Technological developments of artificial intelligence paired with incredibly realistic simulations of organic bodies will probably make machines hardly differentiable from living beings in the near future. The increasing possibilities of replacing bodily parts by robotic replications do not simplify a strict division between organisms and machines. Therefore, it is relevant to think about the question whether modern machines can be subsumed under well-known concepts of organisms. And if they do, can we accept that? Or should such concepts be rethought and updated?
In her paper "Organismus - Maschine: Analogie oder Gegensatz", Marianne Schark compares the Aristotelian and the Cartesian conception of organisms. According to the Aristotelian conception, living beings consist of a physical body (matter) and a soul (form), which is necessary for viability. According to Aristoteles, the organic body functions as the soul’s tool. Supporters of the Cartesian conception criticize this theory by claiming that animals are nothing more than organized bodies and thus do not differ from machines. In general, those two conceptions vary regarding their interpretations of the nature of abilities: While, according to Aristoteles, living beings possess active abilities, René Descartes rather considers them as merely having passive dispositions.
Since it seems obvious that modern machines can be considered as organisms according to the Cartesian conception, in this paper, I will focus on the more ambiguous Aristotelian conception. I argue for the claim that modern machines can be considered as organisms even according to the Aristotelian conception of organisms. If this is true, we should seriously think about which distinctive features still differentiate organisms from modern machines and consequently, whether an introduction of new theoretical approaches of organisms is required.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION
II. MAIN ARGUMENT AND OUTLINE
III. THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF ORGANISMS
IV. STATEMENT
V. CONCLUSION
Objectives and Topics
The paper examines the Aristotelian conception of organisms in the context of modern technological advancements, specifically questioning whether modern machines can be categorized as organisms under Aristotelian criteria. The central research question explores the necessity of updating theoretical biological concepts to account for blurring boundaries between natural and artificial entities.
- Comparison of Aristotelian and Cartesian conceptions of organisms.
- Analysis of the "soul" as a form and the organic body as a tool.
- Assessment of whether modern machines meet the conditions for being considered organisms.
- Evaluation of the distinction between natural and artificial life forms.
- Revisiting the definition of agency and purpose in living vs. non-living systems.
Excerpt from the book
III. THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF ORGANISMS
The Aristotelian conception of organisms is divided into two general parts: First, the introduction of the soul as the form of living beings and second, Aristoteles’ idea of the organic body as the soul’s tool.
In this section, I will reconstruct Marianne Schark’s analysis of the first part of the Aristotelian conception, show its positive and negative implications and justify (P2) regarding the first part. Then, I will turn to the second part of the conception which entails two interpretations. Here, I will reconstruct the first interpretation and show its implications, then reconstruct the second interpretation and show its implications and subsequently justify (P2) regarding the whole second part of the conception. Finally, I will derive the conclusion of my argument.
To begin with the first part, living beings consist of “matter“, which physically constitutes the being through an organic body. But since matter does not suffice for viability, living beings additionally consist of “form“ which makes up their soul and is precisely the differentiating element between animate and inanimate objects. Therefore, the existence of a soul is a necessary condition for the viability of an organic body. In general, the soul represents the special organizational form of a body, i.e. the particular order and interaction of the single bodily parts and organs, as well as the whole form of the body. Thus, the soul (form) can only exist dependent on the existence of the body (matter). Aristoteles considers the soul as the mere capacity to be alive, without any appeal to mental phenomena, in contrast to present interpretations of a soul. Rather, the soul embodies the characteristic activities for living beings, as for instance reproduction, self-nutrition, perception or thinking. If a being complies at least with one of them, it can be considered as a living being. (419-422)
Summary of Chapters
I. INTRODUCTION: Outlines the growing technological similarity between machines and living beings and introduces the core question of whether modern machines fit Aristotelian definitions of organisms.
II. MAIN ARGUMENT AND OUTLINE: Establishes the logical framework for the argument that if machines meet Aristotelian conditions, they qualify as organisms, and maps out the paper's structure.
III. THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF ORGANISMS: Analyzes the Aristotelian soul as form and the tool analogy, arguing that modern robotic systems can be seen as satisfying these conditions.
IV. STATEMENT: Discusses the intuition behind the "natural" versus "artificial" distinction and proposes extending biological theories to account for these modern realities.
V. CONCLUSION: Summarizes the findings and emphasizes the need for continuous reflection on biological definitions in the face of rapid technological progress.
Keywords
Aristotelian conception, Organisms, Machines, Artificial Intelligence, Soul, Form, Matter, Tool analogy, Viability, Natural organisms, Artificial origin, Self-initiation, Agency, Biology, Philosophy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper focuses on a critical analysis of the Aristotelian conception of organisms, specifically examining whether modern, autonomous machines can be classified as organisms based on that historical framework.
What are the central themes discussed?
The central themes include the distinction between natural and artificial beings, the definition of the "soul" as a form or organizational principle, the role of machines as tools, and the philosophical implications of artificial intelligence.
What is the author's primary research question?
The author questions whether modern machines can be subsumed under classical concepts of organisms and, if they can, whether those concepts require updating to maintain a distinction between natural life and technological creations.
Which methodology does the author employ?
The author uses a philosophical analysis, drawing heavily upon Marianne Schark's reconstruction of Aristotelian biology and applying those theoretical conditions to the capabilities of modern humanoid and functional robots.
What is covered in the main body of the work?
The main body deconstructs the Aristotelian definition of living beings (matter and soul), interprets the "tool analogy" of organic bodies, and tests these theories against the behavior and autonomous functions of modern robotic systems.
Which keywords best characterize the work?
Key terms include Aristotelian conception, Organisms, Machines, Artificial Intelligence, Soul, Form, Matter, Tool analogy, and Agency.
How does the author define the "soul" within the Aristotelian framework?
The author describes the soul not as a mystical entity, but as the "form" of a living being, representing the special organizational order and the capacity for characteristic activities like self-nutrition or perception.
What is the significance of the "Robert" case study in the paper?
Robert is a hypothetical humanoid robot used to illustrate how a machine can demonstrate self-initiation and perform specific functions autonomously, thereby fulfilling the criteria of an organism under the Aristotelian conception.
Why does the author suggest differentiating between natural and non-natural organisms?
The author suggests this distinction to reconcile the scientific fact that machines meet the conditions of "organisms" with the human intuition that machines are not part of "nature," thereby preventing a total dissolution of the term "organism."
- Citar trabajo
- Andjelika Eissing-Patenova (Autor), 2019, Machines and Organisms, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/469709
