In the last months the discussion about a European Constitution has gained further popularity with the highly controversial speech of German foreign minister Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University3. Until recently, most draft constitutions like the Spinelli initiative of the European Parliament in 1994 or the Herman Report in 1994 were discussed on a theoretical level without a hope for realization. Now there is a wave of speeches and contribution of key politicians on this subject. In fact, there are reasons to assume that there is more to it that just the typical German focus on constitutionalism4 but that “a window of opportunity is opening”5: the need for legal and institutional reform becomes evident in view of the incipient eastern enlargement and the results of the Amsterdam Conference and its postponing strategy have satisfied only few. Moreover, the fact that ECSC expires in 2002 gives further monumentum to the discussion about where Europe should be heading in the years to come and how the problems of a deeper and enlarged Union can be overcome.
1 see Schneider, Heinrich: Gesamteuropäische Herausforderungen an eine Europäische Union, in: Wildenmann, Rudolf (Hrsg.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen für eine Europäische Union, Baden-Baden Nomos, 1991 (Studien zur gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, Bd. 9), pp. 125.
2 see Weidenfeld, Werner: Die Reformbilanz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: ′Bundesrepublik Europa′ als Perspektive? in: Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang (Hrsg.): Wege zur Europäischen Union. Vom Vertrag zur Verfassung? Bonn Europa Union, 1986, pp. 28, and Hertel, Wolfram: Supranationalität als Verfassungsprinzip. Normativität und Legitimation als Elemente des Europäischen Verfassungsrechts, Berlin Duncker und Humblot, 1999 (Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht, Bd. 47), Diss. Univ. Tübingen 1998, pp. 21.
3 Fischer, Joschka: Vom Staatenbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration. Rede am 12. Mai 2000 in der Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/4_europa/index.htm.
4 Kohler-Koch, Beate: A Constitution for Europe?, Mannheim, 1999 (Arbeitspapiere - Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Bd. 8), pp. 2.
5 ibid. pp. 3.
At a glance
- Examines double legitimacy through the 1994 Herman Report draft constitution
- Examines Habermas’s critique of Grimm on a European demos and public communication
- 59 sources in the bibliography
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION
II. DOES THE EU HAVE A CONSTITUTION?
III. SHOULD THE EU HAVE A CONSTITUTION?
III.1. The EU - State or Process?
III.2. A Constitution without a State?
III.3. A Constitution and legal/institutional reform
III.4. A Constitution without a Constituency?
III.4.a. Principle of Double Legitimacy
III.4.b. The Democratic Deficit
III.4.c. European Democracy without a European Demos?
IV. CONCLUSION
Aims and Themes
This work examines whether the European Union’s founding treaties constitute a constitution in the full sense and whether a European constitution would be a desirable response to the Union’s institutional and democratic challenges. It assesses constitutional theory alongside debates about supranational authority, citizenship and political legitimacy.
- The distinction between descriptive and normative conceptions of a constitution
- The constitutional character of the European treaties
- Integration, statehood and institutional reform
- Citizenship, double legitimacy and the democratic deficit
- The European demos, public communication and political participation
Excerpt from the Book
III.4.c. European Democracy without a European Demos?
As Grimm points out, “the success of democratic constitutions depends not just on the intrinsic excellence of their regulations, but equally on the external conditions for their effectiveness.” A working democracy depends to a great extent on the existence of the mediatory structures of a civil society, i.e. communication media, associations, non-governmental organizations, interest groups and citizens movements. Only these external conditions enable the democratic institutions to fulfill their tasks and that avoid a situation where “democratic substance is lacking even if democratic forms are present.” In the case of the EU, these external conditions or prerequisites for a 'living democracy' are a European demos and consequently a European wide public sphere and a transnational political infrastructure.
The current situation of these prerequisites is rather disappointing at the European level. There is broad consensus that there is currently no such thing as a European people. The EU exists only as a legal community without a social substrate. There are virtually no transnational mass media as well. Public communication and mediation is still segmented and stays within the national bounds of the Member states. Even European topics are usually covered from a national point of view. Moreover, the public is unable to identify political leaders in the Commission. National parties, interest groups etc. loosely cooperate, but there are practically no genuine transnational political structures. In short, Europe is lacking “public communication that transcends the boundaries of the until now limited national public spheres.” What are the prospects? Are there chances that a European demos might develop? Some authors are optimistic about a future European political sphere and regard for instance the French-German TV-channel Arte as an indicator for the emergence of a transnational discourse. It is often neglected that obviously the problem of language arises here. Communication forms the basis of political participation, will-formation and mediation of interests. Due to the great diversity of languages within the EU, a transnational discourse outside a small elite is illusory. The frequent comparison of this finding to the situation in states like Switzerland or Belgium does not hold here. The sheer number of languages makes it highly improbable that comparable linguistic competence or translation infrastructure can be developed. Language may thus prove one of the main barriers to deepening the European integration. In the long run, “a workable policy on how a multilingual polity will manage its multilingualism” seems inevitable.
Chapter Summaries
I. INTRODUCTION: The introduction places the debate in the context of European integration and contemporary proposals for a constitution. It sets out the questions of whether the treaties already constitute one and whether the Union should adopt one.
II. DOES THE EU HAVE A CONSTITUTION?: This chapter distinguishes descriptive and normative understandings of a constitution and assesses the treaties against features of constitutional law, including popular legitimacy and the limits of public authority.
III. SHOULD THE EU HAVE A CONSTITUTION?: The main chapter examines constitutional flexibility, statehood and legal reform before considering citizenship, double legitimacy, the democratic deficit and the social conditions of European democracy.
IV. CONCLUSION: The conclusion argues that constitutional language alone cannot resolve the Union’s institutional and democratic problems and calls for attention to representation and participation in a supranational setting.
Keywords
European Union, European constitution, European integration, constitutional law, founding treaties, supranationalism, statehood, democratic legitimacy, double legitimacy, democratic deficit, European citizenship, European demos, public sphere, institutional reform, political participation
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this work about?
It examines the European Union’s constitutional status and the arguments for and against adopting a European constitution.
What are its central themes?
The work focuses on supranational authority, the founding treaties, democratic legitimacy, European citizenship and the conditions for political participation.
What is the primary research question?
It asks whether the EU already has a constitution and whether it can and should adopt one in the full normative sense.
What research method does the author use?
The author develops a conceptual and legal argument through analysis of the European treaties and scholarly debates in constitutional and political theory.
What does the main chapter cover?
It considers constitutional flexibility, the relationship between constitution and state, legal and institutional reform, citizenship, legitimacy and the possibility of a European demos.
Which keywords characterize the work?
Key terms include European constitution, supranationalism, democratic deficit, European citizenship, public sphere and democratic legitimacy.
How does the work approach the Herman Report?
It uses the report’s 1994 draft constitution to examine the idea that the Union’s authority derives from both its member states and their citizens.
Why does the discussion of a European demos address language?
The author considers whether linguistic diversity affects the development of a transnational public sphere and communication among citizens.
How are Grimm and Habermas relevant to the argument?
The work discusses Grimm’s account of the social conditions for democracy and Habermas’s response concerning communication and the formation of a political community.
- Citation du texte
- M.A. Hans Christian Siller (Auteur), 2000, Why Europe does not need a constitution, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/5484