This paper is concerned with optimising the enforcement of European Union Competition Law against cartels participants.
A critique of Directive 2014/104 and its main shortcomings will begin this paper. Investigation then launched into role of national competition authorities in the Union, arguing that enhanced member state cooperation and full transposition of draft Directive 2019/1 (ECN+) will deter cartel activity. Final point concerns individual liability against the company agents behind cartels, how corporate fines imposed by European Commission fail to deter individuals against continued cartel participation.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. EU Private Enforcement: David & Goliath?
(i) Current Law
(ii) Hot Topic: Directive 2014/104
(iii) Collective Redress & ADR: Patching Holes
2. Harmony Required: EU Public Enforcement
(i) 2019: Cracks in the NCA Pavement
(ii) ECN+ Directive: New Rulebook
(iii) NCA Optimisation Requires Unified Union
3. Cartels: Promoting Individual Liability
(i) Trimming Weeds, Pulling Roots
Objectives & Core Themes
This paper explores the optimization of EU competition law enforcement against cartel participants by critically analyzing current legislative frameworks, the role of national authorities, and the necessity of individual liability.
- Critical analysis of the effectiveness of Directive 2014/104 in private enforcement.
- The role of the European Competition Network and the impact of the ECN+ Directive.
- Advocacy for a centralized enforcement agency to foster a federalist competition regime.
- The implementation of individual criminal and civil liability for cartel agents to ensure better deterrence.
Excerpt from the Book
(i) Trimming Weeds, Pulling Roots
The European Commission is the engine of public competition law enforcement, but how effective is it fundamentally? EU cartel statistics do not show any large reduction in the number of cartel cases decided by the Commission since 2014. Cartels are a consistent problem in Europe. One caveat, the number of active cartels is unknown so it’s difficult to predict if the Commission is achieving optimal deterrence. I elect for criminal sanctions against company employees responsible for cartels throughout the Union. I believe individuals sanction would be useful compliance mechanism to existing EU Competition Law. To kill a weed, you must spray its root.
The root in this case are the individuals responsible for the cartels. They hide behind the company’s veil in prosecutions – it doesn’t make sense to impose civil fines on company’s only to allow individual cartel agents to escape personal liability. Fines levied against infringing undertakings are like trimming leaves on infectious flora, the problem persists. Fines promise immediate deterrence, but the net effect gives perpetrating company agents no reason not to begin another cartel in a separate industry.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Provides an overview of the "supreme evil" of cartel activity and outlines the paper's focus on enforcement optimization, legislative critiques, and individual liability.
1. EU Private Enforcement: David & Goliath?: Examines the current state of private litigation, the impact of Directive 2014/104, and the need for better collective redress and ADR mechanisms.
2. Harmony Required: EU Public Enforcement: Discusses the fragmentation of public enforcement across Member States and argues that the ECN+ Directive and a centralized authority are essential for a unified Union approach.
3. Cartels: Promoting Individual Liability: Argues that corporate fines are insufficient for true deterrence and advocates for personal criminal and civil liability to hold individuals accountable for cartel participation.
Keywords
EU Competition Law, Cartels, Private Enforcement, Directive 2014/104, ECN+ Directive, National Competition Authorities, Collective Redress, Individual Liability, Deterrence, European Commission, Antitrust, Federalism, Corporate Fines, Criminal Sanctions, Enforcement Regime.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this paper?
The paper evaluates current enforcement strategies against cartels in the European Union and proposes methods to optimize them, specifically through legislative improvement and individual accountability.
What are the central themes discussed?
Key themes include the evolution of EU private enforcement, the harmonizing role of the ECN+ Directive, the potential for a central European competition authority, and the move toward personal liability for cartel agents.
What is the primary goal of the author's research?
The goal is to determine the optimum method of enforcement against cartel participants by addressing systemic weaknesses in both the public and private enforcement sectors.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The work utilizes a legal-analytical method, reviewing existing EU jurisprudence, relevant directives, case law, and statistics to substantiate arguments for legislative reform.
What topics are covered in the main body?
The main body covers the efficacy of the Damages Directive, the administrative fragmentation of the European Competition Network, and a justification for shifting from purely corporate sanctions to individual liability.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
Keywords include EU Competition Law, Cartel Enforcement, Directive 2014/104, ECN+, Individual Liability, and Federalism.
Why does the author advocate for a "federalist system"?
The author believes a centralized European Competition Authority would provide the necessary clarity and consistency that fragmented national approaches currently lack.
What does the "trimming leaves" metaphor imply?
It implies that current corporate fines are merely superficial measures ("leaves") that do not stop the underlying problem (the "root"), which is the individual behavior of human actors within companies.
How does the author view the role of the ECN+ Directive?
The author sees it as a vital step toward harmonizing enforcement powers across Member States, helping to bridge the gap between national autonomy and the need for a unified Union competition policy.
- Citar trabajo
- Ronan Garvey (Autor), 2019, EU Competition Law. Optimum Enforcement Methods Against EU Cartel Participants, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/544537
