Does China challenge US dominance in the UNSC by increasing foreign aid for non-permanent members? This research question will be the focus of the paper. With a look at Chinese spending on foreign aid the assumption of buying support does not seem far-fetched. Chinese foreign aid could potentially be even more effective than US aid in strategically buying support in the UNSC, because it comes without any strings attached and gives state leaders more freedom to decide over the allocation of resources.
According to the realist school of thought, international politics are power politics and states constantly work to increase their power – be it economic or military power – relative to each other. And although the United States can be seen as a hegemon since the end of the cold war, unipolarity is regarded by realists as the least durable of all power configurations. China is almost caught up to the United States in terms of military spending and economic growth, the population is three times that of the US and China can already be seen as a regional hegemon in Asia.
However, even though China has become more aggressive and vocal in global politics since Xi Jinping’s shift away from the “hide and bid policy” and scholars have indeed observed subtle strategies of Beijing challenging and resisting the authority of the hegemon, it remains understudied, if China also attempts to challenge US dominance in the UNSC. If the expectation of a balance of power by realists were true though, we might expect China not to let the US dominate – especially in a critical area such as international security politics – the decisions of the UNSC by strategically buying votes or support with foreign aid.
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
3. THEORY
4. RESEARCH DESIGN
5. FINDINGS
6. DISCUSSION
7. LIMITATIONS
8. CONCLUSION
Research Objectives and Themes
The study aims to investigate whether China utilizes foreign aid as a strategic instrument to secure support for its interests within the United Nations Security Council, thereby challenging the established US dominance in this international institution through a realist lens.
- Realist perspective on power dynamics and international regimes
- Transactional diplomacy and foreign aid as a strategic tool
- Quantitative analysis of Chinese foreign aid spending and UNSC membership
- Comparative analysis of Chinese and US aid strategies
- Examination of the "Belt and Road Initiative" in the context of global influence
Extract from the Book
1. Introduction
Since President Donald Trump’s administration, it has become public knowledge that the United States (US) expect conformity in exchange for money within the United Nations (UN). Nikki Hayley, former US Ambassador to the United Nations commented on the release of the yearly report on UN voting patterns by the State Department with the following: “The American people pay 22 percent of the U.N. budget – more than the next three highest donor countries combined. In spite of this generosity, the rest of the U.N. voted with us only 31 percent of the time, a lower rate than in 2016. [...] this is not an acceptable return on our investment" (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2018).
Research has shown that years that the US strategically buy vote compliance with foreign aid both in the UN General Assembly (GA) as well as the Security Council (SC) (see e.g. Dreher et al., 2008; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010). And although this type of transactional diplomacy collides with the democratic character and self-conception of the GA, there is hardly any criticism of the US’ behavior – neither from governments, nor from the UN secretariat.
Thus, the question arises: what about the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? Do they also try to secure support and a similar voting behavior by using foreign aid as an incentive? Research so far has been very much focused on the behavior of the US and a small group of scholars have considered the G7 nations as a whole, but to this day, no investigation of the case of China has been conducted. Seeing China’s rapid rise in economic and military power and the realist expectation of a balance of power, this study aims to address the research gap and examine, whether China also pursues a strategy of increasing foreign aid as a country becomes a non-permanent member of the UNSC.
Summary of Chapters
1. INTRODUCTION: This chapter introduces the research problem regarding China's use of foreign aid and establishes the central research question concerning the balance of power in the UNSC.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: This section surveys existing scholarly work on the relationship between foreign aid and vote compliance in the UN, primarily focusing on US practices.
3. THEORY: This chapter outlines the realist theoretical framework that posits states act to balance against hegemons, providing the basis for the hypothesis that China may use aid to influence UNSC outcomes.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN: This chapter describes the methodology, including the use of linear regression to test the impact of UNSC membership on Chinese foreign aid allocations between 2000 and 2014.
5. FINDINGS: This chapter presents the empirical results of the regression analysis, which indicate no significant correlation between UNSC membership and Chinese foreign aid.
6. DISCUSSION: This chapter interprets the findings, suggesting reasons why China might not currently employ a strategy of vote buying in the UNSC, such as the focus on the Belt and Road Initiative.
7. LIMITATIONS: This section identifies constraints regarding data quality, timeframe, and the simplicity of the model as factors that may influence the results.
8. CONCLUSION: This chapter synthesizes the research outcomes and suggests that while China is rising as a power, it does not currently mirror US tactics in the Security Council.
Keywords
United Nations Security Council, UNSC, China, Foreign Aid, Realism, Balance of Power, International Relations, Vote Compliance, Belt and Road Initiative, Quantitative Analysis, Global Hegemony, Economic Development, AidData, Political Influence, Regression Analysis
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this term paper?
The paper examines whether China uses foreign aid as a strategic tool to influence the voting behavior of non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
What are the primary themes discussed?
The main themes include international relations theory, the role of foreign aid in securing political support, the balance of power between the US and China, and the nature of China’s increasing engagement in global governance.
What is the research question addressed?
The central question is: "Does China challenge US dominance in the UNSC by increasing foreign aid for non-permanent members?"
Which methodology is applied in this study?
The author uses a quantitative approach, specifically employing a linear regression model to test the association between a country's UNSC membership status and the amount of aid received from China.
What does the main body of the work cover?
The main body covers a literature review on aid-for-votes, theoretical foundations based on realism, a detailed research design, empirical findings from regression analysis, and a discussion of these findings in the context of broader Chinese foreign policy.
Which keywords best characterize the research?
The research is characterized by terms such as UNSC, China, foreign aid, realism, balance of power, and international relations.
Why were the results of the regression analysis unexpected?
The results were unexpected because realist theory predicted a positive correlation between UNSC membership and aid, but the statistical analysis revealed no significant effect, suggesting Beijing does not currently pursue a vote-buying strategy.
What role does the Belt and Road Initiative play in the analysis?
The Belt and Road Initiative is discussed in the findings and discussion as a potential alternative explanation, indicating that China's financial resources are heavily directed towards these infrastructure projects rather than specifically for UNSC vote-buying.
- Citar trabajo
- Marla van Nieuwland (Autor), 2019, A Balance of Power in the United Nations Security Council?, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/534862
