Factors for Success in Japan

Content

1. INTRODUCTION

2. FACTORS OF SUCCESS
2.1 What to consider when entering the Japanese market
2.2 Why invest in Japan now
2.3 How to stay successful in the Japanese market
2.4 How to become an Insider in Japan

3. CONCLUSION

1. Introduction

It is normal for an industrialized country to receive a portion of the world's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) equal to its economic position in the world as measured by its gross national product (GNP); it is also normal for these countries to have approximately equal amounts of inbound and outbond foreign investment. For Japan both of these ratios are about 20:1, making Japan far out of balance with the industrialized world [Attridge 1996, p. 211]. While the United States, with a world gross domestic product (GDP) of 26 per cent, has attracted about 30 per cent of the world's FDI, Japan, with a world GDP of 16 per cent has attracted only 0.8 per cent of global FDI [Jordan 1996, p. 196]. The ratio of inward to outward direct investment per capita for Japan in 1990 was 16.9, while for the US it was 1.05 and for Germany 1.66 [Dunning 1996, p. 62]. Expressed in absolute numbers, 1995 Japan was investing $50.7 billion abroad, but only $3 billion were invested by foreign companies in Japan [Toyoda 1997].

These figures show that FDI in Japan is disproportionately low. This paper does not discuss the reasons for the low FDI, but instead wants to motivate foreign companies to invest in Japan. Therefore, the main focus is on practical advice for foreign companies on how to be successful in the Japanese market. Some examples are:

- Coca-Cola produces 60 percent of all carbonated beverages sold in Japan and had 1988 sales of over $3.4 billion. Japan is their most profitable operation
- IBM's wholly owned subsidiary today employs more than 26,000 people and had sales of $9.2 billion in 1988, which accounts for 14 percent of the worldwide sales
- American Insurance Union (AIU) revenues in Japan are larger than those of its US parent [Morgan 1991, pp. 92-93]
- McDonald's had over 2,400 stores with $2.7 billion in sales in 1997 [Weinberg 1998], and is increasing the number of stores rapidly [Hutton 1998]

2. Factors of Success

2.1 What to consider when entering the Japanese market

Companies that are not already present in the Japanese market must examine it before considering penetration. Most important is to find out whether products have to be adapted or local engineering must be done. Also, the kind of human resources and capital budgeting required over the long term should be clear before one considers entering the Japanese market.

After being convinced that the Japanese market is worth entering it is very important to make a company-wide commitment to Japan. At Applied Materials, a Silicon Valley semiconductor equipment maker, an educational program for the employees was developed. The program included reading about Japan, cultural orientation and talks with Japanese executives who were in the US on assignment. The next step included a visit to Japan by the executives. Visits of Japanese companies were one of the most important aspects of the trip. Nowadays all levels of management at Applied Materials have to attend courses on Japanese history, society, culture and basic Japanese. Additionally, televised classes on Japanese are offered in connection with Stanford University.

When starting in Japan, introducing a limited line of low-support products proves to be the best way to develop strong relationships and a support apparatus. Not until strong relationships exist should a company move up to a broader line of more sophisticated products [Morgan 1991, p. 160]. Nevertheless, the product should be unique and of high quality compared to domestic versions [Perlmutter 1996, p. 100]. But one must always start from the assumption that one's company is nothing in Japan; reputation outside of Japan does not matter [Nagami 1996, p. 337].

It is very important to know that in Japan pricing is part of the product image. For example, Johnny Walker dropped the price of the Black label brand. Instead of increasing sales, sales declined drastically. Japanese consumers saw the price reduction as somehow related to quality problems with the beverage, and Johnny Walker suffered a drop in status. Still today the black label is on the cheaper end of the drink menus [Morgan 1991, p. 160].

One of the first questions that must be considered by a company entering Japan is how to distribute the product. Many companies start with distributing their products through general trading companies (sogo sosha). The advantages include instant market access, minimal start- up costs and risks, and an accepted customer interface with a trusted name. However, the disadvantages for most companies outweigh the advantages. So, successful companies usually do not distribute their products through general trading companies. The main disadvantage is that the trading company is insufficiently familiar with your product. The opportunities for direct customer contact are very restricted and therefore only limited technical support is possible. Another major problem is that the product is only part of a larger catalog, which means that no special attention will be given to the product.

Another possibility are licensing agreements. But this method of distribution has proven to be the most dangerous and least effective way of entering the Japanese market. RCA, for example, received $50 million a year for its color television technology, instead of pushing to gain access to the booming Japanese market through direct sales. Nowadays Japanese companies dominate the television technology and markets worldwide, because licensing gives competitors access to new technology without high R&D costs. Another disadvantage for the licenser is that no local presence for R&D, marketing and manufacturing can be established.

One of the quickest ways to plug into Japanese markets is to form strategic partnerships with Japanese companies for joint ventures. The most important advantages of a joint venture are quick access to the customer, reduced risk of failure, and the sharing of costs. A joint venture also allows "Japanization" through local manufacturing and sales presence and therefore better acceptance of the product. The direct contact with the customer provides a feedback that is necessary for long-term evolution. Potential disadvantages of joint ventures are that the Japanese partner will tend to control customer interface, local organization and the technology evolution. It will also make it very difficult to integrate the Japanese operation into the global organization of the parent company [Morgan 1991, p. 170]. A survey of British small-sized companies indicates that 83.5 percent of the joint-ventures ended after a rift between the parent companies [Collinson 1996, p. 58]. In a joint venture, focus must be placed on selecting the right partner. General evaluation points should be:

- Distribution channels and large customer associations [Morgan 1991, p. 171]
- Recognized technical leadership in the field with a definite product, technology or brand to provide an immediate source of profit [Collinson 1996, p. 59]
- Support and service capabilities
- Geographic coverage
- Market image and reputation
- Complementary / competitive product fit
- Industrial ranking (first, second or third tier)
- Willingness for non-exclusival contracts
- Industrial or banking grouping association (how much one's relations with a certain partner excludes one from doing business in other industrial groups)
- Philosophical fit and possible long-term synergies
- Personal relations between managements

When negotiating a partnership a few things should be considered. They may sound obvious, but they play an important role in Japan.

- Do not try to overcontrol the partnership
- Show an interest in understanding Japanese culture
- Understand how the Japanese define a "successful outcome" to the negotiations. [Morgan 1991, p. 172] Understand fully the objectives and expectations of the Japanese side regarding the partnership as any miscommunication at the initial stage will cause serious difficulties later [Collinson 1996, p.59]
- Have detailed facts and technical information readily available
- Neatness, attention to detail, and follow-through are critical
- Be sensitive and hospitable, follow basic rules of etiquette and language. Demonstrate knowledge of customs, gift giving, etc.
- Respect hierarchy. Ensure representatives of correct stature at meetings
- Do not take anything for granted; ask if you are unclear
- Show interest in your partners' activities, not just in promoting your own
- Take the time to listen to what they are doing
- Spend time informally outside the business setting. Get to know your counterpart more personally and build a web of trust at all levels of the organization. Make binding obligations by taking trips, playing golf, giving gifts, and doing favors
- Show humility - never boast, insult, or display uncontrolled emotion
- Work at all levels of the ringi-sho process, including lower level managers and technical personnel. Top-down decisions in Japan usually fail without support from the managers responsible for implementation [Morgan 1991, p. 173]
- Make a long-term commitment with a relatively long initial payout period [Collinson 1996, p. 59]
- Commit upper management's time upfront

Mergers and acquisitions have recently become a very popular way to expand the market share in Japan. This is very surprising since companies in Japan are generally not bought or sold. The main reason for this is that you are perceived as having to buy people and this carries a sense of social irresponsibility and even immorality about it. Therefore, all directors usually have to agree to the sale [Abegglen 1985, p. 233]. One of the most spectacular acquisitions was the take-over of Yamaichi Securities' offices and employees by Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch announced that it would open approximately 30 branches with 2,000 employees, bringing its total number of employees in Japan to about 3,000 [Merrill Lynch 1998]. Already in 1996, Ford bought a share of 25 percent - now 33.4 percent - in Mazda and installed Henry D.G. Wallace as the first non-Japanese executive to run a Japanese car company [Lev 1997]. The weak Yen and the trouble of many financial institutions make Japanese companies very affordable. Nevertheless the problems will arise after the acquisition, when the Japanese company has to be integrated into the global organization. This is particularly problematical since most Japanese companies still have a purely Japanese management.

The best long-term strategy for entering the Japanese market seems to be a direct presence through a subsidiary or on-site support operation. Most important are close customer- relations, which help to improve the responsivness to the market, assessment of future needs and opportunities and feedbacks for continous product development. Only by showing continually increasing commitment to the market through investment, local hiring, and developing a localized technical capability can foreign companies realistically expect to support local requirements and build essential relations with Japanese companies [Morgan 1991, pp. 150-155]. Persistance in the Japanese market is very important. Olivetti, for example, prefers to keep the relationship with important customers even if the profits are not high [Nagami 1996, p. 232]. Once the relationship with a customer or distributor is severed it is very difficult to win them back when the economy recovers. A wholly owned subsidiary also allows unified strategy and objectives worldwide [Morgan 1991, p. 156]. The Disadvantage of this is the high start-up costs with fixed expenses, making it quite difficult for smaller companies to follow this strategy [Collinson 1996, p. 60]. It is also necessary to build up relationships. Special attention has to be made to the Japanese labor market. For successful growth in Japan, Human Resources is a key position. Most foreign companies have difficulties in hiring the right staff because they lack experience and contacts. One's company in Japan represents much more than a job and a salary. It is most often considered an extension of the family, a prime determinant of social status, and a sphere of relationships throughout one's life. Security and social status are more important than financial incentives. Therefore, companies that want to attract good employees must show stability and make long- term commitments to their employees. Many foreign companies lack these points and can therefore not attract Japanese students from top universities. Many foreign companies therefore hire non-Japanese students from Japanese Universities, such as Koreans and Chinese. They also hire an unusually high proportion of top women graduates, who are closed out from traditional Japanese companies. A network of personal connections (jinmyaku) is essential in Japan. Since college professors play the role of mentor to many students, they must be won over first if a company is to have any success in generating interest with the candidates themselves [Morgan 1991, p.189]. To keep and motivate employees it is very important to inform them about your business and goals on a regularl basis [Nagami 1996, p.12].

Some foreign companies have had the possibility to hire retired executives from major Japanese companies and government ministries. A very successful story is the one of American Family Life Assurance Company (AFLAC). AFLAC was able to hire a amakudari ("descent from heaven") person, a retired person from a Japanese ministry [Nagami 1996, p. 141]. With his help AFLAC acquired the exclusive license to sell cancer insurance, because the Ministry of Finance deemed that it was not appropriate for Japanese companies to sell such insurance. This window enabled AFLAC to earn $6.8 million in net profits on $1.8 billion in premiums in 1988 - 75 percent of the company's worldwide revenues - and win it a 90 percent market share in Japan [Morgan 1991, p. 120].

To be present with a facility in Japan is important, because it shows the customers and suppliers a long-term commitment to the Japanese market. The first facility should be in Tokyo for reasons of prestige. The main idea is to see as well be seen, therefore the location is important, but not the size or appearance. Additional sites should be as close to the customer as possible. In the long run a facility should be bought or built to show real commitment to the customer and also to show staying power.

2.2 Why invest in Japan now

Many reasons exist to invest in the Japanese market and right now seems to be a very good time.

- Foreign companies still have several technological advantages over their Japanese competitors, especially in chemical, telecommunication, information and communication industries. Faced with the necessity to create industries that support economic growth for the future, the chances are greater than ever that government and industry in Japan will cooperate in these areas [Neumann 1996, p. 209].
- Japan is not a closed market in the sense that people would not buy what outsiders have to sell. Gojiro Hata, president of Louis Vuitton Japan, an exclusive French manufacturer of bags, believes that, "The best quality products can always sell in this market regardless of the state of the economy." So believes Mr. Noritomo, president of United Destiller Japan, who thinks that the idea that one should buy things of quality and long-term value has taken firm root in the Japanese mind [Nagami 1996, pp. 21, 53, 313]. Nike is currently a good example how popular foreign products are. The new Brand Jordan shoes increased its sales in Japan by 200 percent in January 1997 [Mathews 1997]. When Bijan Fragrances of California introduced its new Michael Jordan cologne, customers in Japan were standing in line to be among the first to own it [Johnson 1997]. Between July 1994 and July 1995 exports grew by 10.3 percent and imports by 28.6 percent. Between 1985 and 1991 the value of Japan's imports increased from $40.2 to $120.3 billion with an increase of manufactured goods from 30 to 50 percent of total imports. These trends point to the growing opportunities that exist in Japan for foreign firms. The reasons for this include an increase in Japanese consumers' acceptance of imported products and the need to cut costs in Japanese companies, through buying cheaper imports [Collinson 1996, p. 5].
- Recent consumer trends have shown that the more familiar the Japanese consumers become with living standards in other countries, the more they question Japan's relatively high prices.
- The keiretsu system and the network linking politicians, bureaucrats and business executives are weakening. Longterm business relationships between suppliers and distributors are neither as exclusive nor as strong as before and the idea of lifetime employment with a company is no longer a predominant concept [Neumann 1996, p. 209]. Many reforms were implemented in recent years. In 1991, for example, Toys 'R' Us opened its first mega-store following revision of the Largescale Retail Store Law. In 1998 self-sevice petrol stations were introduced [Sprague 1998]. Almost every formal tariff or quota restriction has come down, and major changes are taking place in the distribution structure with a flatter distribution system, opening the door for more imports. Liberalization is taking place in almost every industry, from telecommunications and finance, to the railroads and agriculture [Morgan 1991, p. XIX].
- Living costs, office costs and real estate costs are still falling. Prime commercial space in the business district can now be purchased for just 12% of what it would have cost in 1991 [Seno 1998]
- Due to the recession more qualified staff is available, who are more willing than ever to experience working for foreign companies [Neumann 1996, p. 209]

2.3 How to stay successful in the Japanese market

The keys to success seem to be as follows:

1. Revering the customer as God: In no other country are the requirements for customer service and support more demanding than in Japan. As Mr. Fred Krehbiel, CEO and vice chairman of Molex, an electronic connector company, said, "In quality, product design, delivery and miniaturization, Japan was setting the pace. We were required to reduce new product cycles to six months for our Japanese customers, while in the United States, twelve months was the norm, and eighteen months was acceptable in Europe. Today our years in Japan gives us a jump on our competitors in this regard." [Morgan 1991, p. 99]. Servicing the customer is part of the national culture and a critical part of success in Japan. Excellence in service is essential to survival in Japan [Morgan 1991, p. 227]. Some aspects of service and support in Japan are expected in many cases to be part of production packages at no additional costs [Collinson 1996, p. 74]. Amway for example gives full refund if the customer is not interested in the product for any reason. BMW, one of the most successful foreign car companies in Japan, repairs anything for free for the first three years [Nagumi 1996, pp. 78, 166]. A survey of small-sized British companies showed that the insight and determination not to treat the Japanese buyer like any other buyer was a main factor for success [Collinson 1996, p. 54].
2. Controlling your own destiny: Building a strong team of key people loyal to your company and then assuring and providing them full support are the key prerequisites to long-term success in the Japanese market [Morgan 1991, p. 227]. People in the top team must understand the Japanese market, which in most instances includes Japanese people rather than expatriates [Perlmutter 1996, p. 101]. Customer relationships are critical, therefore a local presence aimed at growing close to the customers and end users is important. Any relationship, which might reduce control, customer access, and future expansion opportunities in Japan, must be avoided. Sun Microsystems, a Silicon Valley maker of Computer workstations, for example found that multiple partnerships was the right strategy. Each of these relationships was targeted at a major untapped market, either a different industrial group or a vertical technology segment. This helped Sun to reach sales of $250 million in 1989 in Japan, comprising over 12 percent of the company's total revenues [Morgan 1991, p. 109]. Other examples are BMW and Louis Vuitton, which both have their own sales networks. Mr. Noritomo, president of United Destiller Japan, made the following rather drastic remark after several bad experiences: "Bring distribution under own control." [Nagumi 1996, pp. 67, 78, 305].
3. Researching and manufacturing the right product for Japan: An intimate understanding of the Japanese market will permit companies to provide their customers with appropriate products - distributed, advertised, and supported in the appropriate ways - which in turn will result in increased market share and profits from Japan [Morgan 1991, p. 227]. Customization in Japan, more than anywhere else, means changing the product and everything associated with it to sell what the customer wants, not what the manufacturer thinks the customer needs [Collinson 1996, p. 70]. Establish a positive corporate image and preserve that image at all costs. If the Japanese buy something that they are led to believe is of a high quality and it turns out to be otherwise, the company that sold it will suffer a tremendous decline in image. You should also have a clear product identity. Therefore advertising is very important. If a product is unknown it has a very difficult time getting into the consumer market, regardless of its the quality [Nagumi 1996, pp. 3, 4]. It is also necessary to know that the recommendation of the local storeowner plays an important role in the decision making of the customer. Therefore special effort should be made to educate the distributor about your product [Nagumi 1996, p. 13]. The importance of the appearance and packaging of the product should not be underestimated. Many companies do extra research on this subject. Most successful foreign companies like Olivetti and Nestle develop special products for the Japanese market [Nagumi 1996, pp. 232, 268]. In the long term this may necessitate providing development and manufacturing capabilities in Japan. Taking advantage of Japan's experienced talent and access to the latest technology offers a major strength to differentiate the company from its competitors outside of Japan.
4. Embracing cooperation and competition: In today's highly industrialized, highly specialized world, working more closely with vendors and even competitors becomes critical. Technical leverage can be increased manifold in the critical areas of differentiation. In the twenty-first century, no company will be able to support every activity or product in-house [Morgan 1991, p. 227]. In a survey of British companies the transfer of technology to other parts of the firm and to suppliers ranked third in importance in the Japanese market. The product developments led by the Japanese market and technology monitoring activities were second [Collinson 1996, p. 125].
5. Ningen kankei (Human Relations): Trust, obligation, and respect for the human side are the foundations of business in Japan. For most foreign companies, a relationship with a customer begins with a deal. In Japan, the deal begins with a relationship. Loyalty, friendship, and mutual obligation between suppliers and customers have far more weight than performance considerations alone. This is because, in the long run, partners will work together to enhance performance and assure mutual benefit for maximum value [Morgan 1991, p. 227]. In Japanese companies the high level of personal responsibility taken on by each employee on behalf of the whole firm means that each will apologize directly for any mistakes or failures relating to their product or service no matter who was actually responsible [Collinson 1996, p. 76]. The Japanese are more interested in the long-term benefits of a relationship than in the revenue from a specific contract or transaction, and are very attuned to the idea of reciprocity and interdependence with close partners over the long-term [Morgan 1991, p. 227]. Customers even help their suppliers to reach the demanded quality. When US Precision Lens (USPL) started to deliver to Japanese customers the customer took USPL step by step through an analysis of the problem. USPL virtually shut down the plant to rearrange the work-flow. Today, USPL is respected in Japan as a high-quality, loyal supplier to a large number of major Japanese firms [Morgan 1991, p. 113].
6. Adjust to the Japanese way of dealing with employees: Provide a written document for office regulations. Make very clear from the start which level of management will take charge of which tasks. The responsibilities and seniority within the office should be clear from the beginning. If you have to hire a non-Japanese person for any reason make sure that his Japanese ability is good enough. It is not desirable that the non-Japanese manager has to rely on a limited number of Japanese staff who can speak good English but are often not the best people for their respective jobs [Collinson 1996, pp. 112-115]. In the long run senior managers should be brought up through the firm rather than bringing in outsiders who disrupt the organisation for existing employees [Collinson 1996, p. 99].
7. Use Japanese management tools: Only companies that emphasize shitsu (quality) , kaizen (continous improvement), and Just-In-Time delivery will be able to meet the hard requirements of Japanese customers.
8. Respond quickly to competitors: When targeting the Japanese market, the capability to respond quickly and powerfully to a competitor's countermoves around the world is essential [Morgan 1991, p. 227]. Competion is not passive, so adaptive updating is desirable [Perlmutter 1996, p. 100]. Only by putting pressure on the Japanese in their home market can foreign companies make them divert resources from their global strategies. If the foreign company wants to take the offensive it requires fast-turnaround product designs, a development infrastructure in each local market, and analysis teams aimed at building a solid intelligence base. One must have the awareness of the resources, partners, and technology that the Japanese competitors possess and how they plan to use them. Manufacturing companies must also have the ability to mass manufacture, with enough flexibility to meet growth in times of demand and to re-tool in times of product shift. Information is power and few foreign companies know enough about what is happening in the Japanese market.
9. Emphasizing similarities / taking advantage of differences: Most non-Japanese companies have the advantage of unhindered ideas, overseas experience, multicultural management and independence from industrial group affiliations which limit market opportunity for the competition. These qualities should be used and can also help to recruit bright young Japanese people and other managers who have been stifled in Japanese companies [Morgan 1991, p. 230].
10. Believing that success in Japan leads to global excellence: Develop a mutual trust and respect between the Headquarters (HQ) and the Japanese affiliate. If corporate HQ has little confidence in their Japanese affiliates, it is clearly in a precarious position [Perlmutter 1996, p. 101]. A survey of British companies indicated that a main reason for failure in Japan was the lack of support by the HQ. This can result from the too little financial importance of the Japanese market, too little board-level experience about Japan, communication problems due to language or technical skills, or from conflicting interests between the subsidiary and the HQ [Collinson 1996, p. 117]. The most important reason for being in Japan is that the experience it provides will increase the overall ability to compete worldwide. The ultimate goal of the Japanese operation is to integrate the new ideas and technologies originating in Japan and to prepare your worldwide organization for the new level of performance expectation that the Japanese are creating.

2.4 How to become an Insider in Japan

The goal for a foreign company should be to become an insider in Japan. When people on the street do not know that your company is foreign, then you are successful in Japan. An insider company is a non-insulated company which is considered a local player and which has control over its own destiny in direct sales to customers, product development, strategy, and manufacturing. An insider in Japan will:

- Have a management team that is close to Japan's decision makers - major banks, industrial groups, MITI and other government ministries, and other major Japanese company management
- Keep decision-making authority on deals and general operations as local and as close to the market as possible [Morgan 1991, p. 203]. Structure your management and create your marketing strategy in accordance with the local market [Nagami 1996, p. 3]. Titles (katagaki) are very important in Japan. Therefore, the foreign CEO should be the chairman (kacho) and the Japanese CO the president (shacho), because the president presents more prestige to the outside. Nevertheless, the inside responsibilities can be the other way round [Nagami 1996, p. 344]
- Maintain a direct sales force and research presences capable of monitoring the pulse of both the current market and new technologies
- Maintain direct relations with major first-tier Japanese corporations
- Work with a select group of suppliers and dedicated contractors to support manufacturing
- Play an active role in industry associations and standards bodies
- Recruit from top universities and from leading Japanese companies
- Operate in local currency
- Often be mistaken for a Japanese company

Insider status will not come easily but companies like IBM, Proctor and Gamble and CocaCola have shown that it is possible. The longer you are in Japan, the more you realize that decisions are not based only on pricing and performance, but on trust, personal relations, history, and emotions. Therefore, it is inexpressably important to move as quickly as possible to the insider stage. The typical stages in becoming an insider are as follows:

1. Distributor / Licensing Agreement
2. Local Sales Office / Sales Through Partners
3. Customer Service and Customization Capability
4. Direct Sales / Local Engineering Development
5. Local Product Design and Manufacturing
6. Local Research and Development for Local and Worldwide Markets
7. Insider Status (as described above)

3. Conclusion

This paper showed that the most important factors for success in Japan are to:

- Emphasize on customer service and support
- Have control over your relationships especially your distribution channels
- Research the Japanese market intensively and manufacture the right product for Japan. This will often require special customizing and R&D
- Cooperate with competitors and customers
- Build long-term relationships
- Adjust to the Japanese way of dealing with human resources
- Use Japanese management tools such as kaizen and Just-In-Time
- Respond quickly to competitors
- Take advantage of being a foreigner
- Believe that success in Japan leads to global excellence

If the described factors are taken into consideration success in the Japanese market is very likely.

But remember the following two phrases when considering entering the Japanese market: Shobai wa akinai - Never Give Up

Ganbatte - Stick to it (iveness)

[Morgan 1991, pp. 158, 230]. It takes time to learn how to function in Japan. Instant success is not likely. Five to ten years is the average, therefore patience is required [Perlmutter 1996, p. 100] or as Theodore Heinrichson, former president of Bayer Japan, once said, "Be patient, spend a lot of money, expect good returns, not quick ones, build your personnel and have continuity. Short term, quick, cheap, and fast are not adjectives which are going to be successful in Japan." [Morgan 1991, p. 105]

It is not an easy market with fast returns on investment, but if you become an insider your profits will usually be higher than in any other market. In the late 1980s profits of foreign affiliates in Japan, as a percentage of gross sales, averaged 3.8 percent (4.6 percent in manufacturing), compared to 2.3 percent (3.4 percent) for Japanese firms. In 1992 profits were averaging 3.0 percent (3.3 percent) for foreign firms and 1.8 percent (2.6 percent) for Japanese firms [JETRO 1994].

4. Bibliography

Abegglen, James C., Stalk, George Jr., Kaisha - The Japanese Corporation, Tokyo 1985.

Attridge, William, Commentary on: 'What are the actual experiences of foreign multinationals in Japan? The European point of view', Reinhard Neumann, Foreign Direct Investment , ed. Masaru Yoshitomi and Edward M. Graham, Cheltenham, UK, 1996, pp. 211-214.

Collinson, Simon, Small and Successful in Japan, Avebury, England, 1996.

Dunning, John H., 'Explaining foreign direct investment in Japan: some theoretical insights', Foreign Direct Investment, ed. Masaru Yoshitomi and Edward M. Graham, Cheltenham, UK, 1996, pp. 8-63.

Hutton, Bethan, 'Fast-food group blows a McBubble in slow economy', The Financial Times, May 8, 1998, p. 24.

JETRO, 'Measures for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment in Japan 1994', Japan External Trade Organisation, Information Service Department, Tokyo 1994.

Johnson, Marylin, 'Jordan wears scent of smart merchandising', Atlanta Constitution, May 19, 1997, C1.

Jordan, Thomas F., 'The future of foreign direct investment in Japan', Foreign Direct

Investment, ed. Masaru Yoshitomi, Edward M. Graham, Cheltenham, UK, 1996, pp. 195-201.

Lev, Michael A: 'Ford Executive Retools mazda - undramatically', Chicago Tribune, March 31, 1997, 4-1.

Mathews, Jay: 'Shoes Made for Climbing; With Nike Leading the Way, Sneaker Stocks Scale the Heights', The Washington Post, February 16, 1997, H2.

Merrill Lynch, 'Merrill Lynch Announces Plans To Open Private Client Brokerage In Japan', Press Release, February 12, 1998.

Morgan, James C., Morgan, J. Jeffrey, Cracking the Japanese Market, New York, 1991.

Nagami, Kishi, Russell, David, Successful Gaijin in Japan, Lincolnwood, Ill., 1996.

Neumann, Reinhard, 'What are the actual experiences of foreign multinationals in Japan?: The European point of view', Foreign Direct Investment, ed. Masaru Yoshitomi and Edward M. Graham, Cheltenham, UK, 1996, pp. 202-210.

Perlmutter, Howard V., Commentary on: 'What can the theory of foreign direct investment tell us about the low level of foreign firm participation in the economy of Japan?', Edward M. Graham, Foreign Direct Investment, ed. Masaru Yoshitomi and Edward M. Graham, Cheltenham, UK, 1996, pp. 94-102.

Seno, Alexandra A., Murakami, Mutsuko, 'A Buyer's Market', Asiaweek, May 1, 1998, p. 54.

Sprague, Jonathan, Murakami, Mutsuko, 'Freeing the Future', Asiaweek ,May 1, 1998, p. 52.

Toyoda, Shoichiro, 'Dismantle Japan Inc.', The New York Times, April 17, 1997, A23.

Weinberg, Neil, 'Damn the torpedos', Forbes, January 26, 1998.