject a nd object; that notwithstanding, Hegel h olds that their unity expresses the Infinite.
From this section, it is clear that the Principle of S peculation is the i dentity of s ubject a nd object. Hegel claims, furthermore, that this identity is Reason and that Reason is the appearance (Erscheinung) of the Absolute. With the above passage, it is clear how a finite term is not an
expression of the Principle of Speculation. The function of Reason is to unify content Into one concept. Finite terms are juxtaposed to, at least, o ne other term and are therefore not unified into a single concept. Furthermore, some light has been shed on the relationship between the Absolute and Principle of Speculation. The identity of subject and object is an appearance of the Absolute.
We can, therefore, draw the conclusion that the Absolute is not fInite. That said, a definition of the Absolute is still not available; my Interpretation of Absolute will be discussed later on. However, this points to the profound importance that identity has In Hegel's philosophy. If we understand better the properties of the Absolute Identity, which expresses the union of the subject and object, then how Hegel understands the operation of Speculation and the appearance of the Absolute will become clearer. The properties of this i dentity are the c rux of this paper and will be discussed toward the conclusion of section one.
§1.4 Fuss with Fichte
Hegel advocates that Fichte develops a speculative principle of Ich=Ich.[6] We can understand this p rinciple a s speculative because the Ich of the first term is subject and the Ich of the second term is object. Hegel a rgues In the Differenzschrift that F ichte's system fails t o r eturn t o this i dentity and Instead passes over to an Infinite chain of acts that n ever reconstructs itself a s i dentity or, a s Hegel calls it, t rue Infinity. True Infinity must, therefore, e ncompass everything, return to the outset and express an identity. We can, o n strength of the Principle of Speculation, attribute these properties to the appearance of the Absolute, b ut not necessarily to the Absolute itself.
At this point, Hegel Introduces the terminus technics of Transcendental Intuition (Anschauung) as the Principle of Speculation. Though Hegel fails to give a definition of Transcendental Intuition, I 've understood him to mean by Intuition the apperception of the Principle of Speculation. Furthermore, Hegel understands transcendental along the same lines as Kant does; viz. transcendental are those conditions that make experience possible. Thus, Transcendental Intuition is the immediate recognition that experience is only possible if the identity of subject and object is true. Concerning Fichte, Hegel claims that Transcendental Intuition is never shown to be a ctual (wirklich) a nd Instead is merely a normative demand posited by the Ich of the first term on that of the second term. Hegel argues further that the fatal mistake of Fichte's philosophy was its dependence on Reflection and its neglect of Reason.
Hegel fails to handle one dilemma at this point; namely, how does Fichte's reliance on Reflection preclude him from showing the altheticity of the Principle of Speculation? Inother words, how does Fichte's neglect of Reason force the Principle of Speculation to remain solely deontic? The section of the Differenzschrift that answers this question is not the focus of this e ssay. Therefore, I will not be addressing this concern. However, Hegel’s argument does reveal two interesting aspects about the relationship between Refection, Reason and the Principle of Speculation. Hegel demands that the Principle of S peculation be not j ust of n ormative but also of necessary modality. According to Hegel, a philosophy of Refection can only show the i dentity of subject and object to be of ethical consequence. Thus, Hegel argues, o nly Reason can show the Principle of Speculation to be necessary. How I interpret Reason to be able to go beyond the deonticity and show the altheticity of the Principle of Speculation will be discussed toward the conclusion of this paper.
Concluding the preface, Hegel has developed four different elements t o the Principle of Speculation. F irst a nd foremost, it is the i dentity of s ubject a nd object. This i dentity makes itself present In Transcendental Intuition. In order to show this i dentity to be necessary, and not j ust normative In nature, p hilosophy must s et the faculty of Reason, which unites its c ontent Into a single concept, as its foundation. Lastly, this unity is, likewise, the appearance of the Absolute. At this point, we understand the Absolute to be Infinite but a very special kind of Infinite. If we think of the natural n umber 1 ine extending out t o Infinity, then we have not expressed what Hegel means by the Absolute Infinity. Instead, Absolute Infinity encompasses everything and reconstructs itself in its appearance as the identity of subject a nd object.
The following aspects, h owever, r emain unclear at this point. F irstly, how does Reason show the identity of subject and object? This question is another wording for the operation of Speculation. This will be addressed toward the conclusion of section one. S econdly, is it possible for a philosophy of speculation to avoid Refection altogether? And, i f not, what is the relationship between Reason and Refection? These concerns will be addressed in section 1.7.
§1.5 Historicism - The Eternal and the Idiosyncratic in Philosophy
We now come to the part of the Differenzschrift translated as ' Various Forms Occurring in Contemporary Philosophy that supplies the primary content of this paper. Though contemporary refers to the philosophy beginning at the 18th century, Hegel discusses the following dilemmas: How is philosophy to be done? What is the starting point for philosophy? What is the relation between philosophy and logic? How do we understand i dentity? These questions remain controversial to this day; e specially, when we consider the current debate between the analytic and continental c ultures of p hilosophy. beyond that, this section of the Differenzschrift holds great relevance for Hegel research as it contains not only Hegel's approach to above dilemmas b ut also explains how he thinks Speculation to operate. That being said, the Differenzschrift is, however, Hegel's first major publication.
Hegel begins Various Forms by addressing a major conjecture raised by Reinhold about the nature of philosophy.[7] Reinhold's argument resembles a form of perspectivism that would latter be advocated by Nietzsche. According to Reinhold, philosophy is essentially a historical phenomenon and is, by nature, an i diosyncratic enterprise. it is, however, not the focus of this paper to address Reinhold's a rgument, b ut Instead to elucidate Hegel's conception of the r elationship between philosophy and historicism. Hegel disagrees with Reinhold, b ut does tend toward a particular form of p erspectivism. To understand what exactly Hegel means in this section requires us to understand what Hegel views a s the task of p hilosophy. However, Hegel does not discuss this until the next section of the Differenzschrift. Therefore In this section of the essay, I will be presenting his claim but not his argument.
Hegel claims that s eeing philosophy as being merely the product of the advances made before would be to understand it as nothing but a transposition of previous information.[8] It would, seen under this light, lack the freedom of true philosophy. Hegel argues that philosophy can never escape being treated as a historical phenomenon, but he cautions against viewing philosophy solely as a historically idiosyncratic science. At the end of this section, Hegel does, however, advocate a certain particularity of philosophy. He claims that the way Reason presents itself out of the material of a given age is i diosyncratic.[9] By way of analogy, Hegel states that Homer was not a precursor t o Virgil, b ut that Virgil was a ctually expressing the s ame as Homer, though within his own historical context.
Three things remain unclear at this point. First, h ow does p hilosophy e scape historicism or, if we like, p erspectivism? Secondly, if p hilosophy is not a historical s cience then how is Hegel not contradicting himself by claiming that p hilosophy expresses Reason within a historical c ontext? Lastly, what d oes Hegel mean when he claims that the freedom of p hilosophy would be 1 ost?
Only the first of these questions can be a ddressed with the Information provided by this section. Given that philosophy is p hilosophy of speculation, then, as already discussed, it s eeks to show the Principle of Speculation. If it is an identity that philosophy presents, then, regardless of the perspective, the result will always be the same. It is, after all, an i dentity. The second and third questions will be addressed In the following section.
§1.6 The Necessity/Need of Philosophy - The Dichotomy and its Suspension
The second section of Various Forms is called the Bedtirfnis der Philosophic. This can be understood as b oth the need and the necessity of p hilosophy; viz. Hegel discusses what p hilosophy needs and what is needed of philosophy. The all important term expressing this Bedtirfnis is dichotomy (Entzweiung). Here, Hegel expresses more of what he means by the i diosyncratic nature of p hilosophy and thus answers the two questions from above. Each historical Instance of philosophy possesses i diosyncratic dichotomies; this is o ne of two aspects.[10] This is a necessary condition and does not, however, expresses the freedom of philosophy. It is, Instead, the presentation of the overcoming of the historical d ichotomies that is the freedom of the philosophy of speculation.[11] Furthermore, Hegel advocates that o nly a philosophy of speculation, that of Reason, is capable of overcoming dichotomies. What is still u nclear is how Reason is able to overcome the dichotomies and Refection is not.
Hegel's argument a gainst Reflection follows along 1 ines a s discussed earlier. He claims that a philosophy of reflection, whose faculty is the Intellect, is o nly able to reproduce itself In its attempt to overcome dichotomies.[12] Inother words, philosophy of reflection splits, polarizes and creates the dichotomies by dividing its content into conceptually separated categories. This argument can be understood best by the example of Kant who places Reason In the hands of the Intellect, follows it to the necessary conclusion and comes to the very famous dichotomies that Kant a rgues can never be overcome. That said, Hegel argues that when Reason emerges from the dichotomies and recognizes itself as appearance of the Absolute, then the difference between the two terms of the dichotomy vanishes.[13] Thus, the task of Reason, and also of the philosophy of s peculation, is to suspend the j uxtaposition between the given terms. Hegel cautions us not to draw the conclusion that Reason is opposed to j uxtaposition. Instead, Reason needs j uxtaposition in order to appear. Reason is a ctually opposed to the i dea that dichotomy cannot be overcome.[14]
Since the task of the philosophy of speculation is to overcome dichotomy, then the philosophy of speculation is needed when a dichotomy arises. Hegel argues that this is the only presupposition for the philosophy of speculation.[15] Here we can observe him emphasising that a philosophical system cannot begin with any principle.[16] Thus, it appears to me that Hegel treats the Principle of Speculation not as a foundational but as a heuristic principle.[17] That is, should juxtaposition be encountered during philosophical investigation, then the Principle of Speculation is used as a guide for the discovery of the unity of the juxtaposed. However, the reason Hegel does not use the word 'heuristic' to describe the Principle of Speculation remains a mystery. It was widely used in this context. For example, Kant writes that a heuristic principle is one that sets natural facts within a teleological c ontext In order t o aid In the s earch for natural laws.[18] I c an only assume that Hegel is c onvinced by the t ruth of the Principle of S peculation and does want t o diminish its s tatus by focusing purely on the utility of the principle.
Hegel a rgues that s eeing the Principle of S peculation as a presupposition is a ctually to view it under the guise of the Intellect. When the Intellect receives the principle, it becomes divided into two principles ( ent-zwei-t).[19] The first p rinciple is the Absolute and the second is the emergence-of-consciousnes-from-the-Absolute-into-dichotomy. Having our cognition of the Absolute, on the one hand, and the Absolute itself, o n the other, would open up a gulf of intelligibility between consciousness a nd the Absolute, 1 eaving to s cepticism.[20] Therefore, the philosophy of speculation has the task of showing that these two principles posited by Reflection are actually i dentical.
What Hegel u nderstands a s the task of p hilosophy of s peculation advocates a different conception of the Absolute then that of, for example, Absolute Time or Absolute Space in Newtonian physics. As is well known, In classical mechanics, ti me and space a re unchanging fixed entities. However, it is clear by Hegel's description that the idea of the Absolute as something unchanging isn't what he means. As is already discussed above, the identity of subject and object is ahistorical. However, the appearance of this identity, which is likewise an appearance of the Absolute, is i diosyncratic and therefore historical. Thus, the Hegelian Absolute changes its appearance a s a result of the two factors mentioned above; n amely, the historical dichotomy and the philosopher’s i diosyncratic s uspension of the dichotomy.
The pressing question is to what degree can the Absolute be associated with its appearance.
If we attribute even the slightest aspect, then we must claim that the Absolute is dynamic. Such a standpoint supports the interpretation that Hegel understands the Absolute through its literal meaning; viz. it is that which absolves itself of its own 1 imits. How it absolves itself of its own 1 imits is not understood at this point; this will be addressed at the conclusion. That said, when I contemplate the nature of an entity that absolves itself of it self ( as it must also be its own 1 imits), I can not help but imagine a self-destructive entity, akin to the S chopenhauerian Wile zum Leben. With each historical appearance, the Absolute must release itself and its grip from what it was before. Therefore, I claim that the Hegel of the Differenzschrift, at least, supports the conception of the Absolute advocated by Zizek that the Absolute is not In harmony, b ut Instead at war with itself.[21]
At this point the relationship between Reason, Intellect and the Absolute remains unclear.
This will be addressed in detail In the next section of this paper. That said, a few things have been elucidated. F irst, the answers t o the questions from the previous section are now available. Philosophy e scapes p erspectivism by showing the one and same identity; therefore, it is not a contradiction to say that this one i dentity can be shown differently depending on historical context. There are, after all, many ways t o prove the same theorem, or many way t o mathematically express the same phenomenon. S econdly, the i diosyncratic of p hilosophy is the mode of p resentation of this identity[22] ; this is, likewise, what Hegel understands as the freedom of philosophy. Furthermore, we have a clearer understanding of what Hegel means by the Absolute. it is a n Infinite that idiosyncratically appears, through the absolution of fInite terms, as the identity of subject and object resulting from the suspension of the dichotomy of those finite terms. Thus, not the Absolute but the appearance of the Absolute, expressed as an identity, exhibits harmony. Moreover, Hegel has clearly laid out the task of the philosophy of speculation. Philosophy of speculation shows the Absolute.
§1.7 Reflection as an Instrument for Philosophy-
In this section of the Differenzschrift, Hegel explains three different relations between Reflection, R eason and/or the Intellect. Firstly, R eason has its own form of Refection that is o fen referred t o by Hegel a s p hilosophical r ef ection, b ut I will c all it the Refection of Reason. Its function, which is rather simple, will be elaborated in section 1.7.1. The second relation, which has already been discussed above, is between Refection and the Intellect. For the s ake of understanding, I will n ow be denoting this Refection as the Refection of the Intellect. Recall that the Refection of the Intellect d elineates its content. Hegel a dvocates that the Refection of the Intellect without the Principle of S peculation creates a n antinomy of the its c ontent. T hese, then, pose a dichotomy for p hilosophical thought that cannot s uspended by the Intellect alone. However, under the Principle of Speculation, Refection of the Intellect becomes a function of Reason. This is the third relation. I will denote this chief y Hegelian relation between Refection, Intellect and Reason as the Reflection of the Intellect for Reason. This relation will be discussed in section 1.7.2.
The main aspect to be developed in this section of the essay will be the function of Reflection of the Intellect for Reason and how it relates to both the Principle of Speculation and the Absolute. It will be integral for understanding how Hegel sees the philosophy of speculation to operate, how the .Absolute appears through Reason, and the properties of the .Absolute I dentity.
§1.7.1 Reflection of Reason
As already discussed, Reflection of the Intellect sees the need/necessity of philosophy as two presuppositions a nd it is the ta sk of p hilosophy of speculation to overcome this d ichotomy a nd show for consciousness b oth presuppositions to be one. It would seem, then, that a philosophy of speculation could not use the Reflection of the Intellect as this would result In a contradiction, due to its p ropensity t o produce 1 imits In its results a nd to reduce its knowledge t o an antinomy. Hegel expresses this by saying that when the Absolute is posited by the Reflection of the Intellect the Absolute is cancelled because the Absolute is limited by its opposite.[23] What Hegel here means is that by reflecting on the Infinite, we c ome to an understanding of it by positing the finite. For example, i f I wanted to understand the Infinite a s the natural n umber 1 ine, I would then posit a series of finite numbers. Hegel's argument is that by arriving at an understanding of the infinite by juxtaposing it to that which it is not, the finite, then we fail to conceive of the Infinite as such.[24] At this point Hegel claims that it is the function of the Reflection of Reason to mediate this contradiction.[25]
[...]
[1] cf. Glendinning, Simon, The Idea of Continental Philosophy, Edinburgh University Press, 2006. For an informative account of the history of the two terms, analytic and continental, I refer the reader to Glendinning, who shows that the term continental philosophy is largely an invention by the analytic culture to distinguish their philosophy.
[2] cf. Sainsbmy, R.M., Reference without Referents, Oxford University Press, 2005. For more information, I refer the reader to Sainsbury, who gives a detailed account of both the Mediated and Direct Reference Theories and proposes a middle path between the two based on Free Logic.
[3] cf. Nuzzo, Angelica, Hegel and the Analytic Tradition, Continuum Press 2010 and cf. Redding, Paul, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, Cambridge Press 2007.
These compendiums offer several accounts of how the analytic tradition is interpreting Hegel as having proposed a theory of pragmatics and semantics.
[4] Hegel, G.W.F., Differenz des Fichtischen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophic, in: Jenar Schriften 1801-1807 Werke 2, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1986, pg.9 [10-20].
[5] Hegel pp.10-12.
[6] Hegelpp. 11-12.
[7] Hegel pg.16 [21-36].
[8] Hegel pg.15 [20-31].
[9] Hegel pg.19 [20-24].
[10] Hegel pg.20 [12-14].
[11] Hegel pg.20 [6-10].
[12] Hegelpg.20[24-30],
[13] Hegelpg.21 [1-3].
[14] Hegel pg.22 [1-5].
[15] Hegel pg.24 [18-22].
[16] cf. Hegel pg.550: “Der Grundsatz eines Systems der Philosophie ist ihr Resultat.“
[17] We must distinguish the principle of a system from the way philosophizing begins. cf. Hegel pgs. 47-48 [35-1].
[18] Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Werke in sechs Banden, Band 5, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1983, pg. 411 [1-9].
[19] Hegel pg.25 [10-18].
[20] cf. Hegel, G.W.F, Phanomenologie des Geistes, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2006. pgs. 57-58.
[21] cf. Zizek, Slavoj, Less Than Nothing, Verso Press, New York, 2013. pp.286-291.
[22] cf. Hegel, G.W.F., Hegel's Philosophy ofRight, trans. S.W. Dyde, London: George Bell 1986, pp. Xxviii-xxix. “As for the individual, every one is a son ofhis time; so philosophy also is its time apprehended in thoughts/1
[23] Hegel pg.25 [27-30].
[24] This sentence is a perfect example ofhow juxtaposing is a better translation than opposing.
[25] Hegel pg.25 [33-26].