Demographics of Kosovo and its Security Implications

Table of Contents

1 Growing tensions in Kosovo-Serbia relations

2 Diagnosis: Demographics as a Security Risk
2.1 Social Dimension: Violent clashes
2.2 Institutional Dimension: Weak institutions and lack of acceptance
2.3 Diplomatic Dimension: Disturbed political relations and mutual mistrust

3 Countermeasures
3.1 Social Dimension: Revitalization of Mitrovica Bridge
3.2 Institutional Dimension: EULEX mission
3.3 Diplomatic Dimension: EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue

4 Policy recommendations
4.1 Social Dimension: “Bringing people together”
4.2 Institutional Dimension: Extend EULEX mission (new focus)
4.3 Diplomatic Dimension: Conditionalization of further financial support

II References

1 Growing tensions in Kosovo-Serbia relations

The purpose of the present paper is to work out the demographics of Kosovo as a risk for the security and the relations of Serbia and Kosovo. The ethnical divided population of the country that declared its unilateral independence back in 2008 has been and still is the trigger for a row of violent incidents and political unrests. A current example that empha­sizes the underlying tension in the relation of Belgrade and Pristina is the declaration of Serbian prime-minister Ana Brnabic as persona-non-grata for lifetime in Kosovo as a reaction on comments she stated about Kosovo-Albanians¹ (Begisholli, 2019). Another current example are the raids of Kosovan police forces, that took place in May this year in Serb-dominated villages² near Mitrovica, which raised Belgrade officials’ concerns and led Vucic to prepare Serbian police for possible responses (Begisholli and Zivanovic, 2019).

Remembering also the violent confrontations in the years after the declaration of inde­pendence, e.g. in July 2011 when armed ethnic Serbs attacked NATO peacekeeping troops (Bytyci, 2011; Lowen, 2011), it becomes clear how fragile the situation is. Conse­quently, these permanent tensions, recurring incidents and aggressive rhetoric should sound the alarm of the EU, especially taken into account that Kosovo and Serbia stressed their willingness to normalize their relationship recently on the Western Balkan confer­ence (Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2019) that took place in April 2019 in Berlin.

As both countries (and the other Western Balkan states) are also potential or official can­didates for an EU accession and from high importance for the stability in the region, the relationship between Belgrade and Pristina needs to be normalized. Therefore, the EU should modify its policy towards the Kosovo-Serbia crises. Recommendations for such changes will be given after analyzing the connection of demographics and security in the following chapter and identifying already implemented countermeasures that addressed these issues. Thus, the aim of this paper is to develop a modified strategy in order to sooth the situation and to prepare both countries for a potential EU-accession.

2 Diagnosis: Demographics as a Security Risk

To understand the disturbed relations of Serbia and Kosovo it is important to look at the distribution and composition of the Kosovan society. One of the main obstacles in nor­malizing the relations of Belgrade and Pristina is the situation of the ethnic minority of the Kosovo-Serbs (Russell, 2019, p. 1). As it is shown in figure 1, there are Serb major­ities in southern parts of Ko­sovo and a coherent predomi­nantly Serbian area in North­ern Kosovo. Expressed in numbers the Serbian commu­nity is roughly equally di­vided between Northern Ko­sovo and the areas in the south. In total there are living around 150.000 ethnic Serbs in Kosovo (around 8 % of the total population). As the 2011 Kosovo census excluded the Serb-dominated areas in Northern Kosovo (European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo, 2013, p. 1), these numbers are based on the OSCE Municipal Profiles of Kosovo 2018.

In Northern Kosovo, where Serbs make up more than 80 % of the total population, the division of the society is particularly visible. The region north of the Ibar river that is dividing the city of Mitrovica is in large parts outside the scope of the government in Pristina, as the population is not recognizing Kosovan state authorities (Papst, 2019). Symbolic for the division of the society along ethnic lines is the infamous bridge in Mi­trovica, that is meant to connect the Albanian part of the city (south of the Ibar) and the Serbian part (north of the Ibar). Ambitions of the EU to fund the revitalization of it, will be discussed in 3.2.

As described, it is not possible to distinguish Kosovo into a “Serbian-only” and an “Al­banian-only” part, as there are also significant numbers of Kosovo-Albanians living in the Serb-dominated north of the country³ and as there are Serbian enclaves in the rest of the country⁴. This heterogenous and ethnical divided society bears the risk of violent clashes as demonstrated in the introduction. Accordingly, this paper will identify three policy-relevant security dimensions, that are linked to the complicated demographic sit­uation of Kosovo.

2.1 Social Dimension: Violent clashes

The ethnical division of the Kosovan society has led to several violent incidents and to tense Belgrade-Pristina relations. Looking on where such events took place it becomes obvious that they are likely to happen where Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians en­counter. This is the case in the divided town of Mitrovica, that was the scene of numerous acts of violence. Examples are the execution of Kosovo-Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic by Serbian nationalists, most likely due to his efforts in connecting Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians (Rudic, Isufi and Zivanovic, 2018) or several clashes in the area of the Mitrovica bridge like in June 2014, when police fought Kosovo-Albanians, after they tried to attack Kosovo-Serbs that erected a road blockade on the other side of the bridge (“Clashes in Kosovo’s Mitrovica over bridge blockade”, 2014). Without many words said, the first demography-related security risk is identified easily as the toxic division of the Kosovan society along ethnical lines and a lack of mutual understanding and possi­bilities to connect. The risk of further incidents remains high, as long as the relationship of Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs isn’t improving. Therefore, inter-ethnical ex­change and possibilities to connect need to be created, as it will be discussed in 4.1.

2.2 Institutional Dimension: Weak institutions and lack of acceptance

For many years before and after the unilateral declaration of independence Belgrade op­erated parallel institutions in Northern Kosovo, such as police, health care and courts. These actions undermined Pristina’s attempts to get this Serb-dominated region under its control (Russell, 2019, p. 5). What intensifies this problem is the lack of acceptance from Kosovo-Serbs - especially in the north⁵ - for Kosovan authorities. In the years after the break-up custom posts and border crossings were burned, courts were occupied and the population of Northern Kosovo protested violently against any presence of the Kosovan state in Northern Kosovo (Wittkowsky and Kasch, 2012, p.1).

This situation has improved by incorporating these parallel structures into the official Kosovan institutions. Nevertheless, made achievements were undermined, when Bel­grade asked incorporated Kosovo-Serbs to quit their duty as a result of Pristina’s plans to convert Kosovan security forces into a regular army (Russell, 2019, p. 5). Shortly after that claim a wave of violent crime struck Northern Kosovo, what emphasizes that the power of the Kosovan state is still absent in that region (Radonjic, 2018a).

Protests of the population of Northern Kosovo against the police raids that were men­tioned in chapter 1 (Begisholli and Zivanovic, 2019) are also stressing the low level of acceptance of Kosovan state authorities by Kosovo-Serbs. This could at least be partly related to the underrepresentation of them in official Kosovan institutions (Russell, 2019, p. 5). That is why weak institutions (especially in Northern Kosovo), a lack of acceptance by Kosovo-Serbs and an underrepresentation of the aforementioned is identified as the second policy-relevant security challenge.

2.3 Diplomatic Dimension: Disturbed political relations and mutual mistrust

The Kosovo War in the years 1998-1999 accomplished facts in the for a long-time dis­puted territory, as the UN Resolution 1244 established the UN Interim Administration of Kosovo (UNMIK). Due to that resolution Kosovo should be administered as an autono­mous part of Serbia and as an UN protectorate (Bátora, Osland and Peter, 2017, p. 11). Since then there was no dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, as Serbia treated Kosovo still as a conventional province of its territory, even after the unilateral declaration of independence. Until 2011, when the EU facilitated the first dialogue, officials on both sides even refused to shake hands (Gashi and Novakovic, 2017, p. 4).

Since negotiations started, considerable progress was made. In numerous bi-lateral meet­ings under the auspices of the EEAS and the HR for Foreign Affairs, 33 agreements were concluded, covering mostly technical questions such as telecommunications, trade and boundary/border crossings (Russell, 2019, p. 3-4). However, it is still enshrined in the Serbian Constitution, that Kosovo⁶ is part of the Serbian territory (Serb. Const., Art. 114), while recognition of the status quo is a base for further normalization talks of Pristina and Belgrade (Gashi and Novakovic, 2017, p. 3). Consequently, the non-recognition is one of the reasons why the dialogue has come to a halt since 2016 (Russell, 2019, p. 3).

Due to stagnated talks, the implementation of the Brussels Agreement and the following 2015⁷ agreements were slow and remains incomplete (European Commission, 2019a, p. 54) while the rhetoric of both parties speaking about the respectively other party became increasingly aggressive (Russell, 2019, p. 3). Silence broke shortly, when President Vucic of Serbia and President Thaci of Kosovo came up with the US-backed idea of a possible land swap⁸ (Walker and MacDowall, 2018), but at the latest when Serbia blocked Ko­sovo’s Interpol-accession, talks stopped and tensions increased significantly again. As a reaction Kosovo levied 100 % import taxes on goods from Serbia and from Bosnia-Her- zegovina. Reacting on that, Vucic cancelled all future dialogues until Kosovo will abolish the taxes again. One month later, Kosovo decided to upgrade its security forces into a regular army, provoking Belgrade to warn Pristina officials, that this move could result in a military response from the Serbian side (Russell, 2019, p. 2-3).

Tensions are increasing since then, as the incidents of 2019 that were mentioned in the introduction are showing. It becomes clear that apart from achieved efforts, the relation­ship of Belgrade and Pristina has aggravated in the course of the last year, with even bringing military options into the play. That’s why the disturbed relations, the mutual mistrust and territorial claims are identified as the third security-related policy challenge. This was also emphasized by EU Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Maja Kocijancic, when she urged both parties to return to the negotiating tables again (Tanjug, 2019).

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¹ Ana Bmabic called them “people that literally just emerged from the woods”.

² These operations were officially directed against organized crime.

³ According to the OSCE Municipal Profiles of Kosovo 2018 around 11 % of the population of Northern Kosovo.

⁴ As shown on figure 1.

⁵ The Serbian enclaves in the south of the country accepted the fact of Kosovo’s independency faster.

⁶ The official name in the Serbian constitution is Kosovo and Metohija.

⁷ These were also concluded within the framework of the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.

⁸ The idea was, that Northern Kosovo would become a part of Serbia and the Serbian but predominantly Albanian-inhabited Presevo valley would become a part of Kosovo.