In this paper, I propose that Hegel and Frege are more alike than currently thought. As Hegel and Frege are the founding fathers of the continental and analytic cultures of philosophy respectively, the salient argument of this paper is that the two cultures are, likewise, more alike than thought. I compare Hegel's first publication, often called Differenzschrift, to Frege's later works on the philosophy of language, Funktion und Begriff and Über Sinn und Bedeutung. I argue that in explicating the cognitive difference expressed by the concept of identity, Hegel develops a theory of pragmatics and semantics that has several similarities to the Mediated Reference Theory proposed by Frege. In doing so, I present an analytic account of Hegel's Absolute Identity determined by the equality of the co-domains produced by two compound functions. These functions are composed of semantic, pragmatic and epistemic constraints that evaluate the ontic content of a proposition.
Table of Contents
§1 Hegel of the Differenzschrift
§1.1 Some Initial Terminology – Reason, Intellect, Speculation, Reflection
§1.2 Translation of Key Terms
§1.3 Qualms with Kant
§1.4 Fuss with Fichte
§1.5 Historicism – The Eternal and the Idiosyncratic in Philosophy
§1.6 The Necessity/Need of Philosophy – The Dichotomy and its Suspension
§1.7 Reflection as an Instrument for Philosophy
§1.7.1 Reflection of Reason
§1.7.2 Reflection of the Intellect for Reason I
§1.7.3 The Failure of Reflection of the Intellect without Reason
§1.7.4 Reflection of the Intellect for Reason II
§1.7.5 Conclusion of Reflection as an Instrument for Philosophy
§1.8 Relation of Speculation to Common Sense
§1.9 Summary of sections 1.1 – 1.8
§1.10 Principle of a Philosophy in the Form of an Absolute Basic Proposition
§1.11 The Absolute Identity
§2 Frege
§2.1 Funktion und Begriff
§2.2 Über Sinn und Bedeutung
§2.3 Conclusion
§3 Fregel
Research Objectives and Core Topics
This paper aims to bridge the gap between continental and analytic philosophy by demonstrating that G.W.F. Hegel and Gottlob Frege share a deeper structural similarity in their approaches to identity and semantics than is typically acknowledged. By comparing Hegel’s "Differenzschrift" with Frege’s later works, the research question investigates how both thinkers utilize identity to address the relationship between cognitive value, semantic context, and ontology.
- The role of "Reason" and "Intellect" in Hegel’s early philosophical system.
- The operational mechanics of Speculation as a method for overcoming historical dichotomies.
- The transition from identity to non-identity within propositions.
- Frege’s analysis of Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (referent) as mechanisms for handling cognitive value.
- The potential for a unified interpretation of identity across both philosophical traditions.
Excerpt from the Book
§1.7.3 The Failure of Reflection of the Intellect without Reason to construct the Absolute
Drawing further conclusions about its operation, we see that Reflection presents the Absolute as the juxtaposed subject and object. Thus, Reflection posits a relative totality, wherein each is posited, each is conditioned and a conditioning. The Intellect cannot go beyond this stage of everything being juxtaposed, because it, per definition, conceives of everything conditioned as such. Thus, the task of the Reflection of the Intellect to appear as the Absolute extends out ad infinitum, much like the natural number line. Hegel claims that one would see this to be merely the Intellect at work, but, as the Intellect is driven to a concept of totality, one can discern function of Reason operating within the Intellect. Thus, Hegel argues that, within the Intellect, Reason actually presses forward bestowing unto the Intellect the need for boundlessness, which Reflection cannot achieve alone, and is, thereby, the cause of the Intellect's downfall.
As to how the Intellect is unable to grasp the Absolute, Hegel presents a combination of an infinite regress and an ad absurdum argument. It works as follows. For each term posited by the Intellect it is, per definition, finite. In grasping the infinite, Intellect sees that in order for the term to be so determined, it must have resulted from an indeterminate infinite. For the Intellect the indeterminate, the infinite, is meaningless because the Intellect only produces, per definition, that which is delineated. The Intellect cannot delineate the limitless and thus cannot produce the infinite; such is the ad absurdum argument. Instead, the Intellect operates by taking up the infinite and the finite together, juxtaposing them ad infinitum. Therefore, the Intellect is only able to arrive at the Absolute in an infinite approach through finite terms; such is the infinite regress argument. This infinity is not the true infinity that Hegel argues that Reason is able to achieve, where finite and infinite are shown to be identical.
Summary of Chapters
§1 Hegel of the Differenzschrift: An introduction to Hegel's early terminology and his critique of grounding philosophy solely on the logic of the Intellect.
§1.1 Some Initial Terminology – Reason, Intellect, Speculation, Reflection: Defines the core technical terms used throughout the paper to conceptualize Hegel's faculties of consciousness.
§1.2 Translation of Key Terms: Analyzes the philosophical nuances of translating German terms like 'Aufhebung' and 'entgegensetzen' into English.
§1.3 Qualms with Kant: Discusses Hegel's critique of Kant’s reliance on the Intellect, arguing that it fails to reach the Absolute.
§1.4 Fuss with Fichte: Examines Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s "Ich=Ich" and his focus on the need for true infinity.
§1.5 Historicism – The Eternal and the Idiosyncratic in Philosophy: Addresses the challenge of reconciling the historical nature of philosophy with the search for the Absolute.
§1.6 The Necessity/Need of Philosophy – The Dichotomy and its Suspension: Explores how philosophy arises from and aims to overcome historical dichotomies.
§1.7 Reflection as an Instrument for Philosophy: Outlines the three distinct relations between Reflection, Reason, and the Intellect.
§1.7.1 Reflection of Reason: Investigates how the Reflection of Reason mediates the contradictions produced by the Intellect.
§1.7.2 Reflection of the Intellect for Reason I: Explores how Reason connects limited terms to the Absolute.
§1.7.3 The Failure of Reflection of the Intellect without Reason: Demonstrates why the Intellect cannot construct the Absolute without the aid of Reason.
§1.7.4 Reflection of the Intellect for Reason II: Concludes the function of the Intellect when utilized by Reason.
§1.7.5 Conclusion of Reflection as an Instrument for Philosophy: Summarizes the necessity of overcoming dichotomies for a speculative philosophy.
§1.8 Relation of Speculation to Common Sense: Analyzes the difficulties common sense has in grasping the Speculative Moment.
§1.9 Summary of sections 1.1 – 1.8: A synthesis of the findings regarding the transition from a philosophy of reflection to a philosophy of speculation.
§1.10 Principle of a Philosophy in the Form of an Absolute Basic Proposition: Discusses the refutation of synthetic and analytic distinctions in favor of speculative identity.
§1.11 The Absolute Identity: Provides a mathematical/functional framework for the Absolute Identity using subject and object functions.
§2 Frege: An analysis of Frege's philosophy of language, focusing on his essay "Über Sinn und Bedeutung".
§2.1 Funktion und Begriff: Examines Frege's early questions regarding equality and partial equivalence.
§2.2 Über Sinn und Bedeutung: Outlines Frege’s mature development of sense and referent.
§2.3 Conclusion: Summarizes Frege's findings on the nature of difference within identity.
§3 Fregel: A concluding comparative analysis highlighting the points of convergence between Hegel and Frege.
Keywords
Hegel, Frege, Identity, Analytic, Continental, Pragmatics, Semantics, Differenzschrift, On Sense and Referent, Über Sinn und Bedeutung, Absolute, Absolute Identity, Dialectic, Speculation, Reference Theory
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper examines the philosophical intersections between G.W.F. Hegel and Gottlob Frege, specifically concerning their theories of identity, semantics, and how different philosophical cultures address the cognitive value of propositions.
What are the primary thematic fields?
The core themes include the operation of speculative philosophy versus formal logic, the distinction between sense (Sinn) and referent (Bedeutung), the historical nature of philosophy, and the ontic status of identity.
What is the primary research goal?
The objective is to argue that despite belonging to different traditions (analytic and continental), Hegel and Frege both engage with a similar dilemma regarding how identity functions in language and thought, and that their solutions are more alike than conventionally assumed.
What scientific methods are applied?
The paper utilizes a comparative, textual analysis method, examining primary sources of both authors (such as Hegel's "Differenzschrift" and Frege's later essays) to map their arguments onto a shared logical framework of pragmatics and semantics.
What does the main body of the work cover?
The main body systematically analyzes Hegel's early work, breaking down his concepts of Reflection and Reason, before contrasting these with Frege's semantic analysis of equality and the Morning/Evening star example.
Which keywords characterize this work?
Key terms include Hegel, Frege, Absolute Identity, Speculation, Analytic/Continental divide, Semantics, Pragmatics, and the nature of ontological versus epistemological claims.
How does Hegel’s "Reflection" differ from "Reason"?
Reflection, for Hegel, is the faculty of the Intellect that tends to split reality into juxtaposed parts, whereas Reason is the faculty that unifies these parts into a cohesive, speculative whole that approaches the Absolute.
What is the significance of the "Absolute Identity" in the paper?
The Absolute Identity serves as a functional condition or threshold where the distinction between subject and object is suspended, allowing for a proposition to attain ontological significance rather than just logical or epistemological validity.
- Citar trabajo
- John Dorsch (Autor), 2012, Fregel. Hegel and Frege, or Toward a Unified Conception of Identity Differenzschrift and Über Sinn und Bedeutung, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/412273
