This paper will be about reconstructing the argumentation of "Skepticism about Weakness of Will" (1977) by Watson and about discussing if his proposal is plausible. My main thesis is that he cannot give a clear answer to the question of when exactly a person acts weak-willed, either. One point of criticism will be about him introducing the term "self-control" as a solution. We will see that this kind of solution creates new issues. For instance, how do we know if and when a person is or should be capable of self-control? A second point will be about Watson’s argument that we can hold a person responsible for acting weak-willed because he/she should have learned and applied the skills needed for resisting but didn’t. What is troubling here, underlies the same problem than the previous question. Are we really able to tell when this is the case? And what are the consequences if we cannot say for sure when a person acts weak-willed?
In "Skepticism about Weakness of Will" (1977) Watson challenges the common account whose proposal consists of two components: First, it believes a weak-willed action to be intentional and against the person’s better judgment. Second, it claims such actions to be free in the sense that the person could have resisted acting weak-willed. Watson himself comes to the opposite conclusion regarding the second component (a weak agent could not have resisted acting against his/her better judgement in the moment of action) based on his main thesis: "Weakness of will involves the failure to develop certain normal capacities of self-control."
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Socrates and Davidson on weakness of will
2.1 Socrates
2.2 Davidson
3. Watson on weakness of will
3.1 Watson’s criticism regarding Socrates and Davidson
3.2 The virtue self-control
3.3 The difference between weakness of will and compulsion
3.4 Self-control as an explanation
3.5 Watson versus the common account
4. The plausibility of Watson’s proposal
4.1 Are socratism and Davidson to be rejected?
4.2 Self-control
4.3 Weakness of will versus compulsion
4.4 Is self-control the solution?
4.5 Does Watson’s proposal succeed?
5. Conclusion
6. Bibliography
Objectives and Research Themes
This paper reconstructs and critically evaluates Gary Watson's argumentation in "Skepticism about Weakness of Will" (1977), focusing on his attempt to distinguish weakness of will from compulsion through the concept of self-control. The primary research question addresses the plausibility of Watson’s proposal and whether he successfully avoids the conceptual difficulties faced by the traditional "common account" and Socratic views.
- Analysis of Socratic and Davidsonian perspectives on akrasia.
- Critique of the "common account" of weakness of will.
- Examination of the virtue of self-control as a potential explanatory tool.
- Discussion of the ethical implications regarding moral responsibility and agency.
- Evaluation of the relative character of weakness of will and compulsion.
Excerpt from the Book
1. Introduction
In “Skepticism about Weakness of Will” (1977) Watson challenges the common account whose proposal consists of two components: First, it believes a weak-willed action to be intentional and against the person’s better judgment. Second, it claims such actions to be free in the sense that the person could have resisted acting weak-willed. Watson himself comes to the opposite conclusion regarding the second component (a weak agent could not have resisted acting against his/her better judgement in the moment of action) based on his main thesis: “[W]eakness of will involves the failure to develop certain normal capacities of self-control[.]”
To show this, he first argues against socratism and Davidson. Then, he works on differentiating weakness of will from compulsion and brings these terms in relation to the virtue of self-control. Based on this procedure he draws his conclusions and proposes his theses. At last, he argues why his proposal is more reasonable than the common account.
My paper will be about reconstructing this argumentation by Watson and about discussing if his proposal is plausible. My main thesis is that he cannot give a clear answer to the question of when exactly a person acts weak-willed, either. One point of criticism will be about him introducing the term “self-control“ as a solution. We will see that this kind of solution creates new issues. For instance, how do we know if and when a person is or should be capable of self-control? A second point will be about Watson’s argument that we can hold a person responsible for acting weak-willed because he/she should have learned and applied the skills needed for resisting but didn’t. What is troubling here, underlies the same problem than the previous question. Are we really able to tell when this is the case? And what are the consequences if we cannot say for sure when a person acts weak-willed?
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Outlines the paper's goal to reconstruct and critique Gary Watson’s arguments regarding the relationship between weakness of will and self-control.
2. Socrates and Davidson on weakness of will: Explores the Socratic denial of akrasia and Davidson’s attempt to reconcile incontinent actions with rational principles.
3. Watson on weakness of will: Details Watson’s departure from the common account, his criticism of existing theories, and his proposal of self-control as a core capacity.
4. The plausibility of Watson’s proposal: Critically evaluates the internal consistency of Watson’s arguments and the potential issues arising from his definition of self-control.
5. Conclusion: Synthesizes findings, concluding that while Watson successfully critiques his predecessors, his own model fails to provide a definitive or univocal solution.
6. Bibliography: Lists the academic sources utilized throughout the analysis.
Keywords
Weakness of Will, Akrasia, Self-control, Davidson, Socrates, Nonsocratic skepticism, Compulsion, Motivation, Practical judgment, Moral responsibility, Rationality, Incontinence, Agency, Virtue, Externalism.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper deals with the philosophical debate surrounding "weakness of will" (akrasia) and specifically analyzes Gary Watson's critique of the traditional "common account" and his alternative framework involving self-control.
What are the central themes discussed?
Key themes include the nature of intentional action, the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the role of rationality in human behavior, and the moral responsibility of agents who act against their better judgment.
What is the author's primary research goal?
The goal is to determine if Watson’s "nonsocratic skepticism" and his reliance on the virtue of "self-control" offer a more plausible and coherent explanation of weakness of will than the theories of Socrates or Davidson.
Which scientific methods are employed?
The paper utilizes a reconstructive philosophical analysis, comparing and critiquing the logical arguments presented by Watson, Davidson, and Socrates, and evaluating their practical implications using thought experiments like the "drinking-woman" example.
What does the main body of the work cover?
It covers a detailed analysis of Watson’s criticism of Socratic principles, his distinction between motivational and evaluative senses, and his ongoing attempt to distinguish weak-willed behavior from compulsion through the lens of self-control capacity.
How can the paper be characterized by its keywords?
The paper is defined by the intersection of philosophy of action, ethics, and psychology, focusing on how agency is maintained or lost when individuals fail to act according to their better judgment.
Does Watson effectively distinguish between compulsion and weakness of will?
The paper concludes that Watson’s attempt is problematic because he ultimately relies on an interpretive, relative concept of self-control that he previously argued could not serve as a stable foundation for explanation.
What is the author's conclusion regarding Watson's proposal?
The author concludes that Watson’s proposal is not more reasonable than the common account; it raises more questions than it answers and fails to provide a clear, objective criterion for when a person is truly acting "weak-willed" versus "compulsively."
- Citation du texte
- Kim Ann Woodley (Auteur), 2019, Nonsocratic skepticism. A critical view on the relation between weakness of will and self-control, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/911121
