Jerry Fodor’s radical concept of nativism did not find many supporters. Some scholars have even declared it to be utterly ridiculous. Yet, as Laurence and Margolis point out, his argument poses challenges that are problematic to oppose by his colleagues. Because it has proven difficult to say exactly what’s wrong with Fodor’s original argument, it still matters, even though his own view on it was not consistent and changed towards the end of his career.
This essay wants to follow his earlier argument and assess it with having regard to an example of colour-concept learning. It will first examine the classical view on the nature of concepts and how Fodor confronted it. After having presented Fodor's own opinion about the composition of concepts, the essay will focus on the question of concept acquisition. It will introduce the two opposing schools of thought and explore some of Fodor’s arguments for the innateness of concepts.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Nature of Concepts
3. Fodor’s Theory of Innateness
4. Conclusive Application of Theories
Objectives and Topics
The main objective of this work is to analyze Jerry Fodor's radical concept nativism and assess its validity in contrast to the classical empiricist view of concept acquisition, specifically focusing on the debate of whether concepts are innate or learned through sensory experience.
- Fodor’s theory of radical concept nativism
- Classical theory of concepts and definitional structure
- The distinction between learning and triggering
- Empiricism and the 'tabula rasa' perspective
- The hierarchy of triggers and concept acquisition
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Fodor’s Theory of Innateness
There are two leading schools of thought on concepts acquisition, namely Empiricism and Nativism. The Empiricist view, which stems from the classical theory is that most of the conceptual lexicon in the mind is acquired by experiential sensory learning (Margolis & Laurence 2011). One of its earliest proponents was John Locke, according to whom nothing is in the mind that did not enter through the senses (Stöckle-Schobel 2013: 13). In its most radical form, Empiricism maintains the idea of the mind being a ‘tabula rasa’ at birth and the world a source of tangible knowledge and information. As a human being experiences the world, knowledge and information enter the mind and create a mental state such as “an experience of x.” In accordance with the classical theory, this experience can then be used to create new thoughts about x and to link it with other experientially acquired concepts (Laurence & Margolis 1999: 10; Stöckle-Schobel 2013: 13-14).
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: This chapter introduces the core debate regarding whether concepts are innate or learned and outlines the focus on Jerry Fodor’s radical concept nativism.
The Nature of Concepts: This chapter examines the classical theory of concepts, Fodor’s critique of definitional structure, and his alternative asymmetric-dependence theory.
Fodor’s Theory of Innateness: This chapter contrasts the Empiricist and Nativist views and explores Fodor’s specific arguments regarding concept triggering and the hierarchy of acquisition.
Conclusive Application of Theories: This chapter applies the previously discussed theoretical arguments to the example of a child learning colour concepts to evaluate the plausibility of Fodor’s claims.
Keywords
Concept Nativism, Empiricism, Jerry Fodor, Language of Thought, Concept Acquisition, Radical Nativism, Cognitive Science, Classical Theory of Concepts, Asymmetric-Dependence Theory, Innateness, Triggering, Semantics, Lexical Concepts, Rationalism, Poverty of the Stimulus.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental focus of this research?
The research focuses on the debate within cognitive science and philosophy concerning whether human concepts are learned through experience or are innate from birth, with a specific focus on Jerry Fodor's "Mad Dog Nativism."
What are the primary thematic areas explored?
The paper explores the classical theory of concepts, the empiricist view of learning, Fodor’s radical nativist position, and the mechanical process of concept acquisition.
What is the primary objective of the work?
The objective is to evaluate Fodor’s argument that concepts cannot be learned through rational hypothesis testing but are instead innately present and triggered by environmental stimuli.
Which scientific methods are employed?
The work utilizes a theoretical and literature-based analytical method, examining philosophical arguments and cognitive science debates to contrast opposing schools of thought.
What content is addressed in the main chapters?
The main chapters cover the definition of concepts, the shift from classical theories to Fodor’s atomism, the distinction between learning and triggering, and a practical application to colour-concept learning.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
Key terms include Concept Nativism, Empiricism, Asymmetric-Dependence Theory, Innateness, and Language of Thought.
What does Fodor mean by the "triggering" of concepts?
Fodor argues that concept acquisition is not a rational learning process but a "brute-causal" triggering of pre-formed concepts that occurs when the sensorium is activated by environmental stimuli.
Why does Fodor reject the classical view that concepts have internal definitions?
Fodor argues that definitions for simple concepts are generally impossible to establish, as they rarely fulfill the necessary and sufficient conditions required by classical theories.
How does the "poverty of the stimulus" argument support the nativist view?
It posits that environmental evidence is too scarce for a child to learn complex concepts, suggesting that the concepts must be pre-formed in the mind and merely activated by the environment.
How does the author interpret the example of a child learning colors?
The author concludes that Fodor’s suggestion—that the concept GREEN is triggered by the environment rather than learned through a complex rational process—is the most plausible explanation.
- Quote paper
- Benjamin Plett (Author), 2018, Concepts and their Acquisition. Assessing Jerry Fodor’s Concept Theory in Comparison with the Classical/Empiricist View, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/972367
