Current Church Conflicts in the Ukraine and their Historical Roots

Introduction

In this paper I want to outline the present conflicts between the church organisations in Ukraine. Beside the present confrontation I also want to show their historic roots. The conflicts between denominations and church organisation, which are in Ukraine, much more complex than in other post-Soviet states can only be understood following their historic development. I especially want to show that the religious division and the struggle between the churches are a result of foreign domination of Ukraine in a religious dimension. The issue is very important as religion plays an important role in the formation of a national identity esp. for Orthodox countries and also for the creation of a civil society in the Post-Communist states. To develop both are very important in a state with so strong centrifugal forces, autocratic tendencies of the political leaders and the lacking of tradition as an independent nation.¹

Present Ukraine has one of the most tolerant religious legislation is Eastern-Central Europe. Therefore the countries has a very high number of religious organisations. In this paper I will only focus on the main religious organisations as there are the Uniate Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church². The keep the scope of the paper limited I will leave the conflicts with religions of ethnic minorities out as there are Armenian Orthodoxy, Ruthenian Catholic Church,³ Protestant Churches, Muslims or Jews or non-traditional religions.⁴

In the first part of the paper I will outline the history of the Churches in Ukraine. The main focus is to show that the religious life and much more its organisations were tools for political domination by Poland-(Lithuania) and the Habsburg Empire on the one side and of Russian imperialism and later Soviet Communist rule on the other side. Therefore religious issues played also an important role for the Ukrainian independence movements. In the second part I will briefly introduce the different churches in Ukraine. In the last part I want to show the developments since 1991, when Ukraine regained its political independence .

History of Churches in Ukraine until 1991

The Christian history of Ukraine begins in 988 as Prince Volodymir took the Byzantine Rite as the religion for the Kyivian-Rus and with the establishment of the Kyivan Metropolia. Important to notice is that this occurred before the Great Schism in 1054 and that Kyiv, even belonging to the Patriarchate of Constantinople always kept contact with the Latin West. With the invasion of the Tatar the Rus was divided into two main areas. A second Metropolia was established in Vladimir (1299), which was later moved to Moscow (1325). The most part of the Kyivan Rus in today’s Ukraine came after the Tatar invasion under the rule of Lithuania. The pagan rulers of Lithuania did not interfere into the religious life of the Ukrainians, which slowly but surely changed with the dynastic Union with Catholic Poland. The ruling elite strengthened the Roman Catholic influence and a church organisation was build up, parallel to the existing Orthodox Church. Since this 14th century the Christian Unity of Ukraine was disturbed. To overcome this division the representatives of Ukrainian Church took part in the Union of Florence-Ferrara (1439). The Metropolitan Isidore was one of the main creators of the Union. With the rejection of the Union by the Moscow, the Union failed and finally Moscow declared its autocephaly.⁵ Since then there was not unity of the Orthodoxy of the Rus lands.⁶

In the 16th century the division became even more evident as the Church of Moscow became a Patriarchate and followed the doctrine of Moscow as the “Third Rome“. Since this time the Church supported the plans of the secular ruler to unite all the lands of the Rus and also to act as the protector of the Orthodoxy in neighbour countries and even to intervene into their politics. In the area belonging to Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the Union was confirmed in the Council of Brest (1596), which led to the establishment of the Uniate Church in Ukraine.⁷ The rulers of Poland- Lithuania saw the Union as step in the conversion of the Ukrainians to the Catholic Church. This was a part of the policy of Polonisation, esp. after the Union of Lublin (1569) in which Ukraine was passed to Poland proper. A great number of the Ukrainian aristocracy joined the Uniate or even Catholic Church, as this secured their rights in the Sejm and the Polish Renaissance culture was more attractive for them. For the Ukrainian bishops this was a guarantee of their own ecclesial and cultural independence. Not the whole hierarchy and the faithful of the Kyivan Metropolia joined this step and maintained their canonical dependence on Constantinople. Therefore the Union of Brest was not able to overcome the crisis of division, it rather even deepened the trench between the two Byzantine Churches in Ukraine.⁸

In 1648 the Cossacks which were formally under the rule of the Commonwealth were able to get full independence. This independence was not only political but also religious, as the Cossackdom was based on Orthodoxy and rejected the Latinising and Polinising policy. In their struggle against Poland they asked Moscow for support and accepted the supremacy of the Romanows. After several troublesome years of wars and civil wars the territory of Ukraine was divided. The land east of the Dnjepr and Kyiv came to Moscow and the Western part to Poland. The Metropolia of Kyiv, which Orthodoxy was intellectually advanced by the influence and struggle with Protestantism and Counter Reformation, was able to influence the development of the Moscovian Church. The Academy of Kyiv was the leading institution of religious teaching of the Slavic Church. Even a movement of a “Second Jerusalem“ emerged, which wanted to make Kyiv to the soul of the Russian Empire. As the Russian Orthodox Church was subjugated to political goals of the autocratic Tsar, there was no in leeway for Ukrainian religious independence. The Uniates were forced to return to Orthodoxy and the Orthodox lost independence. Until the rule of Catherine the left-bank Ukraine was completely absorbed into Russia. And with building of St. Petersburg Ukraine also lost its role as cultural “Gate to the West“. In the Polish part the Orthodox were granted tolerance, but not equal rights and the Uniate Church developed further under the Latin influence. In the Synod of Zamosc the doctrine was harmonised with the Roman Catholic but differences in rites and customs were guaranteed.⁹

With the partition of Poland in the end of 18th century the territorial division of Ukraine was continued and the religious even enhanced. The Western part came to Austria, which supported the Uniate Church. The civil authorities helped the reorganisation of ecclesiastical administration, allowed teaching in the native language by the church and laid therefore the basis for a Ukrainian national movement. In the Russian part the situation was completely different. The tsarist regime undertook mass conversions, often with brutal force and in 1875 the Union of Brest was renounced. Also the Catholic Church was persecuted and put under state control. As in the 18th century also the Russian Orthodox Church lost its spiritual independence under the motto: “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality“. Together with spreading Pan-Slavism (or Pan-Russianism) as state doctrine there was no possibility for any Ukrainian spiritual autonomy.¹⁰ After the 1917 Revolution a movement arose demanding autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. This movement was opposed by the hierarchy of the Church, which was russified and also by the Moscovian Patriarchate. During the turmoil of Ukrainian independence the clergy and laity movement aiming at Ukrainisation of the Church tried a “revolution from below“ and founded their own church organisation. In 1921 the Church gained autonomy with the support of the Russian Bolsheviks¹¹

In the Western part of Ukraine, which came to Poland, the Ukrainian Churches found themselves in struggle with Polish nationalism. The Uniate Church (UC) played with its leader Metropolitan Sheptytsky the main role of protecting Ukrainian interests. This confrontation led to worsening relationships between the Catholic and the Uniates. The Orthodox Church faced again a policy of Polonisation. For them it was a struggle on two fronts, first against the hostile state and second removing Russian influence from the Church administration. As the Churches were active in the social and political movements of the Ukrainians they gained high reputation in the population. Under German occupation the Ukrainian Orthodoxy proclaimed again its autocephaly, which brought them after the war the stigma of fascist-collaborators.¹² In the Soviet Union all religious groups were persecuted by the Stalinist regime in the 1930’s and the Ukrainian Autocephal Orthodox Church (UAOC) dissolved. Since the 1940’s the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) reaching a modus vivendi with the atheist state. By reaching that it also became a tool for the ruling forces and many clergies collaborated with state agency and the secret policy. This went hand in hand with the destruction of the UC, which was forcibly united, with the Russian Orthodoxy in 1940 in Galicia and 1949 in Transcarpathia. With Gorbachev’s Perestroika in the end of 1980’s the UC and UAOC communities re-emerged from their underground existence. Both groups played an important role in the dissident and national-democratic movement, whereas the official Church was discredited as a tool for Russian and Communist domination. The declaration of independence in Ukraine became not only a political but also religious issue.¹³

Churches in Ukraine

With emergence independence of Ukraine, the country became a multi-confessional state again. This time the rifts were not only between the Orthodox and the Catholic churches, but even much more among the successor churches of the Russian Orthodox Church. As in official statistics of Ukraine denomination is not registered the numbers of believers are difficult to assess. About 66% of the population describe themselves as believers. The most people say that they are Orthodox (about 17 million), but due to the division of the churches it is hard to say how many followers, which church has. The Uniate consists of about 5 million believers and the RCC about 800,000. ¹⁴

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOCMP), has 8490 communities, with a majority of them in central and southeastern parts of Ukraine. The Church is the successor of the former Ukrainian Exarchate of the ROC and since October 1990 was granted an unsecured self-governing status. The attempt of the Metropolitan Filaret to receive canonical autocephaly after the announcement of the independence of Ukraine was not granted. The UOCMP forms the biggest Church in the Ukraine and most Russians in Ukraine belong to it. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kyivan Patriarchate (UOCKP) has 2491 communities, mostly in the central regions but also in the western and southeastern areas. Metropolitan Filaret created it in June 1992, after being removed from the UOCMP, and the UAOC. In October 1995 Filaret was elected as Patriarch of Kyiv and all Rus-Ukraine. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) has 989 communities, located in Western Ukraine The Church sees itself as a successor of the church founded in 1921. The first communities appeared in western Ukraine in August 1989 by previous ROC bishops and underground parishes. The UAOC helped to establish the UOCMP, but after personal struggles several bishops left and re-established the UAOC. The Ukrainian Diaspora in North America supports the Church. The latter two Churches are not recognised by the Orthodox Churches in other countries and so are considered uncanonical.

Uniate Church (UC) in Ukraine is officially constituted as Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Despite it was officially forbidden and persecuted, this Church was able to preserve its hierarchical structures in the underground and Diaspora. In December 1989 it was officially legalised and able grow in Western Ukraine and forms with 3240 communities the second biggest church in Ukraine. In 2001 Lubomyr Husar was elected the new head and was subsequently named cardinal by the Pope. The Roman Catholic Church (RCC) in Ukraine, has most of its 772 communities in those areas, which belonged to Poland or Hungary. The most Catholics in Ukraine belong the Polish minority, therefore it is no wonder that more than the half of its priests are foreigners. The ethnic Pole Cardinal Jaworski is the Catholic Primate in Ukraine.¹⁵

Contemporary Church Conflicts in Ukraine

The relations between the church organisations in contemporary are very difficult and full of aggression and polemic, even reaching physical assaults. The conflicts have their roots on different levels, which I will analyse in this part. It is important to mention that the conflicts are not of religious or spiritual nature, as the four dominating religions have similar liturgy. Most of them are related with the problems of the historic conflicts, to troubles of the post-communist society and the creation of a new nation state. Additionally the geopolitical position and importance of Ukraine complicate the situation.

End of Totalitarism

With the fall of Communism in Ukraine the previously oppressed religious life re-emerged. Although officially the Soviet Union seemed to be an atheist state it experienced a religious revival, especially in Ukraine. As open religious practice was no reason to be persecuted and as membership in the Communist party did not require official atheism anymore, many people returned to the Church. Furthermore for many religion became a way to show their dissatisfaction with the Communist system and they expressed in this way their will to change the system. Also this phenomenon is often referred to as religious renaissance or even a “ second baptism “ , it was rather a return to a level that was much lower than in before 1921, res. 1940 and 1944. The religiosity in Ukraine just reached a level as in the quite secularised Central European countries like Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Rather striking for this revival was the low level of practised religiosity and even much more the little knowledge about their own religion and other. This is a result of the nearly non-existent religious education among the majority of the people.¹⁶

From this freedom firstly gained the ROC, which was able to show it self openly in the public again. The limitation of the Russian Church which could only express itself about religious life were removed and it became a social actor again. It used its position to criticise the demoralisation of society and demand religious as well as intellectual freedom. Following its tradition as a pillar of the Russian state the church hoped to become the official church again and a pillar the new state to emerge out of the Soviet Union. As the ROC arranged itself with the system and collaborated with state agencies it was in the eyes of many people discredited and by many Ukrainians also perceived as a tool of Russification of the country. Two churches emerging from their clandestine existence soon challenged it. In western Ukraine the Uniate Church re-emerged after 50 years of official non-existence. Many of communities, which were forced to join the ROC decided to reconvert to their old believe. The church received support from their Roman Catholic brethren, among many of them have hidden during the Communist time and from abroad, especially the Diaspora and the Vatican. Also the UAOC was refunded and grew very quickly in Western Ukraine with the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church abroad.¹⁷

This led to conflicts between the churches. Many of the previous church buildings were used for other purposes and the communities struggled about this property. In many cases communities split in two or even three different communities and demanded chapels and churches. This confrontation often led to violent clashes. Especially for the Orthodox Church under the Patriarch of Moscow that they lost many believers and communities. As it seems was the loss of property and regional influence especially in Western Ukraine even more difficult for them to accept. Although many of the conflicts are solved until today and many new churches are build, the confrontation is still going on.¹⁸

Church and the Ukrainian Nation

The two emerging churches supported the Ukrainian national movement and so supported the opposition to the regime in Kyiv and Moscow. They played an important role for mobilising the people and to mobilise a national movement. Especially the dissident national and democratic movement Ruch based on the support of these organisations and had its strongholds in Western Ukraine. Often the Church and their representatives acted openly anti-Russian, not only towards Moscow but also towards Russians or russified Ukrainians inside the country. As in 1991 the Soviet Union was disintegrating the national movement joined in their demands by Ukrainian communists and a part of the Nomenklatura, which both hoped by this move to stay in power. After the declaration of independence it was a in orthodox tradition a logical step to gain Autocephaly for the orthodox church. The Kyivan branch of the ROC declared itself autokephal, which was rejected by the Patriarchate of Moscow. This lead to a split of the church and the Metropolitan of Kyiv founded the UOCKP. This step was in the beginning supported by all groups in favour of independence and also the UAOC. Very soon it came to personal rivalries, especially about the Metropolitan Filaret. Filaret previously was the representative of the Moscovian Church in Ukraine and followed the official line by persecuting the Uniate Church and prohibiting the Ukranisation of church and services. Furthermore he was suspected collaborating with the KGB. This led very soon to a split and the re- establishment of the UAOC and fierce confrontation between the two churches. The UOCKP based its power mostly on the national communist leadership around President Kravtchuk and radical nationalist groups.¹⁹

Since the beginning of independence the nature of the state was a decisive question as there were a great number of minorities and severe differences between the regions. Whereas in Western Ukraine, except smaller areas like Bukovina and Transcarpathia, the majority of the population has no problem to identify it self with the Ukrainian nation and citizenship, the situation was different in the other regions. In central Ukraine and the capital the country is mostly bilingual and the identity is more based on the state than on the “cultural nation“. In the urbanised and russified southern and eastern region, the identity is stronger with the previous Soviet Union and Russia than with the new state. The same pattern follows the regional distribution of the Churches. Those areas with high level national identity show a high level of religious activity, mostly in the UAOC and the UC. The central region is divided between the two Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. In both areas conflicts occur regularly. The other areas show a low level of religious practice. In these areas also UOCMP and UOCKP are dominating, but due to the weak communities there, both do not show a strong profile and conflicts are rare. For the Roman Catholic Church the situation is very difficult. In the border areas it is always identified with the Polish or Hungarian minority and with their historic domination. In the central region it is more clear a Ukrainian Church, as many of the Catholics there are of mixed origin (Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Russian). This leads to an identity problem inside the church and the church is often confronted with xenophobic polemic by more distinctive Ukrainian Churches.²⁰

Church and State

The relations between the state and the church are very contradictions. From the legal point of view state and church are completely separated. The state and civil authorities are neither allowed to give financial support to churches nor to take influence on them. On the other side are the churches no allowed to support political parties neither they are allowed to take part in election campaigns. As often in former states of the Soviet Union the law and the constitution is not regarded very high. Several political parties enjoy the support open and official support of churches. On the one side there are several national and Christian parties on the political right, which are linked to with those Ukrainian churches with a national agenda. The fragmentation of Christian parties is often linked with the struggles between the churches. The UOCMP is allied with pro-Slavic union groups and the openly atheist Communist Party of Ukraine. Even monks and priests of this church are running for the national parliament. The UOCKP was after its funding put into the position of an official state church as it was supported from the beginning by civil authorities and the previous president Kravchuk. One of the promises of the new president Kuchma was to not involve him with any church. As Kuchma already subordinated his political convictions to populist policy he does the same with his relation towards the churches. He openly demanded in the last years from the Ukranian Autocephalous Church, when they had to elect a new patriarch to join the UOCKP. He also demanded from the UOCMP to change its name and status to an Autonomous Church and to accept that it is canonical territory of Constantinople and not Moscow. This shows also the invitation of the Pope from 1999 in different light, as the president tries to improve his image by this step.²¹

It seems that the Ukrainan Churches do not refrain from becoming the state church. So they are following those patterns of the ROC followed for centuries. All of them oppose the Roman and Greek Catholic “expansion“ on their canonical territory. The struggle between the Orthodox Churches is only about parishes and priests and not about their believers. It is very clear that the struggle between the churches is not about the spiritual needs of the people, rather a fight for worldly power. Those churches or religious organisations refraining from state power and try to use their missionary work or social work to enlarge their flocks. The missionary and caritatvie work of the Roman Catholic Church and of non-traditional religions is seen from the other side as aggressive prosylitism. To put it into the words of Bohdan Cywinski, it is that the two main Orthodox Churches follow still the concept of the Constantinian Church, were the ruler has a spiritual and temporal power. This is opposed to the Julianic concept in which the church is removed from power and gains with it an moral authority, like the underground churches in the Ukraine gained during Soviet times.²²

Ukraine as a bridge or an obstacle between East and West?

The Church conflicts in the Ukraine can not only be seen as a domestic problem. As three of the main Churches in the country have their spiritual centres outside the country, this is a problem of international importance. The Uniate Church is under the supremacy of the Holy See of Rome and gets direct support from the Vatican. The RCC had officially the same orientation, but due the ethnic composition and historical reason it is very close linked with the Catholic Church of Poland. This is visible in the high number of Polish priests and the cardinal Jaworski, who is of Polish origin. The UOCMP is under the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow and gets direct financial support from this there, but also from the Russian State. These facts raise xenophobic feelings against the historic dominators of Ukraine, the Russians and the Poles. Ukrainian nationalists as well as Church leaders use these trends for their interests.²³

The Church question is also linked with one of the main questions of Ukrainian political life. The future orientation of the country. Shall the country join the Western European countries and their organisations or return to the Russian sphere of influence? In case of the Roman Catholic and Uniate Church this in no major question as both support the Ukrainian independence and the western integration. For the two national Orthodox Churches this is a more difficult question. Both fear the Western influence and the decay of Orthodox culture of the country, which will come through this. Rather their decisively anti-Russian attitude makes them also supporter of the western orientation. This can be seen by the open support for the Pope visits by the leaders of UAOC and UOCKP, although both expressed previously their annoyance at Catholic expansion in their parishes. The UOCMP is openly a supporter of Ukraine joining the Slavic Union with Russia and Belarus, as well as if reading between the lines an opposed to Ukrainian independence.²⁴

The conflicts about the Churches in Ukraine have also a religious geo-political dimension. For the Vatican Ukraine is a traditional interest zone. Here the Church union policy had its major success and today it is crucial for the success of the ecumenical movement. For the success of the second issue good relations with the Patriarchate of Moscow are essential. The Holy See is aware of the difficulties of its activities in an area that is perceived a canonical territory by Moscow. The Vatican refrains form upvalueing the Uniate Church, by giving the Archbishop of Lviv the title of a Patriarch. This already led to some tensions between the Vatican and the UC, were the latter perceive itself as second class Catholics. The Vatican also did not yet establish official contacts with the UAOC and UOCKP, which are both seen as “shismatic“ by the Orthodox community. In case of the Russian Church it is very visible that it supports openly the power politics of the Kremlin. The Patriarch Aleksis II blessed the Union between Belarus and Russia, and the organisations of the Russian Orthodox Diaspora work together with the Russian Foreign Service. As the question of Ukraine is essential for Russia being still an empire and a global power it is the same for the ROC. With loosing Ukraine, the title of the Patriarchte of Moscow and the Rus becomes ridiculous. Under these conditions the official protests and the mobilising of Orthodox demonstrators in Kyiv and Moscow the against the coming visit of the Pope can be understood.²⁵

Conclusion

With the visit of the Pope from 24th to 27th of June the conflicts between the churches in Ukraine seem to reach a new climax. Weather the visit can calm down the situation and show into a new brighter future or the divisions are deepened is still very vague. With this paper I historic origins of the very complex present situation. Several characteristics are visible. Due to its history which made the Ukraine the bridge and the battleground between East and West religious divisions appeared quite early and continued until today. Also the division among the Orthodox is a historic phenomenon. Ukraine already developed quite early a Ukrainian orthodoxy, which differed from the Russian one. This is continued until today. Another characteristic is to see that the problems of Ukraine being an independent state undergoing a painful economic, political and cultural transformation are reflected in the conflicts among the religious organisations. It is not clear if there will be a winner in the struggle between the different churches, but it is obvious that the believers and the re-emerged relgiouisity and spirituality are the losers of these struggles.

Over Papa Visit, in: Itar-Tass ( http:www.ewtn.com/vnews/getstory.asp?number=12758 , 08/03/2001, Moscow and Smirnow, pp. 99 - 107

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Streit um einen Papstbesuch in der Ukraine, in: Neue Züricher Zeitung (http://nzz.com/2001/03/27al/page-article7A1IE.html), 16/06/2001, Zürich

Theologische Realenzyklopedie, 1975-2000, Berlin

Ukraine seen as bridge between East and West, in: Religious Information Service of Ukraine (http://www.papalvisit.org.ua/eng/news.php?ac=a&id=81&print), 25/05/2001, Kyiv

Ukraine vor den Wahlen, in: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Politikinformation Osteuropa, No. 74, 1998, Bonn

What people think about religion, in: East-West Church & Ministery Report (http://www.samford.edu/groups/global/ewcmreport/articles/ew020304.htm), Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1994, Swindon/ UK

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¹ for the issue of formation of national identity see: Irena Borowik (1999), Religion and Religious Conflicts in Contemporary Eastern Europe, in: Irena Borowik, Przemislaw Jablonski (eds.): The Future of Religion. East and West, Kraków, pp. 9-10 and also Irena Borowik (1999), Religion and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Paradoxes of Transformation, in: Irena Borowik (ed.): State Church Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, Kraków, pp. 9-16. For the role of religion in Ukraine’s civil society Henrik Bischof (1994), Die Ukraine - Zeit der Unabhängigkeit, in: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Studie zur Außenpoliti (k, No. 64, 1994, Bonn, pg. 15

² The religious terminology used in this paper follows the in Western literature usual used expressions: Uniate Church, for the Churches in Ukraine of Greek res. Byzantine Rite, which have a Union with the Roman Catholic Church and accept the supremacy of the Holy See. In literature also referred to as Greek Catholic or Ukranian Catholic. (from: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 1950-1968, Freiburg, Vol X, pg. 502. To Ukranian Orthodox Churches are here those organisations referred which developed out of the Russian Orthodox Church since 1918 and developed a Ukranian identity. (Presently there is no organisation named Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine anymore). (from: Victor Yelenski (1999), The Ukraine Church and State in the Post-Communist Era, in: Irena Borowik (ed.): State Church Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, Kraków, pp. 221-225)

³ Beside the Uniate Ukrainian Catholic Church there also exists a Uniate Ruthenian Catholic Church in Trans-Carpathia, the Ruthenians see themselves as an ethnic minority, from: Ruthenian Catholic Church, CNE WA (http://www.cnewa.org/Roberson%20(Print%20Pages)/ruthenian_catholic_church.htm), printed: 09/05/2001)

⁴ Anatoly Kolodny, Ludmilla Philipovitch (1994), The Non-Traditional religiosity in Central Eastern Europe in the context of the context of the spiritual revival of Ukraine, in: Irena Borowik, Grzegorz Babinski (eds.): New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, Kraków, pp. 302-304

⁵ Autokephaly: A Church gains its self-governance, but stays part of the whole Orthodoxy. For the recognition by Constantinople the territorial unity of the Church is necessary (defined political broder of the Church) from: Theologische Realenzyklopedie, 1975-2000, Berlin, Vol. V, pp. 1-4

⁶ Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, Vol. X, pg. 449 and Henry Huttenbach (2000), The Ukraine and Moscovite Expansion, in: Taras Hunczak: Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution, Lanham/Maryland, pg. 170

⁷ In the area belonging to the Kingdom of Hungary the Uniate Church was established by the Union of Uzhorod in 1646.

⁸ Walter Leitsch (2000), Russo-Polish Confrontation, in: Taras Hunczak: Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution, Lanham/Maryland, pp. 139-141 and Oleh Turiy, Greek Catholics, Latin Catholics and Orthodox in Ukraine: Who’s who?, from: RISU (http://www.risu.org.ua/content.php?menu=140101&page_id=38), 15/09/2000, Kyiv, pp. 3-4

⁹ Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, 1969-19783, Freiburg, pp. 210-212, and Bohdan Cywinski (1996), A gdyby tak pójsc na calósc? Narysuj mi Kosciól (4), in: Plus Minus, supplement of Rzeczpospolita, 16/11/1996, Warszawa. F or events in Russian part see: Huttenbach (2000), pp. 190-192

¹⁰ Taras Hunczak (2000), Pan-Slavism or Pan-Russianism, in: Taras Hunczak: Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution, Lanham/Maryland, pp. 94-95 and Norman Davies (1982), God’s Playground, A History of Poland, New York, Vol. II, pp. 84-85

¹¹ Bohdan Bociurkiw (1992), The Issues of Ukranisation and Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukrainian-Russian Relations 1917-1921, in: Peter Potichnyi, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, ... (eds.): Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter , Edmonton/ Alberta, pp. 246- 256

¹² Davies, Vol. II, pg. 73 and 448 and Andrzej Chojnowski (1997), Ukraina, Warszawa, pp. 80-81 and pp. 108-112

¹³ Turiy, pg. 7 and Mark Smirnow (1998), Die Rolle der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche in der gegewärtigen politischen Entwicklungsphase Rußlands (1993-1997), in: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Aktuelle Informationen, No. 01/1998, Köln, pp. 95- 98

¹⁴ Number of believers from: Chrystyna Lapychak (1996), Rifts among Ukraine’s Orthodox Churches Inflame Public Passions, in: Transition, Vol. 7, , April 1996, Praha, pp. 6-10

¹⁵ Henrik Bischof (1994), Die Ukraine - Zeit der Unabhängigkeit, in: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Studie zur Außenpoliti (k, No. 64, 1994, Bonn, pg. 20, Benedikt Salmon (1997), Die ukrainischen orthodoxen Kirchen 1997, in: Aktuelle Analyse des Bundesinstitutes für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 41/1997, Köln, pp. 2-8 and Andrey Yurash (1999), Religion as a Non-Traditional Component of the National Security Problem. Ukranian Pattern, in: Irena Borowik (ed.): State Church Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, Kraków, pp. 223-224, 226-227

¹⁶ see: What people think about religion, in: East-West Church & Ministry Report (http://www.samford.edu/groups/global/ewcmreport/articles/ew020304.htm), Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1994, Swindon/ UK, Jan Strzalka (2001), Kto przechyli szale_ mysli?, in: Tygodnik Powszechny, No. 23, 10/06/2001, Kraków and Yourash, pg. 222

¹⁷ Yelenski, pp. 136-141 and Lapychak, pg. 7

¹⁸ 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ukraine, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 25/02/2000, Washington D.C. pg. 47, Janice Broun, Jurisdictional conflicts among Orthodox and Eastern Catholics in Russia and Ukraine, in: East-West Church & Ministery Report (http://www.samford.edu/groups/global/ewcmreport/articles/ew05306.htm), Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 1997, Swindon/UK, pp. 1-5, Jan de Weydenthal (1996), Religiuos Disputes Still Affect Ukraine’s Politics, RFE/RL (http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1996/05/f.ru96051002634.asp), 21/05/1996, Praha and Streit um einen Papstbesuch in der Ukraine, in: Neue Züricher Zeitung (http://nzz.com/2001/03/27al/page-article7A1IE.html), 16/06/2001, Zürich

¹⁹ Irena Borowik (1994), Introduction. Religion in Post-Communist Societies- Confronting the Frozen Past and the Peculiaries of the Transformation, in: Irena Borowik, Grzegorz Babinski (eds.): New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, Kraków, pp. 9-10, Andreas Wittkowsky (1999), Determinanten der ukrainischen Politik, in: FES-Analyse, 1999, Bonn, pp. 3-5, Patrick Cockburn (2001), Russian Orthodox Church vents its fury at John Pauls visit to western Ukraine, in: Independent ( http://news.independent.co.uk/world/russia/story.jsp?story=76814 , 08/06/2001, London and Yelensky, pp. 145- 146,

²⁰ Paul Pirie (1996), National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, in: Europe-Asia Studies,, Vol. 48, No. 7, 1996 November , Glasgow, pp. 180-187, Grzegorz Babinski (1994), Religious and National Identification in the Polish- Ukrainian borderland, in: Irena Borowik, Grzegorz Babinski (eds.): New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, Kraków , pp. 99 - 102, also Cywnski, Strzalka and Yourash, pp. 222-223, 230 -231

²¹ For legal regulations see: Yelensky, pg. 148-149 and Yurash, pg. 224-225, for alignment of church towards parties:, Ott, Alexander Ott (1999), Die Ukraine vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen in Herbst 1999, in: Berichte des Bundesinstitutes für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 27/1999, Köln, pp. 18-19, Ukraine vor den Wahlen, in: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Politikinformation Osteuropa, No. 74, 1998, Bonn, pp. 7-9 and Taras Kuzio, The Struggle to Establish the World’s Largest Orthodox Church, in: RSU (http://www.risu.org.ua/content.php?menu=1402&page_id=35), 05/09/2000, Kyiv. For state interventions into Church affairs see: Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: Ukraine, U.S. Department of State, released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_ukraine99.html), 09/09/1999, Washington, D.C., pg. 25 2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine, U.S. Department of State, released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (http://www.brama.com/news/press/000915irf_ukraine.html), 05/09/2000, Washington, D.C., pg. 22 and Kuchma sees need for single Orthodox Church, RFE/RL (http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/05/6-cee/cee- 090501.html), 09/05/2000, Praha

²² About prosylism and missionary work: Cywinski, Cindy Wooden (2001), In Ukraine, pope hopes gestrues succeed where dialogue has not, from: Catholic News Service (http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/20010608.htm), 08/06/2001, Vatican, pg. 2 and Klara Gudzyk (1998), Proselytism the Ukrainian Way, from: The Day (http://www.day.kiev.ua/DIGEST/1998/04/culture/cul-1.htm), No. 04/1998, Kyiv. For concept of Constantinism and Juliansim see: Adam Michnik, Religious liberty for all?, in: East-West Church & Ministery Report (http://www.samford.edu/groups/global/ewcmreport/articles/ew03306.htm), Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer 1995, Swindon/UK

²³ see Yelensky, pg. 150, Jan de Weydenthal (1998), Ukraine: Papal Visit Remains without Prospect, RFE/RL (http://www.rferl/org/nca/features/1999/03/f.ru980604132301.html), 04/06/1998, Praha and Autocephalous Orthodox Bishops fully support papal visit, in: Religious Information Service of Ukraine (http://www.papalvisit.org.ua/eng/news.php?ac=a&id=116&print), 11/06/2001, Kyiv

²⁴ For pro-Western view: Ukraine seen as bridge between East and West, in: Religious Information Service of Ukraine (http://www.papalvisit.org.ua/eng/news.php?ac=a&id=81&print), 25/05/2001, Kyiv and Filaret thinks Pope will bring Ukraine closer to the West, in: Religious Information Service of Ukraine (http:www.risu.org.ua/article.php?sid=14&mode=threaded&order=0, 22/05/2001, Kyiv For Pro-Eastern: Religious destabilisation has a negative effect on society as a whole. Interview with Aleksiy II, from: The Day (http://www.day.kiev.ua/DIGEST/1998/02/culture/cul-3.htm), No. 02/1998, Kyiv and Mocow Patriarachte Orthodox Protest Papal Visit, in: Religious Information Service of Ukraine (http://www.risu.org.ua/article.php?sid=19&mode=threaded&order=0), 05/06/2001, Kyiv

²⁵ For ecumenical movement and Uniate Church: Alexander Roman, Ukrainian Catholics Lose Leader: What lies ahead?, in: Ukrainian Orthodoxy (http://www.ukranian-orthodoxy.org/index.asp) , printed: 28/05/2001and Strzalka. For protests and ROC foreign policy: Askold Krushelnycky (2001), Ukraine: Protests over papal visit highlight religious divide, in: RFE/RL ( http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/0613062001115639.asp ), 13/06/2001, Praha, Olga Kostromina, Alexis II feels Pressue