This paper attempts to provide a framework for understanding the concept of the human person in his essential and ontological beingness in the light of Yorùbá worldview. The paper argues that the mind-body problem that has taken a central seat in philosophy would be better appreciated if it is allowed to remain as culture-relative. In other words, it would a mistaken assumption of sort to assume that the western categories of monism or Cartesian dualism are sufficient theories around which the mind-body problem should be discussed. At the heart of the discussion is an attempt to open up the Yorùbá perspective to the mind-body problem which, though primarily acknowledges among other considerations that the human person is composed of both material-physical and immaterial-spiritual (metaphysical) aspects, insists a person is more than the mind and body. An attempt will also be made in this project to make a contrast between Cartesian dualism and Yorùbá worldview of the composition of the human person and draw a parallel between the two perspectives.
Central to the numerous challenges that confront philosophy and philosophers is inter alia the question of the composition of the human person. Essentially, philosophers, especially metaphysicians, grapple with the question of "who a person is?" Put differently, what constitutes the human nature? Integrally connected to such fundamental questions are other posers that bother on the mind-body problem, which, on the one hand, focus on the composition of the person as a material being. Such questions like "Is man a composition of mind and body? And, what kind of relationship or interaction (if any) goes on between the domains of substances? ‘Is the human person an entirely physical entity?" Or, "Is he solely non-physical or, is he composed of both physical and non-physical features?" These are the interrogative legacies of Cartesian substance dualism and interactionism bequeathed to philosophy. There is no straightforward answer to these questions as a first-glance approach could present them to be.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Dualist Project versus Cartesian Dualism
Understanding who the Yorùbá is
The Human Person and Composition in Yorùbá Cosmology
Mind-Body Link problem in Yorùbá ontology
Material-Immaterial Relation in Yorùbá Conception of Person
Evaluation and Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper aims to establish a philosophical framework for understanding the concept of the human person according to the Yorùbá worldview. It challenges the universal applicability of Western monism and Cartesian dualism, arguing that the mind-body problem should be viewed through a culture-relative lens, and explores the hierarchical interaction between the material and immaterial constituents of a person.
- Comparison between Cartesian dualism and Yorùbá ontology
- Defining the components of the Yorùbá human person (ènìyàn)
- The role of orí (inner head) in destiny and personality
- The relationship between material (ara) and immaterial (èmí) substances
- The critique of Western interactionism within African philosophy
Excerpt from the Book
The Human Person and Composition in Yorùbá Cosmology
Yorùbá describes the human person as ènìyàn, which has its root in the phrase eni-ayàn, meaning the ‘chosen one.’ The Ifa Oracle succinctly defines the human person this way:
à wa gégébí ènìyàn, … we as human beings, à wa ni Olodumare yàn we are the God’s elect, láti lo tun ilé ayé se, designated to renew the world, Eni -a yàn ni wá... We are the chosen ones.
Interpreting this Odù, Gbadegesin holds that ‘ènìyàn is made by the combined effort of Olodumare, the supreme deity and his subordinate, Òrìsà Nlá, the arch-divinity, with the former giving life (èmí) while the latter makes the corporeal part (ara). The Supreme deity supplies the èmí which activates the lifeless ara. Clearly, from the above, the essence of the person is predetermined by his creator and so is his existence. Yorùbá cosmological theory sees the person as a composition of both the physical and spiritual aspects, and many of their oral literatures expressed in proverbs and folklores reflect this reality.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Outlines the fundamental challenge of defining the human person and the composition of body and soul, introducing the Yorùbá perspective as a critical alternative to Cartesian dualism.
Dualist Project versus Cartesian Dualism: Defines the general philosophical theory of dualism and examines Descartes' specific interactionist model, focusing on the pineal gland as the site of interaction.
Understanding who the Yorùbá is: Provides a geo-locational and historical background of the Yorùbá people to establish the cultural context of the study.
The Human Person and Composition in Yorùbá Cosmology: Explores the conceptualization of ènìyàn as a chosen being, identifying the essential material and immaterial parts that constitute a person.
Mind-Body Link problem in Yorùbá ontology: Discusses the appropriateness of using the term 'soul' over 'mind' and examines the interconnected nature of the human person in Yorùbá thought.
Material-Immaterial Relation in Yorùbá Conception of Person: Analyzes how the spiritual realm influences the material body, positing a uni-dimensional dependency rather than Western interactionism.
Evaluation and Conclusion: Synthesizes the contrast between Cartesian interactionism and the Yorùbá ontological framework, confirming the pre-deterministic nature of the Yorùbá human person.
Keywords
Yorùbá, ènìyàn, Cartesian Dualism, Mind-Body Problem, Ontological, Orí, Èmí, Ara, Interactionism, Cosmology, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Destiny, African Philosophy, Material-Immaterial Relation
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this research paper?
The paper examines the philosophical composition of the human person, specifically contrasting the Western Cartesian mind-body dualism with the unique ontological framework of the Yorùbá worldview.
What are the core themes explored in this work?
Central themes include the definition of the human person (ènìyàn), the nature of human destiny (àyànmó), the role of various spiritual components like orí and èmí, and the critique of Western dualistic categorizations.
What is the main research question?
The paper seeks to answer how the Yorùbá conceive of the human person's composition and how this perspective offers a more holistic alternative to the standard Western mind-body interactionist discourse.
Which scientific or philosophical method is employed?
The author uses a comparative philosophical analysis, evaluating indigenous Yorùbá thought systems alongside Cartesian principles to identify points of convergence and divergence.
What topics are covered in the main section?
The main sections cover the definitions of Yorùbá identity, the tripartite or quadripartite structural composition of the human person, and the causal link between immaterial spiritual forces and the physical body.
Which keywords characterize the essence of this study?
Key terms include Yorùbá, ènìyàn, Cartesian Dualism, mind-body problem, orí, èmí, and ontological framework.
How does the Yorùbá concept of destiny relate to the physical body?
In Yorùbá thought, the immaterial orí determines the destiny and actions of the physical body, meaning the body acts under the guidance of its spiritual counterpart rather than possessing independent volition.
What is the significance of the "pineal gland" comparison?
The author uses the pineal gland as a reference point for Descartes' interactionism to show that unlike the Cartesian attempt to locate interaction in a specific organ, the Yorùbá view of interaction is non-locatable in space and time.
Does the death of the body mean the death of the soul in this ontology?
The text explains that the èmí (life-force) and orí are essential immaterial components that survive the physical death of the body, indicating that the essence of the person transcends the material structure.
- Citar trabajo
- James Alabi (Autor), 2018, Dualistic conception of the human person in Yorùbá worldview, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/463175
