This thesis is conducting an in-depth analysis of the links between political power, institutional evolution and economic growth in Ethiopia since the fall of the Derg regime in 1991.
A contemporary critique of the global political economy must not be caught in a liberal perspective on the origins of economic development. Liberal theorists, amongst others, have perceived rapid economic development to be contingent on the support by the legal-institutional structure which characterises capitalist societies in the Global North. The central pillars of this structure are legally protected private property rights, the rule of law and a state monopoly on violence. Liberal strands of development theory have attributed the failure of many societies in the Global South to catch up with Northern levels of welfare to the absence or insufficiency of these institutions.
In the most recent decades this perspective has been promulgated most prominently by the New Institutional Economics (NIE). Its analysis, which found its way into policy under the catchword of good governance, claims that the takeoff of capitalism in the Global South is impeded by high levels of corruption, legal insecurity and the capture of state institutions by vested interests.
Scholars who stand in the tradition of Marxism and Keynesianism have been disputing this causality for its supposed disregard of the socio-historical conditions which evoked the entrenchment of capitalist interests in societies of the Global North. Marx had highlighted that the transition to capitalism – and indeed all forms of economic growth, redistribute economic surplus unequally between different social forces. He therefore claimed that the entrenchment of capitalist modes of production was an outcome of social power struggles, in which the dominant group enforced its interests on less powerful groups. Institutions functioned to consolidate, materialise and perpetuate this relation of power. Abandoning the teleology of Marx, some post-Marxist scholars have adapted this perspective on institutions; they claim that institutions are an outcome of power struggles and thus reflect historical distributions of power rather than to be a means to transform the distribution of power in itself.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Opening the Discussion: Conceptualising the Link Between Capitalism and It’s Institutions
1.2 The Structure of this Thesis: Political Settlements of Mustaq Khan and the Case of Ethiopia
2 State of the Art
2.1.1 Between Market and State: Early Theories of Development Economics
2.1.2 State-dependent Development: the Cases of the Fast-growing East Countries
2.2 A Political Turn in Development Theory: Early Contributions of Adrian Leftwich
2.3.1 From Institutions to Development: a Framework by North, Wallis and Weingast
2.3.2 Institutions as Development Traps: a Framework by Acemoğlu and Robinson
2.4 From Development to Institutions: the Political Settlement Theory by Mustaq Khan
3 Methodology: Process Tracing by Beach and Pedersen
4 Political Settlements and Institutional Change: the Case of Ethiopia
4.1.1 Ground in the Mill of Modernisation: Authoritarian Reform and the Politicisation of Ethiopian Ethnicities
4.1.2 Growing Beyond Ones Limits: Forging the EPRDF Coalition
4.2.1 Perceptual Organisation: Building the Democratic Authoritarian State
4.2.2 Joggling Political Demands: Liberalisation and State-led Peasant Economy
4.3 Reshuffling the Deck: the Ethio-Eritrean War and the Rise of the Developmental State Paradigm
4.4.1 My Neighbour, the Developmental State: Intimate State-Society Relations and Technological Diffusion
4.4.2 A Thin Ice for Authoritarian Expansion: The Sudden Rise of Horizontal Factions
4.4.3 Enlightened Authoritarianism: Developing Rural Economies
4.4.4 Industrialising Ethiopia: Between Forgotten Leaders and Spoiled Newcomers
4.5 Development Without the People: Collapse of the Developmental State?
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks: Political Settlements, Economic Policy and Agency of the Global South
5.1 Theories of Economic Development: Evidence from Ethiopia
5.2 Political Settlement Theory of Mustaq Khan: Possible Implications for Ethiopian Policy Makers
5.3 Implications for Theory? – Some Preliminary Suggestions
Research Objective and Core Themes
This thesis examines the evolution of institutional performance and economic growth in Ethiopia following the 1991 regime change, specifically testing Mustaq Khan’s Political Settlement theory. It seeks to answer how the power dynamics between the ruling coalition and various social forces influence institutional effectiveness and whether these dynamics explain distinct episodes of economic development in the country.
- The relationship between political power distribution and institutional enforcement.
- The role of the EPRDF ruling coalition in shaping the "developmental state" paradigm.
- Empirical analysis of agricultural and industrial policies, including land management and state-owned enterprises.
- The impact of informal institutions and patronage on development outcomes.
- The utility of Mustaq Khan’s political economy framework compared to New Institutional Economics.
Excerpt from the Book
4.4.2 A Thin Ice for Authoritarian Expansion: the Sudden Rise of Horizontal Factions
In approaching the 2005 national elections, the EPRDF seemed sure about having the consent of a majority of the electorate and the base of its developmental coalition to be fully consolidated. Against this backdrop, it liberalised the political space and the media. Oppositional parties were allowed to organise and rally for voter approval. They quickly consolidated in a pan-Ethiopian party coalition – the CUD – and one ethnicity-based oppositional block – the UEDF. The former was able to appeal to the neglected urban constituency, as well as Muslim trader communities and Gurage people (the ‘private sector’), the old Amhara elite and their followers. Its campaign could build on substantial financial contributions from the diaspora and private sector, and capitalise on the sense of ‘Ethiopianism’, which had gained momentum during the war with Eritrea. The UEDF also received diaspora support but concentrated its efforts on bases of strong ethnic dissidence in SNNPRS and centres of OLF activity in Oromia RS.
The EPRDF completely underestimated the situation. After the TPLF split, its most eloquent speakers had departed while the senior party personnel was busy in the daily workings of government. Until a month before the election it scarcely campaigned, allowing the opposition to dominate the public debate. The CUD denounced the dominance of Tigrayans in the Ethiopian state and their alleged enrichment through endowment funds. It demanded a liberal economy, private ownership of land, the end of urban poverty and that Ethiopia should take possession of the Eritrean port of Assab. The EPRDF accused the CUD of initiating a Rwandan Interahamwe. In some rural constituencies the EPRDF’s misapprehension of the situation was mirrored in unexpected ways on side of the farmers, who feared to be punished if they voted for the loser. Yet, due to its apparent weakness, this perceived loser was the EPRDF, not the opposition. Thus, in rural pockets of strong contestation, a sense of obedience tilted perceptions of power, giving the opposition an edge over the EPRDF.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: Introduces the critique of liberal development theory and presents the research focus on Mustaq Khan’s political settlement theory within the Ethiopian context.
2 State of the Art: Provides a comprehensive literature review of development theories, moving from early state-centred models to New Institutional Economics and Mustaq Khan’s political settlement framework.
3 Methodology: Process Tracing by Beach and Pedersen: Details the theory-testing process tracing method chosen to analyse the causal mechanisms of institutional change in Ethiopia.
4 Political Settlements and Institutional Change: the Case of Ethiopia: Conducts an in-depth empirical study of the political and economic evolution of Ethiopia from the 1991 regime change through various developmental phases until the 2018 collapse.
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks: Political Settlements, Economic Policy and Agency of the Global South: Discusses the findings, tests the theoretical predictions against the empirical evidence, and offers policy suggestions and theoretical implications.
Keywords
Political Settlements, Ethiopia, EPRDF, Mustaq Khan, Developmental State, Institutional Change, Economic Development, Process Tracing, Rent-seeking, Authoritarianism, Middle-income Trap, Decentralisation, Civil Service, Agricultural Policy, Industrialisation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this thesis?
The thesis explores the connection between power distribution, institutional performance, and economic growth in post-1991 Ethiopia using the Political Settlement framework.
What theoretical lens does the author use?
The author primarily applies Mustaq Khan’s Political Settlement theory, contrasting it with traditional New Institutional Economics and developmental state models.
What is the primary research question?
The work investigates how the power of the ruling coalition in Ethiopia relative to other social forces affects institutional performance, and whether this link explains various episodes of economic growth.
Which methodology is applied?
The author employs "theory-testing process tracing" as outlined by Beach and Pedersen to investigate causal mechanisms within the single case of Ethiopia.
What are the main thematic areas covered?
The thesis covers Ethiopia’s political evolution, land reform, the role of state-owned enterprises, industrial policy (specifically leather and floriculture), and the impact of the EPRDF’s "developmental state" strategies.
Which key concepts characterize the research?
Key concepts include "Political Settlement," "holding power," "rent-seeking," "democratic centralism," and "developmental coalition."
How does the "developmental state" in Ethiopia differ from East Asian models?
The author argues that while Ethiopia attempted to emulate East Asian developmental success, it lacked similar institutional coherence and was more heavily influenced by internal factional power struggles and precarious rent-sharing arrangements.
What role did the "model farmer" policy play?
This policy was a tool used by the EPRDF to expand its clientelist base, improve agricultural input distribution, and secure rural political loyalty, although its actual economic effectiveness was mixed and led to increased inequality.
- Citar trabajo
- Oliver Reimer (Autor), 2020, Seizing Power through Development. The EPRD's Quest for a Developmental Coalition, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/962543
