Task: Please review the discussion in Units 8 and 9 pertaining to the Three Cs and the Multi-Layered Opportunity Structure. Answer one of the questions below. Your essay should be 500 words.
A. Review the multi-layered opportunity structure in the Peacemaking section of Unit 8. Discuss three ways an incentive might be applied to conflict parties that are reluctant to sign peace accords.
With regard to a multi-layered opportunity structure, I am going to discuss three ways how a peace incentive can be applied to conflict parties that are reluctant to sign peace accords. Providing such incentives can lead to a revaluation of decisions being made on the respective leader levels (in terms of Lederach – top, mid-range and grassroots level), which in turn may bring forward a peace process.
In some cases, insecurity about the impacts of a thinkable peace accord, but also the convenience of the current situation might turn warring parties away from acceptance (“war is lucrative”, Sisk 2001, p. 61 ). This in turn implicates that the respective constituency being under control of such leaders/spoilers has to be brought in, too. Additionally, it is very important to offer peace incentives on all levels to improve the chances for a sustainable peace (Sisk 2001, p. 6).
As long-term incentive could be considered capacity building. As mentioned before, capacity building aims at "the improvement of systemic conditions to create an enabling environment for poverty reduction and sustainable development" (Black 2003, p. 116). By providing the necessary framework, this strategy can improve living conditions on the long run, e.g. via educational programs and training on the grassroots level (Deng, Rothchild and Zartman 1996, p. 58), strengthen and institutions on the higher levels (Walter 1999, p. 139ff). Hence, reliable structures that help to orientate and to reduce arbitrariness, as well as realistic prospects for a better future by opening different viable options can increase confidence, modify attitudes and thus might lead to a greater willingness for signing a peace accord.
Time sensitive incentives are “applied to particular conflicts at particular points and for limited periods of time”, e.g. human rights observers and preventive deployment (Hampson 2002, p. 170). The easy availability of weapons, their quick use to solve problems for own purposes (see warlords) can hinder a peace accord coming into effect (Dzinesa 2007, p. 73). Through demilitarization and disarmament mercenaries can e.g. be integrated into the local and reorganized security structure, thus offering them future perspectives2. Furthermore, immediate programs like the World Bank program of structural adjustment can contribute to “encouraging accountability, openness, and predictability in governance”, and thus lead to a reassessment of attitudes (Deng, Rothchild and Zartman p. 58).
Last but not least, global incentives can improve the chances for achieving a peace accord. Resources coming from the international donor community may stimulate and boost for instance the local economy, so that it can finally function on its own. Development aid from NGOs or International Organizations and even several large states are an important factor (Branka Magas 2001, p. 280). Infrastructural programmes and investment promises increase perspectives for the future, thus facilitating the decision for a peace accord.
To sum up:
The more promising and feasible the incentives on each layer of the opportunity structure, the more leading figures on the respective levels ‘buy in’, the greater the probability that a peace accord comes about. However, the issue of “incentive incapability” has to be kept always in mind, meaning that incentives can only function well if there are enough countries, NGOs etc. willing to invest and provide resources (Walter 1999, p. 130).
1 in particular when looking at all the kinds of spoilers as mentioned in part II of the module
2 Knight and Özerdem observe that “such programmes should be seen as an investment in the productive potential employment of former combatants rather than as a bribe to keep them ‘busy’ and ‘out of trouble’” (2004, p. 513).
- Quote paper
- Natalie Züfle (Author), 2009, Conflict Managment. Three Ways to Peacemaking, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/180053