This paper will address the following research questions:
To what extent will Japan's adjusted strategy (Independent Variable) have an impact on the deterrence effectiveness (Dependent Variable) and the security dilemma/ stability-instability paradox (Intervening Variables)?
During 2022, Japan (JAP) saw deteriorating security dynamics with North Korea (NK) regarding missile tests, plans for building the world’s strongest nuclear force, and bellicose rhetoric. These provocations aimed at compelling JAP to refrain from further conducting military exercises with the US and South Korea and reconsidering plans for “fundamentally” strengthening its “defense capabilities” and a “substantial increase of Japan’s defense budget”. In turn, JAP chose these measures to respond to NK’s
continued violations of UN Security Council resolutions and increased threat perceptions. That culminated in the revision of its “National Security Strategy (NSS)”/ “National Defense Strategy (NDS)” on 16 Dec. 2022, which aims at
reinforcing the deterrence posture to 1) dissuade attacks against JAP or its US ally and 2) resolve the (nuclear) missile armaments/ test issue.
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
2.1 Definition & Assessment Framework for Deterrence Effectiveness
2.2 Intervening Mechanisms
3. JAPAN’S REVISED SECURITY AND DEFENSE STRATEGY
4. ASSESSMENT
4.1 Past Outcome Perspective
4.2 Future Trajectory Perspective
5. CONCLUSION
Research Objectives and Core Themes
This paper examines how Japan's revised National Security and National Defense Strategy influences its deterrence effectiveness against North Korea, while simultaneously analyzing the impact on security dilemma and stability-instability paradox dynamics.
- Theoretical assessment of deterrence effectiveness in “rogue state” scenarios.
- Evaluation of Japan’s military and diplomatic strategic adjustments post-2022.
- Application of the security dilemma and stability-instability paradox as intervening variables.
- Comparative analysis of past deterrence behavior and future strategic trajectories.
- Synthesis of military and political risks concerning Japan’s defense posture buildup.
Excerpts from the Book
1. INTRODUCTION
During 2022, Japan (JAP) saw deteriorating security dynamics with North Korea (NK) regarding missile tests, plans for building the world’s strongest nuclear force, and bellicose rhetoric (Shin, 2022a, Geoffroy et al., 2022, Gallo, 2022, Cha et al., 2022). These provocations aimed at compelling JAP to refrain from further conducting military exercises with the US and South Korea and reconsidering plans for “fundamentally” strengthening its “defense capabilities” and a “substantial increase of Japan’s defense budget” (Kishida, 2022, p. 2, Shin, 2022b, Mahadzir, 2022a, 2022b, Tachikawa, 2022).
In turn, JAP chose these measures to respond to NK’s continued violations of UN Security Council resolutions and increased threat perceptions (Heavey & Laing, 2022, Davenport, 2022). That culminated in the revision of its “National Security Strategy (NSS)”/ “National Defense Strategy (NDS)” on 16 Dec. 2022, which aims at reinforcing the deterrence posture to 1) dissuade attacks against JAP or its US ally and 2) resolve the (nuclear) missile armaments/ test issue (Koshino, 2022, JMoD, 2022a, 2022b).
Summary of Chapters
1. INTRODUCTION: Outlines the security challenges posed by North Korea in 2022 and defines the research questions regarding Japan's strategic response and deterrence effectiveness.
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: Introduces the conceptual framework for deterrence effectiveness and defines intervening mechanisms like the security dilemma and stability-instability paradox.
3. JAPAN’S REVISED SECURITY AND DEFENSE STRATEGY: Details Japan’s shift in diplomatic, military, and economic strategies, including the plan to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2027.
4. ASSESSMENT: Provides an analytical evaluation of Japan’s past deterrence performance and forecasts the future effectiveness of the revised strategy using an empirical framework.
5. CONCLUSION: Synthesizes findings on the inverse relationship between the intended deterrence increase and actual effect for the medium term, while offering policy recommendations.
Keywords
Japan, North Korea, National Security Strategy, Deterrence Effectiveness, Security Dilemma, Stability-Instability Paradox, Defense Budget, Missile Defense, Counterstrike Capabilities, Military Capability, Strategic Calculus, Regional Security, Diplomacy, Coercion, Arms Build-up.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this study?
The study analyzes how Japan's revised 2022 National Security and Defense Strategies affect its capability to deter North Korean missile threats.
What are the central research objectives?
The objectives are to assess deterrence effectiveness against potential attacks and to evaluate the impact of these strategies on the security dilemma and stability-instability paradox.
What is the core research question?
The research asks to what extent Japan’s adjusted strategy impacts deterrence effectiveness and the stability-instability paradox as intervening variables.
Which scientific methodology is utilized?
The author employs an assessment framework based on literature reviews and empirical trend analysis of past escalating events to predict future deterrence effectiveness.
What defines the main body of the work?
The main body examines Japan's strategic shifts across diplomatic, military, and economic dimensions, followed by an assessment of these shifts against specific theoretical factors of deterrence.
Which keywords characterize this paper?
Key terms include Deterrence Effectiveness, Stability-Instability Paradox, North Korea, Japan, and National Security Strategy.
How does the author view the "time lag" in Japan's defense buildup?
The author argues that the delay between announcing the strategy and actually operationalizing capabilities by 2027 creates a period of vulnerability that may undermine deterrence.
What is the specific policy recommendation provided in the conclusion?
The author recommends that Japan initiate conciliatory diplomatic signals and talks to address open issues rather than relying solely on reinforced military deterrence.
- Quote paper
- Mathias Jahn (Author), 2023, Analysis of Japan's revised National Security and National Defense Strategy for the North Korean case, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1336034
