Resumen o Introducción
A central element of African thought is the conception of communal personhood. In this essay, we will examine three such communal conceptions of personhood in light of their interrelation with individual responsibility.
First, we will have a closer look on Menkiti’s communal conception of personhood and will argue that his account alone is not able to justify individual moral responsibility, but that it is compatible with Gyekye’s communal conception of personhood that underlines certain mental features that hold communal agents individually responsible for their actions. After having discussed and responded to the problem regarding the extent to which a person’s reasoning and her moral sense is shaped by the communal culture she was socialized in, we will have a look on the third communal conception of personhood that arises in a Yoruba allegory and will discuss its implications for individual responsibility. At first, we extract the preferred Yoruba communal conception of personhood out of the allegory. Then, we apply our finding of ‘self-determined but communal’ action on three possible options of receiving one’s destiny in heaven and clarify for each the realm of individual responsibility.
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- David Schneider (Autor), 2017, Conceptions of personhood. Can the idea of individual responsibility remain morally relevant?, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/385488
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