The end of the cold war in 1989 and 1990 appeared without warning. The upheavals that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall were dramatic. Within less than one year since November 9, 1989 the three Baltic states declared their independence from the Soviet Union (S.U.) as did Uzbekistan, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Finally, on October 3, 1990 Germany announced its reunification. At the beginning of 1992, the S.U. ceased to exist. In place of the Soviet empire, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established, bringing together eleven of the fifteeni constituent republics of the S.U. Having constituted the dominant republic of the S.U. and being regarded as its successor state, the Russian Federation had suddenly lost its status as a superpower and its role as a competitor, ideological and political, of the United States of America (USA/U.S.).
However, and 15 years afer the end of the S.U., this essay will argue, the USA is not in a position to influence Russia’s domestic behaviour in a way that is coherent with its liberal foreign policy doctrine. Strategic interests and internal as well as external constraints are the reasons why the U.S. has abandoned many of its foreign policy objectives in regard to Russia. In order to develop this argument, the first part of the paper will shortly outline U.S.-Russia relations since the end of the cold war. Then, the current underpinnings of U.S. policy towards Russia will be analysed. Particularly, the reasons for America’s non-engagement approach will be addressed
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Base Lines of U.S. – Russia Relations Since the End of the Cold War
II A. The Administration under George Herbert Walker Bush
II B. The Administration under William Jefferson Clinton
II C. The Administration under George Walker Bush
III. Russia becomes Autocratic (again): Waiting for the Liberal Empire
III A. Russia’s Setback Concerning Political and Economic Liberalism
III B. Current Underpinnings of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia
III C. The Attention Deficit or: where is the Empire?
III D. The constrained Empire
IV. Conclusions
V. Notes
Objectives and Thematic Focus
This paper examines why the United States, despite its self-proclaimed role as a liberal empire, has struggled to exert influence on Russia's domestic political and economic development. It explores the shift in U.S. foreign policy from active engagement during the 1990s to a security-focused, non-interventionist stance following the events of September 11, 2001, arguing that internal U.S. constraints and external geopolitical factors have rendered the U.S. a "constrained empire" incapable of shaping Russia's internal behavior.
- The historical evolution of U.S.-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War.
- The impact of shifting U.S. administrations (Bush, Clinton, Bush) on engagement strategies.
- Russia's drift toward authoritarianism and its setback regarding democratic and economic liberalism.
- The "attention deficit" and other structural constraints limiting U.S. foreign policy leverage.
- The prioritization of global security cooperation over democratic promotion in U.S.-Russia relations.
Excerpt from the Book
III D. The constrained Empire
As simple as it may seem, but Russia is not Kosovo or Iraq. Russia still has a nuclear arsenal big enough to rule out any U.S. military intervention. Hence, a Western-like regime cannot be installed by means of intervention, occupation and subsequent state building. When Ferguson writes about the U.S. as a liberal empire, he is often referring to cases like Afghanistan and Iraq. These are instances, in which the political or economic transformation presupposed military means. The general approach proposed by Ferguson, namely to underwrite economic globalisation politically,54 is rather a strategy that can be adopted for the case of Russia.
The U.S. should therefore use its non-military foreign policy instruments to bring Russia back on the democratic track. The problem in regard to Russia is that these are not really of use. Russia has experienced high growth rates since the beginning of the millennium. Currently, Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to grow at a rate of 7% compared to 2005.55 Since 2000, the GDP grew annually at a rate of 6% on average.56 Russia’s trade balance for the last twelve months, mainly due to the high oil price, amounts around $120 billion – only Germany’s trade balance is currently higher.57 Between December 2004 and September 2005, Russia reduced its debts at the Paris Club, which it had inherited from the S.U., by more than $20 billion – Russia now has to repay only $20 billion debts to its creditors.
Summary of Chapters
I. Introduction: The introduction outlines the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent challenge for the United States to define its foreign policy toward a diminished but still significant Russia.
II. Base Lines of U.S. – Russia Relations Since the End of the Cold War: This chapter reviews how different U.S. administrations, from George H.W. Bush to George W. Bush, initially prioritized security and economic stability over domestic political transformation.
II A. The Administration under George Herbert Walker Bush: Focuses on the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, emphasizing the management of nuclear stockpiles over Russia’s internal affairs.
II B. The Administration under William Jefferson Clinton: Details the transition toward active engagement, characterized by significant economic aid and the attempt to foster democratic reforms.
II C. The Administration under George Walker Bush: Analyzes the shift toward a more detached, security-oriented relationship, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001.
III. Russia becomes Autocratic (again): Waiting for the Liberal Empire: Discusses the regression of Russian political and economic standards, contextualized by the global role of the U.S.
III A. Russia’s Setback Concerning Political and Economic Liberalism: Examines specific instances of authoritarian drift, including media control, NGO restrictions, and the renationalization of industry.
III B. Current Underpinnings of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia: Explores the pragmatic, security-first partnership that emerged between the U.S. and Russia post-2001.
III C. The Attention Deficit or: where is the Empire?: Applies Niall Ferguson’s theory of "deficits" to explain the lack of political will for long-term engagement in Russia.
III D. The constrained Empire: Explains why Russia’s relative economic strength and strategic autonomy make traditional regime-change tools ineffective.
IV. Conclusions: Summarizes the argument that the U.S. is currently a constrained empire, forced to prioritize pragmatic security interests over its stated liberal values.
V. Notes: Provides detailed references and citations for the analysis presented in the paper.
Keywords
U.S. Foreign Policy, Russia, Liberal Empire, Cold War, Democratization, Realpolitik, Security Partnership, Attention Deficit, Authoritarianism, Economic Globalization, Geopolitics, Regime-Building, Constrained Empire
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research paper?
The paper examines the evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward the Russian Federation from 1990 to 2006, specifically investigating why the U.S. has failed to influence Russia's domestic political development despite its global position.
What are the primary themes discussed in the document?
The central themes include the shift in U.S.-Russian relations post-Cold War, the decline of democracy in Russia under Vladimir Putin, the pragmatic security-focused partnership post-9/11, and the constraints (both internal and external) that limit U.S. influence.
What is the primary research question?
The paper addresses why the United States, as the world's only superpower, is either unable or unwilling to use its capabilities to effectively promote democracy within Russia.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The analysis follows a qualitative, historical, and geopolitical approach, utilizing government documents, economic indicators, and political theories—most notably Niall Ferguson's concept of imperial "deficits"—to evaluate U.S. foreign policy behavior.
What is covered in the main body of the paper?
The main body systematically analyzes the policies of successive U.S. administrations, details Russia's domestic authoritarian shifts, and investigates structural reasons (such as economic self-sufficiency and strategic interdependencies) that prevent effective U.S. engagement.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
Key terms include U.S. Foreign Policy, Liberal Empire, Constrained Empire, Realpolitik, Security Partnership, and Democratization.
How does the author define the "Attention Deficit" in the context of U.S. policy?
It refers to the lack of domestic American political will to engage in another large-scale, costly, and long-term regime-building mission, particularly after disappointing outcomes in the 1990s and the strain of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Why does the author classify the U.S. as a "constrained empire" regarding Russia?
Because Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons, its increasing economic self-sufficiency through energy exports, and the geopolitical necessity for the U.S. to prevent a Russia-China alignment prevent the U.S. from applying meaningful political or economic leverage.
- Quote paper
- Michael Hofmann (Author), 2006, US foreign policy towards the Russian Federation: The constrained Empire, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/75610
