Accurately figuring out the cumulative ordering of preferences of an entire society as an aggregation of the orderings of preferences of many individuals would inherently simplify democratic decision processes. However, the social preference ordering is contingent on the specific procedure, or voting rule, used to aggregate the individual preference orderings. This means that different voting rules can lead to different social preference orderings under the input of the same individual preference orderings. This issue effectuates the questions which of the different possible outcomes is the most legitimate, and by extension which voting rule should be used. Arrow sought to answer these questions by demanding that voting rules satisfy a particular set of democratically desirable qualities – these are referred to as axioms or conditions. A voting rule that succeeds in complying with all the conditions could be considered democratically legitimate. The emerging issue is that no voting rule can possibly satisfy all theconditions simultaneously.
The blatant preliminary conclusion of this impossibility theorem is somewhat bleak: our faith in democratic voting procedures might be entirely misguided. The aim of this paper is to ascertain, whether the implications of this impossibility theorem constitute an actual issue for the practical application of preference aggregation – or voting – in a democratic political system.
Having argued that certain evasions of the impossibility can be practically justified in most cases, the paper will conclude that the impossibility is only relevant for a negligible number of scenarios. Thus, inferring that in most cases Arrow’s impossibility theorem, albeit theoretically relevant, does not constitute a profound issue for voting procedures in a democratic political system.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- I. Introduction
- II. Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem
- a. Introducing Arrow's Conditions
- b. Evaluating the Condition's Normativity
- III. Arriving at Possibility Results
- a. Giving up the Unrestricted Domain Condition
- b. Giving up the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Condition
- IV. Practical Justifications and Implications of the Circumventions
- V. Conclusion
- VI. References
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This paper aims to explore the practical implications of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem for democratic decision-making. It investigates whether the impossibility theorem constitutes a significant issue for the use of voting rules in democratic systems. The paper delves into the theorem's conditions, analyzing their normative justification and potential for alteration. It then examines practical justifications and consequences of circumventing the impossibility theorem.
- Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and its conditions
- Normative evaluation of the conditions
- Circumventing the impossibility by altering conditions
- Practical implications of circumventing the impossibility
- Relevance of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem for democratic decision-making
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
- I. Introduction: This chapter introduces the concept of aggregating individual preferences into a collective ordering and highlights the challenges posed by different voting rules leading to varying social preference orderings. It outlines Arrow's attempt to address these challenges through a set of democratically desirable conditions and introduces the core argument of the paper – assessing the practical relevance of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem for democratic systems.
- II. Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem: This chapter provides an overview of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, focusing on the conditions he established and the impossibility he proves. The conditions are presented in detail, laying the groundwork for the normative evaluation in the subsequent chapter.
- III. Arriving at Possibility Results: This chapter examines ways to circumvent the impossibility theorem by relaxing certain conditions. It explores the implications of giving up the unrestricted domain condition and the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, highlighting the potential for achieving possibility results.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
This paper focuses on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, democratic decision-making, voting rules, social preference orderings, conditions, unrestricted domain condition, independence of irrelevant alternatives, normative evaluation, practical implications, and the relevance of the impossibility theorem for real-world applications.
- Citation du texte
- Johannes König (Auteur), 2018, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in Practice, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/448772
