This essay explores the writing of Patrick Devlin in regards to philosophical conservatism and defends him in response to criticisms leveled by Martha Nussbaum.
In “Hiding from Humanity: Disgust Shame and the Law”, Martha Nussbaum offers a pointed critique of what she views as the legal role of disgust proposed by Patrick Devlin in “Morals and the Criminal Law.”
In spite of Nussbaum’s criticisms, however, this text wishes to make the case that disgust need not be as necessary to Devlin’s argument of collective moral judgement as it first appears.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Defending Devlin from the Critiques of Nussbaum
- Disentangling Disgust from Devlin's Argument
- Disgust as a Contingent Factor in Public Morality
- Rehabilitating Devlin's Argument
- Disgust and Legal Justification: A Potential Role
- Disgust as a Motivating Force for Punishment
- Disgust and the Attainment of Societal Mores
- The Functional Efficiency of Disgust in Public Morality and Law
- Disgust as a Compelling Impetus for Upholding Rights and Responsibilities
- The Rule of Law and Societal Morality
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This essay aims to defend Patrick Devlin's argument for the role of collective moral judgement in law from the critiques of Martha Nussbaum. It explores the relationship between disgust, public morality, and the legal system.
- The role of disgust in shaping legal frameworks
- The relationship between public morality and the legal system
- The theoretical implications of including or excluding disgust from legal justifications
- The concept of a functional and optimal society in relation to morality and law
- The potential benefits of aligning legal frameworks with societal morality
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
The essay begins by analyzing Nussbaum's critique of Devlin's position, arguing that disgust, while a significant human emotion, should not be a basis for legal decisions. It then proposes a reinterpretation of Devlin's argument, suggesting that it does not necessarily depend on disgust as a foundational principle.
The essay further argues that disgust, while not a reliable basis for morality in itself, could potentially play a valuable role in motivating the legal system to punish certain crimes more severely. This argument is illustrated with the example of pedophilia, where society's disgust at the act might lead to a desire for harsher punishment beyond the harm principle.
Finally, the essay discusses the functional efficiency of aligning the legal system with public morality. It suggests that disgust, as an emotion that compels society to uphold certain rights and responsibilities, might contribute to a stronger adherence to the rule of law.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
This essay focuses on the intersection of social and political philosophy, legal theory, and morality. Key terms include disgust, public morality, collective moral judgement, legal justification, the harm principle, rule of law, societal function, and the works of Martha Nussbaum and Patrick Devlin. The essay explores the interplay between these concepts, arguing for a nuanced understanding of the role of disgust in shaping legal frameworks and promoting societal well-being.
- Citar trabajo
- Seth Carter (Autor), 2017, The Legal Role of Disgust. Defending Patrick Devlin from the Critiques of Martha Nussbaum, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/429678
